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Beyond Admissibility:
Real Confrontation, Virtual
Cross-Examination, and the
Right to Confront Hearsay
John G. Douglass*

"If the only tool you have is a hammer,
every problem will look like a nail. "1

Introduction
It is hard to imagine the following scene in an American courtroom:

[Witness is sworn.]
Prosecutor: Please state your name.
Defense Counsel: Objection, your honor. The testimony we
expect from this witness is unreliable. She has a motive to lie and
previously gave two different versions of the events surrounding this
case.
The Court;. Objection sustained. I find there are insufficient
indicia to establish the reliability of this testimony and therefore will
excuse the witness. She will not be permitted to testify.
This scene smacks of fiction because American courts do not screen witnesses based on reliability before they testify. Subject to the rules of competency ,2 courts do not bar witnesses from testifying on the grounds that they
are likely to be mistaken or even deceitful.3 Instead, the adversarial process

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1977;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1980. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the law firm of Hunton
& Williams, which provided research grants to make this project possible. For their patience in
reading an earlier draft, and for their helpful comments, I thank Ron Bacigal, Paul Marcus,
Graham Strong, and Bill Stuntz. Last but not least, I am indebted to Russell Nance, Tracy
Thome, and John Guarino for excellent research assistance.
1 The quotation, though widely attributed to Mark '!\vain, does not appear in any of his
prominent published works. In more recent times, sinillar maxims have been attributed to
American psychologist, Abraham Maslow, author of MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954).
2 See FED. R. Evm. 601. The Due Process Clause also imposes restraints on the admission of wholly unreliable prosecution evidence. See Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567, 598
(1978) ("[D]irect testimony is admissible as long as it possesses 'sufficient aspects of reliability'
to be intelligently evaluated by the jury for its proper weight.") (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977)).
3 See Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the trial
court did not err in allowing the trial testimony of a four-year-old child who gave inconsistent
answers at a competency hearing regarding her ability to tell the truth); United States v. Zizzo,
120 F.3d 1338, 1347-48 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a court is not required to strike the testimony
January 1999 Vol. 0/ No. 2

191

192

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 67:191

of direct and cross-examination equips the jury with the tools to make its own
assessment of the credibility and accuracy of in-court testimony.
Equally implausible would be a similar scene, with the opposite
outcome:

Defense Counsel: Objection, the testimony we are about to
hear is unreliable.
Prosecutor: Your honor, this witness has no motive to lie. Further, she has given consistent and detailed statements about this
crime in the past.
The Court: I agree. Objection overruled. I find sufficient indicia that the witness is reliable. Based on that finding, I will permit
the testimony. Further, because the testimony is reliable, we will
dispense with cross-examination.
The second scene is as implausible as the first, because the court does
not allow the defendant to challenge the testimony, whether reliable or not,
through cross-examination, "one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial" in
an adversarial system. 4 Indeed, the flat prohibition of cross-examination of a
prosecution witness is a classic violation of the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.5
As peculiar as these fictional scenes appear in their treatment of a courtroom witness, they mirror the approach dictated by the Supreme Court when
the "witness" is a hearsay declarant. The Confrontation Clause provides a
right to confront witnesses, not to silence them. 6 Nevertheless, when the
of a government witness, a lifelong criminal and a convicted perjurer, who conceded during
cross-examination that the oath meant nothing to him); see generally Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 21-22 (1985) (per curiam) ("The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every
witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion.").
Courts were not always so generous:
At common law, interested parties such as defendants, their spouses, and their
coconspirators were not competent witnesses. "Nor were those named the only
grounds of exclusion from the witness stand; conviction of crime, want of religious
belief, and other matters were held sufficient. Indeed, the theory of the common
law was to admit to the witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating
the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free from any of the
temptations of interest. The courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors."
United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1273-74 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892)).
4 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687, 692 (1931)).
s See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18
(1974).
6 The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
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prosecution offers a hearsay7 statement in evidence, Supreme Court precedent leads trial courts to apply the Confrontation Clause as a rule of evidence, either admitting or excluding hearsay.8 The out-of-court statement
must pass the constitutional test of "reliability" or the court will exclude it
altogether. If the court admits the statement, the case typically proceeds
without exploring means of testing the credibility or accuracy of the declarant's statement.9 The court's finding of "reliability" simply replaces any
7 For purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis, the Court has defined "hearsay" as "testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being
offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value
upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 n.4 (1986)
(quoting EDWARD CLEARY, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON TiiE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 246 (2d ed.
1972)). The Court has held that an out-of-court statement, not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, "raises no Confrontation Clause concerns." Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,
414 (1985).
Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[h]earsay is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Rule 80l(d) excludes from the definition of hearsay
several types of statements that otherwise literally would fall within the definition. The Rule
provides that certain prior statements of a witness (Rule 801(d)(l)), and admissions by a partyopponent (Rule 80l(d)(2)), including coconspirator statements (Rule 80l(d)(2)(E)), are "not
hearsay." FED. R. Evm. 80l(d). The Court has treated coconspirator statements, when offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted, as hearsay statements for the purpose of Confrontation
Clause analysis. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399 n.12 (1986) ("Federal Rule of
Evidence 801 characterizes out-of-court statements by coconspirators as exemptions from, rather
than exceptions to, the hearsay rule. Whether such statements are termed exemptions or exceptions, the same Confrontation Clause principles apply."). Consistent with the Court's approach,
this Article considers the term "hearsay" to include those statements "exempted" from the definition by Rule 801(d).
s See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815-18 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407-08. See generally Randolph N. Jonakait, Re.storing the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,.35 UCLA L. REv. 557 (1988). Professor Jonakait argues
that the Court's treatment of the Clause as a constitutional test for reliable evidence has rendered the Clause largely meaningless, a "minor adjunct of evidence law." Id. at 622. Properly
interpreted, Professor Jonakait argues, the Clause instead "assures the right to the adversarial
testing of the prosecution's evidence." Id. The analysis in Part II of this Article accords in large
measure \vith Professor Jonakait's views, and further demonstrates how the Court has continued,
in the decade since Professor Jonakait's article, to allow the law of evidence to absorb the Confrontation Clause even more completely. Professor Jonakait's conclusion, however, like that of
virtually every other co=entator on the Clause, ultimately looks to exclusion of evidence as
the proper constitutional remedy. He writes:
The confrontation clause gives the accused the right to exclude all out-of-court
statements when the declarant is not produced except when the prosecutor establishes the lack of a reasonable probability that the accused's cross-examination of
the declarant would have led the jury to weigh the evidence more favorably to the
accused.
Id. This Article contends that the exclusionary approach itself is the heart of the problem.
9 For reasons described in Part III-B of this Article, defense counsel seldom pursue available opportunities to impeach hearsay declarants, despite evidentiary rules such as Rule 806 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which facilitate such impeachment. See Hon. Anthony M. Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The Art of Impeaching Hearsay Der;larants, 13 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 157, 158 (1991) (noting trial lawyers' "virtual total neglect" of opportunities to impeach
hearsay declarants); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of Impeaching the Nonte.stifying Dec/arant, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 495, 495 (1995) (noting that Rule 806 is
"overlooked by lawyers"); cf. Fred Warren Bennett, How to Administer the "Big Hurt" in a
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"confrontation." In effect, the Court gives us two very different Confrontation Clauses: one for live witnesses and another for hearsay.
Modem confrontation-hearsay law is about everything but confrontation. It is about admissibility, reliability, and the historical roots of hearsay
exceptions. It is seldom about taking an available declarant and putting her
on the witness stand to confront the defendant. It is almost never about alternative means by which a defendant might impeach an unavailable declarant. As a result, most confrontation-hearsay opinions end just when the
process of confrontation ought to begin: when the evidence is put before the
jury.
Once the hearsay is in evidence, modem confrontation-hearsay law suggests that the Confrontation Clause serves no further purpose. "[W]here
proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability," the Supreme Court
tells us, "the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." 10 Taken literally, that is an
astonishing statement in an adversarial system of justice. Once "reliable"
prosecution hearsay is in evidence, how can the right of confrontation be
satisfied any more than it is satisfied when the prosecution completes its direct examination of a "reliable" witness in the courtroom? Whatever role the
Confrontation Clause might play in regulating the admission of hearsay,
there is no sound basis for concluding that the Clause has no further role
once hearsay is admitted. In an adversarial system, the confrontation battle
merely begins when a prosecution witness testifies. Because of the Court's
long history of "exclusionary thinking," however, we have no experience with
a Confrontation Clause that looks beyond the issue of admissibility and provides for the adversarial testing of the hearsay declarant.
A new approach to this old confrontation-hearsay dilemma, an approach
that looks beyond admissibility, is more critical today than ever before, for
two reasons. First, as an exclusionary rule,11 the Confrontation Clause might
Criminal Case: The Life and Times of Federal Rule of Evidence 806, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1135,
1141-64 (1995) (describing "nine methods to impeach a witness' credibility").
Basic summaries of the confrontation-hearsay dilemma typically begin with the statement
that "confrontation" of the hearsay declarant is impossible. See, e.g., Christopher K. DeScherer
& David L. Fogel, Project, Sixth Amendment at Tria~ Twenty-fifth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure, 84 GEo. L.J. 713, 1237 (1996) ("The admission of hearsay evidence against a defendant implicates the Sixth Amendment because the defendant cannot confront the out-of-court
declarant.") (footnote omitted).
10 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) (emphasis added).
11 This Article uses the term "exclusionary rule" in its most basic sense: to describe a rule
that excludes evidence. Of course, one typically uses the term to describe the remedy of suppression of evidence that courts impose for some violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (excluding evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution).
Courts and commentators generally do not refer to the Confrontation Clause as an exclusionary rule, presumably because the Clause differs in a major respect from other exclusionary
rules. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules exclude evidence for reasons that
are generally unrelated to the accuracy or truthfulness of the evidence itself; in part, at least, the
rules exclude evidence to deter the police from future violations of constitutional rights. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). But see id. at 929-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(questioning the validity of the deterrence rationale). The Confrontation Clause, on the other
hand, excludes "unreliable" evidence for the purpose of protecting the rights of the defendant
who is on trial when the evidence is offered. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). For
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have reached the end of its useful life. The Supreme Court insists that the
Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of some evidence that otherwise is
admissible under the hearsay rules. 12 But while the Court has struggled for
decades to carve out an exclusionary niche for the Confrontation Clause that
somehow differs from the law of evidence,13 that effort has produced a constitutional rule that excludes a slice of hearsay so thin that the application of
the rule now seems little more than a theoretical possibility.14 Many have
debated that the Court has cut too thin or too thick a slice, but the problem is
deeper than that. By treating the Confrontation Clause as a rule that excludes unreliable hearsay, the Court has doomed the rule to redundancy with
the law of evidence in the great majority of cases. After thirty years, it is
worth asking at least whether the Clause should deal with hearsay in a fundamentally different way.15
that reason, the Clause largely has escaped the principal criticism aimed at other exclusionary
rules: exclusion lets the guilty go free. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. As an exclusionary rule based
on reliability, the Confrontation Clause at least aims to protect the accuracy of the guilt-determining process, albeit in a manner that largely is controlled by the hearsay rules in any event.
12 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990).
13 Those efforts have given rise to such widespread and diverse criticism that the Court has
justified its own path by "the mutually critical character of the commentary." Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 66-68 n.9 {1980). The problem of identifying hearsay that properly may be excluded
under the Confrontation Clause has been regarded as one of the more perplexing dilemmas of
constitutional criminal law. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles, 86 GEo. LJ. 1011, 1012 (1998) (calling the issue one of "pervasive perplexity"); Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 207,
207 {1984) (referring to the question as an "intractable problem").
14 The Court insists that the Confrontation Clause retains vitality as something more than
the mirror image of the hearsay rules. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 814 {"The Confrontation Clause
... bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception
to the hearsay rule."). Wright leaves a Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule, however, that forbids only hearsay that (1) falls outside of the vast area defined by traditional, "firmly rooted,"
hearsay exceptions; and (2) when viewed in context with other corroborating evidence, appears
reliable and therefore admissible under a residual exception; but (3) when viewed in isolation
from such corroborating evidence, does not inspire a court to identify any particular basis for
reliability. See infra text accompanying notes 138-143. That is a "thin slice" indeed.
15 Despite the variety of critical comments spawned by the Court's confrontation-hearsay
opinions, one common thread runs throughout the debate. Virtually all scholarly commentary
frames the question as a conflict over admission or exclusion of hearsay. The list is too long to
include here. In Roberts, the Court chronicled that "outpouring of scholarly commentary." 448
U.S. at 66 n.9. Since Roberts, a number of excellent works have continued the debate over the
limits of admissibility. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles,
84 GEo. L.J. 641, 693-97 {1996) (arguing that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testifying
witnesses and to declarants who testify through ex parte depositions or affidavits); Margaret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial
Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 561-62 {1992) (arguing for a higher standard of admissibility for statements elicited by prosecutors or other government agents); Friedman, supra note
13, at 1026 (arguing that the Confrontation Clause applies only to "testimonial statements,"
excluding such statements absent confrontation of the declarant, with no exception for "reliable"
hearsay); Jonakait, supra note 8; Lilly, supra note 13; Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REv. 149, 173 {1995) (rejecting the Court's reliance on "arcane rules of
evidence" to define the constitutional rule and arguing that hearsay is admissible under the
Clause only when {l) the trial court "has made an independent foundational finding that the
hearsay is competent and (2) the hearsay is independently corroborated").
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Second, a new approach offers a more flexible tool for dealing with the
changing world of hearsay than an all-or-nothing constitutional rule addressing only admissibility. Hearsay exceptions have expanded throughout history.16 More hearsay is coming to modem litigation, and generally for good
reasons.17 Modem courts find a wide range of hearsay to be closer in time to
actual events, more spontaneous, and at least as reliable as the carefully rehearsed in-court testimony of many modem trials. 18 The increasingly international nature of criminal prosecution puts new strains on traditional
hearsay exceptions. 19 The constitutional exclusionary rule for unreliable
hearsay has not served to stem the tide of new and expanded hearsay exceptions, and a rigid wall of exclusion is probably a bad idea in any event. Instead, defendants need a new tool for contending with the increasing variety
of admissible hearsay.
This article suggests that the new tool may come from an old source: the
Sixth Amendment itself. The Confrontation Clause gives a defendant the
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Despite serious arguments to the contrary, the Court has insisted that hearsay declarants ~re
"witnesses against" the defendant.20 This Article contends that if declarants
are "witnesses," then the Sixth Amendment should treat them like witnesses.
The defendant's confrontation right, then, is not to exclude the declarant's
unreliable testimony. The law of evidence and the Due Process Clause21 can
handle that task. The defendant's right is to "confront" the witnesses, to subject their hearsay "testimony" to adversarial challenge, and to impeach the
declarant just as fully as he might seek to impeach a testifying witness. If the
hearsay declarant is available to testify, the Confrontation Clause should provide for real confrontation if the defendant really wants it. Rather than
screening for "reliability," the confrontation inquiry should focus on when,
how, and by whom the declarant will be put on the witness stand. If the
hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify, the inquiry should focus on available means to subject that hearsay to adversarial testing. Both the common
16 See JoHN W. STRONG ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 542-46 (4th ed.1992) [hereinafter McCORMICK].
17 The Federal Rules of Evidence provided the impetus for much of the modem liberalization of rules of admissibility in general, and hearsay exceptions in particular. See Faust F. Rossi,
The Silent Revolution, in THE LmGATION MANuAL 640, 641 (John G. Koeltl ed., 1989). In
anticipation of additional hearsay exceptions, the drafters renumbered the Federal Rules, effective December 1, 1997, to move the "residual exception" from Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) to
the new Rule 807. The change was made "to facilitate additions to Rules 803 and 804." FED. R.
Evm. 807 advisory committee's note.
18 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (finding that in-court testimony by a
coconspirator "seldom will reproduce . . . the evidentiary value of his statements during the
course of the conspiracy").
19 See United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 686-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding a deposition by written interrogatories taken pursuant to French law to be admissible under both the
"former testimony" exception and the residual exception).
20 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992). See generally infra text accompanying
notes 179-181.
21 The Due Process Clause prohibits the use of hearsay evidence that is too unreliable for
a jury to evaluate rationally. See Westen, supra note 2, at 598 & n.89. See generally infra text
accompanying notes 210-213.
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law and the modem rules of evidence recognize a process for impeaching
absent hearsay declarants.22 That process-which this Article calls "virtual
cross-examination"-offers effective opportunities for challenging hearsay
testimony, sometimes more effective because of-not in spite of-the absence of the declarant. Despite this potential, defendants largely have ignored that process in the past, in part because it has been preempted by
exclusionary thinking.
Part I of this Article describes how the Court turned the Confrontation
Clause into a rule excluding unreliable hearsay, culminating in the 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts, in which the Court set out the "general approach"
that dominates confrontation-hearsay analysis today.23 Part II assesses the
application of the Court's exclusionary rule in the two decades since Roberts,
a period during which the Confrontation Clause largely has merged with, and
disappeared into, the law of evidence, in the process losing its significance as
an independent protection for the accused in an adversarial system. Part III
argues that the Court's choice of an exclusionary rule as the tool for protecting the confrontation right has the practical effect of limiting the scope of
that right, while preempting the use of any alternative means of protecting it.
Part IV argues that both the text and the history of the Sixth Amendment
support a different approach: not a rule excluding unreliable hearsay, but an
affirmative right to "confront" hearsay, to impeach the hearsay declarant,
and to challenge hearsay testimony through any reasonably available means.
Fmally, Part V explores the scope and the practical application of that right
to confront hearsay. That Part discusses a defendant's burdens and opportunities in creating a real, face-to-face confrontation when the declarant is
available. It assesses the practical advantages and disadvantages of "virtual
cross-examination," the process of impeaching an absent declarant.
As a rule of admissibility, the Confrontation Clause today has little impact on criminal trials, despite the increasing use of hearsay. If the Clause is
to retain a life independent of the law of evidence, then the Clause must
reach beyond the question of admissibility. Instead of asking when the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, perhaps the better question is the one most often overlooked: "How can the
defendant challenge hearsay?" By exploring creative answers to that question, courts may find in many cases that the old exclusionary rule simply becomes unnecessary. Exclusion of evidence might become the remedy of last
resort, not the premise from which the entire debate begins.

I.

How the Confrontation Clause Became a Rule of Evidence,
Excluding "Unreliable" Hearsay

The Sixth Amendment tells us that a defendant has a right to "be confronted with the witnesses against him." 24 When a prosecution \vitness appears at trial, the basic meaning of that right seems clear enough. First, it
22 See FED. R. Evm. 806; McCoRMicK, supra note 16, at 541; Bennett, supra note 9, at

1136.
23
24

448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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means that the defendant should be present in the courtroom when the witness testifies.25 It also means that the jury should see and hear the witness so
that the jurors can assess the credibility of the witness for themselves based
on her demeanor while testifying.26 Most important, the Court has said, it
means that the defendant should have an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. 27 In essence, the Confrontation Clause creates a right to an adversarial process: a right to see, hear, and test prosecution witnesses through
cross-examination and live scrutiny by a jury.
Hearsay, however, throws a wrench into that process. If the "witness," a
hearsay declarant, never enters the courtroom, then testing seems impossible.
The defendant cannot cross-examine her. The jury cannot assess her demeanor. If the process of confrontation is unattainable, what do we do about
hearsay?
The law of evidence answers that question with a pragmatic compromise. The basic hearsay rule provides that out-of-court statements, the truth
of which cannot be tested, should not come before the jury to prove that
truth.28 But then the basic rule gives way to practicality. Some hearsay is
necessary, or at least very convenient, at trial. Moreover, much hearsay
seems likely to be just as reliable as live testimony.29 So necessity (or convenience) gives rise to exceptions to the basic rule. And for the most part,
judgments about reliability define those exceptions under the law of
evidence.30
25 See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 740 (1987) (holding that a defendant must be
present at any stage of a trial where his presence would enhance his opportunity for cross-examination); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 454-55 (1912) (holding that a defendant has the
right to be present at all stages of his trial, from impaneling the jury to the verdict).
26 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990). In Craig, the Court held that a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation sometimes must give way to an "important public policy" as long as the "reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Id. at 850. The Court
allowed the victim in a child abuse prosecution to testify by way of closed circuit television-the
witness's televised image was visible to both the defendant and the jury.
21 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404
(1965) ("It cannot seriously be doubted ... that the right of cross-examination is included in the
right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him."); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the clause hold that a primary interest
secured by it is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination
may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical confrontation."); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
28 See FED. R. Evm. 801(c).
29 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992) (asserting that the factors contributing
to the reliability of spontaneous declarations and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis
"cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony"); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
395 (1985) (arguing that the in-court testimony of a coconspirator may be less reliable than
hearsay). See generally Nesson & Benkler, supra note 15, at 152 ("We bring witnesses to testify
at trial from memory of events that may have taken place two or three years before, even though
we have depositions or statements taken mere hours or days after the event. We bring expert
witnesses to testify at trial when there is no reason to believe that the information they convey
orally will be any more accurate or comprehensive than what they would convey in a written
report. Indeed, the very opposite is likely.").
30 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). But cf. Nesson & Benkler, supra note 15, at
157 (arguing that the true basis for some hearsay exceptions is their "rhetorical force" as narratives more than their inherent trustworthiness).
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There are good reasons, however, why the Confrontation Clause need
not respond to the hearsay dilemma with the same compromise forged by the
law of evidence. For one thing, the law of evidence is all about admissibility.
The Confrontation Clause, at least on its face, is not. It is about process. For
another, the hearsay rule has exceptions. The Confrontation Clause does
not.
Nevertheless, the temptation to merge the two has always been great.
After all, they both address the same evil: trial by absent, untested witnesses.
As Justice Harlan once commented, it is "not unnatural" to assume that they
both should employ the same method-exclusion of unreliable hearsay-to
combat a common enemy.31 The Court has not been able to avoid that temptation. This "exclusionary thinking" under the Confrontation Clause began
in the Court's first hearsay/confrontation case.
A.

Mattox v. United States: "Necessity" Transforms a Rule of Procedure
into a Rule Admitting "Reliable" Hearsay

In 1895, Mattox v. United States32 presented the Court with its first Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of hearsay against a criminal
defendant. Mattox had been tried and convicted of murder.33 His conviction
was reversed on appeal.34 After a second trial resulted in a hung jury, Mattox
was tried a third time.35 Two key government witnesses had died in the two
years since the first trial.36 At the third trial the court admitted into evidence
the court reporter's transcript of the deceased witnesses' testimony-complete with cross-examination-from the first trial. 37
The Mattox opinion is remarkable because of what it does not do. Mattox assigned as error in the court below the "admitting to the jury the reporter's notes of the testimony of two witnesses at the former trial." 38 The
Supreme Court never seriously questioned the notion that it should apply the
Confrontation Clause as a rule governing admissibility or exclusion of hearDutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The conversion of a clause intended to regulate trial procedure into a threat to
much of the existing law of evidence and to future developments in that field is not
an unnatural shift, for the paradigmatic evil the Confrontation Clause was aimed
at-trial by affidavit-can be viewed almost equally well as a gross violation of the
rule against hearsay . . . . But however natural the shift m11y be, once made it
carries the seeds of great mischief for enlightened development in the law of
evidence.
Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Evans is the only occasion where
a member of the Court argued that courts should not apply the Confrontation Clause as a rule
excluding hearsay. The opinion represented a major change from his earlier view, announced
only six months before, that the Clause was a "preferential" rule that required the prosecution to
produce available declarants whose hearsay statements it wished to use at trial. See Green, 399
U.S. at 174-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
33 See id. at 237.
34 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
35 See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 251 (Shiras, J. dissenting).
36 See id. at 240.
37 See id.
38 Id. at 238.
31
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say. Instead, the Court implicitly accepted the defendant's framing of the
issue, allowing the confrontation question to become a battle over
admissibility.
But initially at least, the Court did not equate admissibility with the reliability of hearsay. Instead, it focused on the defendant's procedural rights.
The right of cross-examination is the heart of the opinion. "The primary object of the constitutional provision," the Court wrote, "was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness .... "39 In the
end, the Court's holding was relatively simple. The transcripts were admissible because the defendant had an adequate opportunity to test the prosecution's witnesses through cross-examination.40 Although the Court implicitly
treated the Confrontation Clause as a rule of admissibility, the standard for
admissibility rested upon satisfaction of the basic procedural right of crossexamination.
The Court might have stopped there, but the lure of the law of evidence
proved irresistible. The right of confrontation, like many other provisions in
the Bill of Rights, the Court observed, is "subject to exceptions, recognized
long before the adoption of the Constitution, and not interfering at all with
its spirit."41 In interpreting those provisions, the Court found that "[s]uch
exceptions were obviously intended to be respected."42 What were the "exceptions?" The court looked to the hearsay rules for its answer:
[T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the
[Confrontation Clause] than the admission of dying declarations.
They are rarely made in the presence of the accused; they are made
without any opportunity for examination or cross-examination; nor
is the witness brought face to face with the jury; yet from time immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony, and no
one would have the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility. They are admitted not in conformity with any general rule
regarding the admission of testimony, but as an exception to such
rules, simply from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a manifest failure of justice.43
39 Id. at 242. A handful of confrontation-hearsay cases in the decades that followed Mattox focus on cross-examination as the central guarantee of the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g.,
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (finding that the Confrontation Clause was
intended "particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness
in the exercise of the right of cross-examination"); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899)
("[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved against an
accused ... except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while
being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every
mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases.").
40 See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244 ("The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved
to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of
subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.")
41 Id. at 243.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 243-44.
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Mattox, of course, was neither a dying declaration case nor a case involving an out-of-court statement not subject to cross-examination. Nevertheless,
the Court's dictum signaled the basic shift that would dominate Confrontation Clause analysis a century later. It was one thing for the Court to hold
that prior cross-examination satisfied the procedural rights guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause. It was quite another for the Court to allow "exceptions" to the right of confrontation altogether and further to equate those
exceptions with the hearsay rules. In doing so, the Court fundamentally
changed its characterization of the Clause from an affirmative guarantee of
procedural rights to a substantive rule for admitting or excluding evidence. If
"exceptional" types of hearsay, like dying declarations, constituted "exceptions" to the right of confrontation, then there would be no need to assess the
adequacy of the procedures available to the defendant to challenge such evidence. The procedural rights protected by the Clause simply would not apply
to those exceptional cases. Admissibility of hearsay would become an all-ornothing issue.
The Court then took one more step for good measure. It argued by
analogy that prior testimony given under oath and subject to cross-examination was constitutionally admissible because it was just as reliable as a dying
declaration:
[T]he sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth
as would the obligation of an oath. If such declarations are admitted, because made by a person then dead, under circumstances
which give his statements the same weight as if made under oath,
there is equal if not greater reason for admitting testimony of his
statements which were made under oath.44
By answering questions that were not before it, the Mattox Court gave
birth to modem confrontation-hearsay analysis.45 The procedural right of
44
45

Id. at 244.

Ironically, the Court missed an opportunity to consider a Sixth Amendment right to
impeach a hearsay declarant in Mattox itself. In an effort to impeach the testimony of one of the
deceased declarants, Mattox sought to call two witnesses of his own to testify that, after the first
trial, the declarant had made statements admitting that his testimony at the earlier trial was false,
having been induced by "threats made to him in the corridors of the court-house." See id. at 245.
The trial court refused to permit the impeaching testimony of the two defense witnesses. See id.
at 238. The court convicted Mattox a second time. See id.
In the Supreme Court, Mattox argued that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the
testimony of the two defense witnesses. See id. at 244. The Court rejected the argument, reasoning that the law of evidence prohibited the use of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a
witness without laying a foundation by inquiring of the witness whether he in fact had made the
statement. See id. at 250. In disposing of the second issue purely as a matter of the law of
evidence, the majority opinion never mentioned the Confrontation Clause. Despite prodding
from three dissenters, see id. at 251-61 (Shiras, J., dissenting), the Court bypassed this early
opportunity to articulate an affirmative Sixth Amendment right to impeach a hearsay declarant.
Instead, the Court restricted its Confrontation Clause analysis to the admissibility of prosecution
evidence and never sought to link that issue with the question posed by the defendant's proffered impeachment testimony. In so doing, the Court established a pattern that it never has
broken. In the one hundred years since Mattox, the Court's opinions in confrontation-hearsay
cases uniformly define the question before the Court as one of the admissibility of hearsay state-
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confrontation would give way to "exceptions." Long-recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule would qualify as exceptions to the right of confrontation.
In the same manner, courts would admit out-of-court statements that were
just as reliable as those covered by the traditional exceptions without finding
a constitutional violation.
It would take most of a century, however, before a majority of the Court
would embrace the "reliability" theme of Mattox. For the next seventy years,
the Court had relatively few opportunities to consider hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause.46 The pace quickened after Pointer v. Texas, 47 where
the Court held that the confrontation right applied in state prosecutions. 48
Through the 1960s and the 1970s, with one notable exception,49 the Court's
confrontation-hearsay opinions dealt primarily with hearsay in the form of
testimony from prior judicial proceedings.50 Because the defendant in each
of those cases had some opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in an
ments. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 {1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990);
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 {1980); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
46 See Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 547-48 {1926) {finding no confrontation
violation where letters were not received in evidence for the truth of matters asserted); Dowdell
v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) {holding that the court and the clerk certifying the
record of trial proceedings for appeal are not "witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause);
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 {1900) {holding that the adnussion of the prior testimony of witness whose absence from the trial is brought about by negligence of prosecution
violates the Confrontation Clause); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 60 (1899) {finding that in
a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, the Clause prohibits the government from proving the
stolen character of goods by introducing the record showing conviction of the thief in an earlier
proceeding).
47 380 U.S. 400 {1965).
48 See id. at 403. Pointer, the Court's first significant confrontation-hearsay opinion of the
modem era, relied exclusively on the deprivation of cross-examination to find a Sixth Amendment violation. See id. at 407. The government had introduced at trial the transcript of the
testimony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had not been represented by counsel. See id. Justice Black's opinion for the Court is perhaps best known for its holding that the
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is made applicable to the states by "incorporation"
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 403-05.
49 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77-78 {1970).
so See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (testimony from an earlier trial); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 {1970) (statement by a witness at a preliminary hearing); Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 {1968) (same); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401 (same). In the same period, the Court
considered several Confrontation Clause challenges in cases in which the hearsay declarant actually had appeared at trial, had testified, and had been subject to some form of cross-examination
about his earlier out-of-court statement. In each case, the defendant asserted that even his opportunity for in-court cross-examination of the declarant failed to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause because of the unwillingness, evasiveness, or forgetfulness of the witness when asked
questions about the out-of-court statement. The Court upheld such a challenge in Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 {1965), where the declarant had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and simply had refused to answer questions. The Court found no confrontation violation in
three later cases in which the witness had answered the cross-examiner's questions, although the
answers might have been limited to "I don't know" or "I can't recall ever making that statement." See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 {1988) (an assault victim with a head trauma
and memory loss was unable to recall the attack or the circumstances under which he made a
prior statement identifying the assailant); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 {1985) (an expert
witness was unable to recall the basis of his opinion); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971) (a
witness denied making a prior statement). In each case, the Court found an "adequate opportunity" to cross-examine the declarant.
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earlier proceeding, the Court typically focused on the adequacy of that opportunity as the test for a violation of the Sixth Amendment.51 The "procedural rights" theme-the narrow holding in Mattox-sufficed to decide those
cases.
The one exception was the 1970 case of Dutton v. Evans. 52 The trial
court admitted the testimony of a jailhouse informant, who related the outof-court statement of the defendant's alleged accomplice in a murder.53 The
accomplice/declarant did not testify and was not subject to cross-examination
by the defendant.54 In upholding Evans's conviction, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion brought the reliability theme to center stage. He found no denial
of the right of confrontation because the circumstances surrounding the outof-court statement made it sufficiently reliable for the jury to consider:
These circumstances go beyond a showing that Williams [the
accomplice/declarant] had no apparent reason to lie to Shaw [the
jailhouse informant]. His statement was spontaneous, and it was
against his penal interest to make it. These are indicia of reliability
which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant.55
Despite Justice Stewart's repeated protests that the Sixth Amendment did
not constitutionalize hearsay rules,56 his opinion implicitly equated reliable
hearsay with two exceptions to the hearsay rules: spontaneous utterances
and statements against penal interest. Such reliable hearsay required "no
confrontation of the declarant."57 Eighty-five years after Mattox, the Court
seemed poised to embrace the notion that at least some hearsay exceptions
provided exceptions to the right of confrontation.
B.

Ohio v. Roberts: The Reliability Theme Prevails

A decade later, in Ohio v. Roberts,58 the Court took the final step in
transforming the Confrontation Clause into an evidentiary rule excluding unSee Owens, 484 U.S. at 557; Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19-22; Nelson, 402 U.S. at 629.
400 U.S. 74 (1970).
See id. at 74.
See id. at 74-75.
Id. at 89. It is ironic, to say the least, that the Court used the particular hearsay statements at issue in Dutton v. Evans as the basis for its first Confrontation Clause decision that
based the admissibility of hearsay on the reliability of the hearsay statement. Although the
plurality opinion found sufficient "indicia of reliability" to admit the jailhouse informant's testimony, two concurring Justices found the admission of the statement "harmless" for precisely the
opposite reason. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion noted that "the claimed circumstances
of its utterance are so incredible that the testimony must have hurt, rather than helped, the
prosecution's case." Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
56 See id. at 82 ("[T]his Court has never indicated that the limited contours of the hearsay
exception in federal conspiracy trials are required by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause."); id. at 86 ("[T]he Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to
do so now.") (footnotes omitted).
57 Id. at 89.
58 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
51
52
53
54
55
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reliable hearsay. As in Mattox, the Court took that step by answering unnecessary questions. Like Mattox, Roberts involved prior testimony by a
declarant who became unavailable for trial. Like Mattox, Roberts was a case
that ultimately turned upon the adequacy of the defendant's opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant at the earlier proceeding.59 In keeping with the
holdings in its earlier Confrontation Clause opinions, the Court could have
decided the case based solely on the adequacy of the defendant's right to
cross-examine the hearsay declarant in a prior proceeding. Instead, Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion chose to set out a "general approach" to "determine the validity of all ... hearsay exceptions" under the Confrontation
Clause. 60 In the opening sentence describing that "general approach," the
Court characterized the Confrontation Clause, in the most explicit terms, as
an exclusionary rule: "[t]he Confrontation Clause operates in two separate
ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. " 61
The Court then established necessity and reliability as the twin pillars of
admissibility.62 The "rule of necessity," the Court noted, reflects "the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation." 63 To satisfy that preference, the
Confrontation Clause requires the government to "produce, or demonstrate
the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against
the defendant. " 64 Anticipating some of the practical difficulties of an absolute rule of necessity, however, the Court hedged. The rule of necessity
would apply only "in the usual case."65 The opinion's principal focus was the
second pillar, reliability. The Court took pains to reconcile the "reliability"
requirement with its earlier opinions extolling the virtues of cross-examination: "Since there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], and counsel ... availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript ...
bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability' and afforded 'the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.' " 66 The effect was
subtle, but significant. No longer the "primary object" of the Confrontation
59 See id. at 70-73. The trial court in Roberts admitted a transcript of the prelinlinary
hearing testimony of a witness who had disappeared before trial. See id. at 60. In denying the
defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge, the Supreme Court found that defense counsel's
questioning of the witness at the preliminary hearing "clearly partook of cross-examination as a
matter of form," id. at 70, and that "counsel was not 'significantly limited in any way in the scope
or nature of his cros.s-examination."' Id. at 71 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166
(1970)).
60 Id. at 64-65. In framing the question as one regarding the "validity of ... hearsay
exceptions," the Court implicitly endorsed the notion that the Confrontation Clause would operate as an exclusionary rule.
61 Id. at 65.
62 See id.
63 Id.
64 Id. "Unavailability" proved to be a short-lived component of the "general approach."
See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-94 (1986); infra Part II.A. See generally Jonakait,
supra note 8, at 561-70 (criticizing Inadi's suggestion that the defendant could produce the available declarant when the defendant wished to cross-examine her.).
65 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. The Court cited Evans as a case in which "the utility of trial
confrontation [was] so remote that [the Court] did not require the prosecution to produce a
seemingly available witness." Id. at 65 n.7 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)).
66 Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)). Stubbs also was a prior
testimony case in which the Court found no violation of the defendant's confrontation right

1999]

Beyond Admissibility

205

Clause, the right to cross-examine became merely one of the "indicia of reliability" that made hearsay constitutionally admissible. The reliability theme,
born in Mattox and nourished by the plurality in Dutton v. Evans, had come
of age.
Ohio v. Roberts completed the transformation of the Confrontation
Clause from a guarantee of procedural rights into a rule of evidence that
excludes unreliable hearsay. Equally important, the Roberts opinion made
explicit what had been merely implicit in Dutton v. Evans. It defined "reliable" hearsay by reference to established hearsay exceptions: "The Court has
applied this 'indicia of reliability' requirement principally by concluding that
certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of
virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' "67
In a passage that became the starting point for its subsequent confrontation-hearsay opinions, the Court added:
[A hearsay statement] is admissible only if it bears adequate
"indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent
a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 68
That brief passage has dominated confrontation-hearsay analysis ever
since.69 Following that formula, a trial court first must determine whether the
hearsay statement falls within a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay
rule. If the court finds such "roots," the inquiry ends; there is no constitutional violation.70 If the hearsay falls outside of a "firmly rooted" exception,
it is "presumptively unreliable" and, therefore, presumptively inadmissible.71
A court then moves to the second step of the reliability inquiry and considers
whether sufficient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" nonetheless
appear in the circumstances surrounding the statement. Unless the Court
finds such "particularized guarantees," it must exclude the statement.72
when there was adequate opportunity to cross·examine the declarant at an earlier trial. See
Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 216.
67 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
68 Id.
69 See Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Since Roberts was announced,
federal appellate courts have marched in near-perfect unison to the Roberts tune.").
70 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 & n.8, 357 (1992) (finding that both spontaneous declarations and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis are "firmly rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule and that statements falling within such exceptions may be admitted
without violating the Confrontation Clause); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183·84
(1987) (holding that a coconspirator's statements fall within "firmly rooted" hearsay exception;
no independent assessment of reliability is required).
71 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) (finding that statements falling \vithin
Idaho's "residual hearsay exception," identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), are "presumptively unreliable") (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 & 544 n.5 (1986) (holding that
a codefendant's confession is "presumptively umeliable" and rejecting the argument that the
statement fits the "firmly rooted" exception for "declarations against penal interest")).
72 See id. at 825-27. In Wright, the Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statements of a child who was the victim of sein1al abuse, con-
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Roberts completed the shift, begun in Mattox, that changed the Confrontation Clause from a procedural right to a substantive rule of evidence. Since
Roberts, the Court has adhered to its "general approach" in dealing with all
hearsay, not just prior testimony. Reliability has become the surrogate for
cross-examination. "Firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions are the surrogate for
reliability. The Confrontation Clause is simply an exclusionary rule for unreliable hearsay, and the law of evidence largely defines the rule.

II.

The Fate of the Confrontation Clause After Ohio v. Roberts:
An Exclusionary Rule That Excludes Almost Nothing

Almost twenty years after Roberts, it is hard to conclude that the Confrontation Clause, as an exclusionary rule, has much practical impact on hearsay in criminal trials. Today, the first pillar of Roberts, the "rule of
necessity," excludes nothing that the hearsay rules would admit in evidence.
Its second pillar, the "reliability" test, has limited effect largely because the
vast majority of admissible hearsay now fits within "firmly rooted" exceptions and, therefore, is effectively exempt from any constitutional reliability
assessment. In an ironic twist, the exclusionary rule of Roberts probably has
encouraged, rather than inhibited, the expansion of traditional hearsay exceptions. In the few cases in which hearsay falls outside of firmly rooted
exceptions, the Court's open-ended standard for identifying "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" has been, at best, an unpredictable barrier to
experiments with nontraditional hearsay. In Dutton v. Evans, the first case in
this century in which the Court seized upon "reliability" as the standard for
admitting or excluding prosecution hearsay, Justice Marshall wrote in dissent,
"If 'indicia of reliability' are so easy to come by, and prove so much, then it is
only reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation Clause has any independent vitality at all." 73 Almost thirty years later, that question looks prophetic.
The "general approach" of Roberts has evolved into an exclusionary rule that
excludes very little.
A.

The Court Retreats from the Rule of "Necessity"

The first element in Roberts' general approach was "a rule of necessity. "74 The Court characterized the approach as a "preference" for live testimony over hearsay. 75 Because the live version is the "preferred" version, the
rule excludes hearsay unless the prosecution produces the declarant or
proves that she is unavailable. 76
As a general proposition, the rule of necessity was short-lived. Six years
after Roberts, in United States v. lnadi,77 the Court ruled that coconspirator
eluding that there were not sufficient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to admit the
statements without violating the Confrontation Clause. See id.
73 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
75 See id.
76 See id.
11 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
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statements are admissible notwithstanding the availability of the declarant.78
At its next opportunity, in White v. Illinois,19 the Court retreated further,
stating that the unavailability of the declarant was a predicate to admissibility
"only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course
of a prior judicial proceeding. "80
After Inadi and White, the Confrontation Clause "rule of necessity" has
no real impact on the admission of hearsay. The rule now applies only to
former testimony. Under the law of evidence, in both federal and state
courts, former testimony is admissible now, as it was before Roberts, only
when the declarant is unavailable.81 In the end, the Roberts rule of necessity
has no application independent of the law of evidence.82
B.

Firm Roots Everywhere: The Hearsay Exceptions Swallow the
Confrontation Clause

Under the general approach of Roberts, a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception defines a class of hearsay statements so reliable that cross-examination would add very little to the jury's ability to assess them.83 Given these
theoretical origins, one might expect that the two decades since Roberts
would have produced a test for distinguishing "firm" from "not so firm" roots
See id. at 399-400.
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
80 Id. at 354. The Court gave three reasons for its retreat. Frrst, aside from prior testimony, the Court found no reason to prefer live testimony over hearsay. Coconspirator statements, spontaneous declarations, and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis-those at
issue in Inadi and White-the Court wrote, "are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness." Id. at 355. The circumstances that make them reliable "cannot
be recaptured" in the courtroom. See id. at 356. For that reason, such hearsay "may justifiably
carry more weight with a trier of fact than a sinillar statement [in] the courtroom." Id. In other
words, the rule of preference now was turned on its head; some hearsay might be preferable to
live testimony. Second, the Court argued, as applied to much hearsay, the rule of necessity was
simply impractical. Imagine, for example, trying to lay the foundation for a corporate financial
ledger as a business record by demonstrating the unavailability of, or producing in court, every
individual who provided information recorded in the ledger. The Court wanted no part of a rule
that inconvenient. See id. at 355. Third, the Court saw little hardship to defendants in limiting
the rule. If a defendant really wants to cross-examine the declarant, the Court noted, "the Compulsory Process Clause and evidentiary rules permitting a defendant to treat witnesses as hostile
will aid defendants in obtaining a declarant's live testimony." Id. (footnote omitted).
81 See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(l); McCoRMICK, supra note 16, at 516.
82 As a practical matter, the Roberts "rule of necessity" probably had little impact from
the start. When the Court announced the Roberts decision, FED R. Evm. 803(1-23) enumerated
twenty-three hearsay exceptions that applied whether or not the declarant was available. Strictly
applied, the Roberts rule of necessity would have rendered all of those exceptions unconstitutional as applied to available declarants in criminal cases. There is little indication that lower
courts applied Roberts to effect such a fundamental change in the law of evidence. The issue
seems to have crystallized first in coconspirator hearsay cases. Following Roberts and before
Inadi, three United States Courts of Appeals imposed an unavailability requirement on coconspirator hearsay. See United States v. lnadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Lisotto, 722 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ordonez, 722 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir.
1983). The Supreme Court put an abrupt end to that trend when it decided Inadi.
83 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 82021 ("Our precedents have recognized that statements admitted under a 'firmly rooted' hearsay
exception are so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to their reliability.").
78

79
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based on the likely reliability of statements falling within a given exception.
Instead, the Court's standards-if there really are any standards at all84show little concern for reliability.85 The common-law hearsay exception for
coconspirator statements, for example, developed for reasons wholly apart
from any notion of the inherent trustworthiness of the statements of one thief
or murderer to another. 86 Nevertheless, the Court readily anointed coconspirator statements as a "firmly rooted" exception. 87 Conversely, statements
against penal interest, excepted from the hearsay rule purely on the basis of
their supposed reliability,88 have yet to receive the Court's final blessing as
"firmly rooted." 89 The Court quickly dismissed the "residual," or "catch-all,"
84 Roberts offered four examples of "firmly rooted" exceptions-dying declarations, crossexamined prior-trial testimony, and the business and public records exceptions-that apparently
possessed such solid foundations. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8. Beyond that, the Court gave
no guidance for identifying firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, apparently preferring the gradual
development of standards on a case-by-case basis.
85 If the Court had adopted standards based on realistic assessments of reliability, the
results might have been quite different. Professors Nesson and Benkler have argued that cultural evolution and increased understanding of human psychology have undermined the empiri·
cal basis for believing that many traditional hearsay exceptions bear any real relation to
reliability:
[M]any exceptions have worn too thin to remain convincing. . . . Consider, for
instance, the dying declarations exception, which arises from the cultural experience of "facing one's Maker" as a moment of truth. But in a culture that only
grows more cynical about the authenticity of religious experience, the exception
loses its rhetorical force. Dying declarations no longer evoke the image of a person
making a solemn statement on the death bed, before a confessor, surrounded by
family members. Instead, we more commonly envision a drugged, whispering patient in an impersonal hospital, alone except for a detective holding a little black
book and straining to hear a name gasped against the flow of pure oxygen. The
contemporary image lacks the comforting effect of the traditional one.
As knowledge of human psychology becomes more sophisticated and widely
disseminated, that discomfort extends to more of the hearsay exceptions. Do we
still believe that people excited by an upsetting event are more likely to tell the
truth than to exonerate themselves ... from blame? Do we still believe that a
plaintiff is more likely to tell the truth to the physician hired to testify as an expert
at the plaintiffs trial than to any other person whose testimony does not fit another
hearsay exception?
Nesson & Benkler, supra note 15, at 156 (footnotes omitted).
86 See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 189 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("[U)nlike many common-law hearsay exceptions, the coconspirator exemption . . . was not
based primarily upon any particular guarantees of reliability or trustworthiness .... "); David S.
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1378, 1384 (1972); cf. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)
advisory committee's note ("Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of
hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system
rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule. No guarantee of trustworthiness is
required in the case of an admission.") (citations omitted).
87 See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.
88 See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("The circumstantial guaranty of
reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make statements
which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.") (citing
Hileman v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1965)); McCORMICK, supra note 16, at
528.
89 See Wiiiiamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994) ("[W)e need not decide
whether the exception for declarations against interest is 'fimtly rooted' for Confrontation
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exception, the only exception in the Federal Rules that explicitly requires a
finding of trustworthiness as a condition to admissibility, as lacking firmness
of roots.90
History, rather than reliability, generally has driven the Court's decisions
identifying "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. Even the search for historically adequate "roots," however, has been less than exacting.91 The Court
has relied upon a rather amorphous mix of chronological age and widespread
acceptance-a sort of historical popularity contest. The Court's test is so
generous that virtually all recognizable hearsay exceptions have passed. Applying this approach, the Court has ruled that the exceptions for coconspirator statements,92 spontaneous declarations,93 and statements for
purposes of medical diagnosis94 are "firmly rooted." In dictum at least, the
Court similarly has recognized the firm roots of the exceptions for public
records, business records, dying declarations, and prior trial testimony subject to cross-examination.95 Following the Court's example, federal and state
appellate courts have been quick to fill in the few remaining gaps, finding
sufficiently firm roots in the exceptions for recorded recollection,96 admis-

Clause purposes."); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986) ("We reject respondent's categorization of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple 'declaration against penal interest.' That
concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis.").
90 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990).
91 Mattox had offered a theory for identifying exceptions to the confrontation right: "We
are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was
adopted . . . . Many of its provisions in the nature of a Bill of Rights are subject to exceptions,
recognized long before the adoption of the Constitution, and not interfering at all \vith its spirit.
Such exceptions were obviously intended to be respected." United States v. Mattox, 156 U.S.
237, 243 (1895). Consistent with Mattox, the modern Court might have defined "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions as those that were "recognized ... before the adoption of the constitution."
The Court has not followed that course, and with good reason. The task of identifying which
hearsay exceptions the Framers "recognized," and in what form they were recognized, is itself a
highly uncertain enterprise. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 177-78 & n.12 {1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (contrasting Professor Heller's view that the dying declaration exception was the
only recognized hearsay exception when the Sixth Amendment was ratified, see FRANCIS H.
HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 105 (1951), with Wigmore's conclusion that several hearsay
exceptions predated the Constitution, see 5 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 130
(3d ed. 1940)).
92 See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183. The Court cited a long tradition of admitting coconspirator statements, established by the Court for over 150 years. See id. (citing United States v.
Gooding, 12 U.S. (1 Wheat) 460 (1827)).
93 See White, 502 U.S. at 346, 355 n.S. In recognizing the firm roots of the spontaneous
declaration exception, the Court noted that the exception is "at least two centuries old," and that
it is "recognized under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) and in nearly four-fifths of the States."
Id.
94 See id. Curiously, the White Court made no reference to history when it blessed the
exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. It found "firm
roots" because the exception appears in the Federal Rules (Rule 803(4)) and is "widely accepted
among the States." Id.
95 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980).
96 See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Picciandra,
788 F.2d 39, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1986).
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sions by an agent, 97 statements regarding the declarant's state of mind,98 and
the res gestae exception.99
Only once has the Court found that a hearsay exception lacked "firm
roots." In Idaho v. Wright, the Court held that "residual" hearsay exceptions100 do not partake of any "tradition of reliability" and, therefore, should
not be treated as "firmly rooted." 101 Except for statements against interest,102 the Roberts formula effectively exempts from constitutional scrutiny
hearsay statements that bear the label of any exception recognizable by students of the law of evidence. In short, the Court's test for firmly rooted hearsay exceptions has been as demanding as the I.Q. tests administered to the
fictional children of Lake Wobegon, and the result has been the same: all
tum out to be above average. 103
C.

Pigeonholing Hearsay into Expanding Exceptions: The Primacy
of Labels

On its face, the Roberts opinion treats firmly rooted exceptions as if they
were fixed targets with easily recognizable boundaries. In truth, they are not.
Hearsay exceptions have tended to expand over time, as legislatures and
courts redefine them. 104 Categories of hearsay that bear a common label can
vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. 105 Roberts described the
hearsay rule and its exceptions as "an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of
patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists." 106
The remarkable irony of the past two decades is that after making that obserSee United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1525 (5th Cir. 1992).
See United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1493-94 {11th Cir. 1993).
99 See Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492, 1495 {11th Cir. 1984).
100 See FED. R. Evm. 807 {formerly Rules 803(24) and 804{b){5)).
101 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 {1990). Of course, like the exception for
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis, residual hearsay exceptions appear in the Federal
Rules, see FED. R. Evm. 807 (formerly Rules 803(24) and 804{b){5)), and are "widely accepted"
by the states. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1350 {West 1995). The Wright Court neither paused
to struggle with such a comparison nor considered the irony that the residual exception is the
only exception that requires a trial court to make an explicit finding of "trustworthiness" before
admitting the hearsay.
102 The Court has not explicitly declared statements against penal interest to be a firmly
rooted exception. The Court skirted the issue in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986). In
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 {1994), in dictum, the Court left little doubt that it
now views the exception as firmly rooted. See infra note 135.
103 See Garrison Keiller, Monologue Excerpt (visited October 5, 1998) <http://phc.mpr.org/
chat/1997/00l_children/hearts.shtml>. The reference is to the weekly "sign-off'' comment of host
Garrison Keiiler, from "Lake Wobegon, where all the women are strong, all the men are good
looking, and all the children are above average."
104 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987) {holding that FED. R.
Evm. 104{a) modified the traditional "bootstrapping" rule of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 74-75 (1942), which required independent evidence of conspiracy as a foundation for the
admission of coconspirator statements). See generally Rossi, supra note 17, at 645-48.
105 See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1970) (comparing Georgia's hearsay exception for coconspirator statements with the federal version).
106 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 {1980) (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909, 921 (1937)).
97

98
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vation in Roberts, the Court has elevated traditional hearsay exceptions-the
"patches" in that "crazy quilt"-to a position of constitutional primacy.
The Court justified its generous treatment of firmly rooted exceptions
because they "rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually
any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional
protection."'107 Given that rationale, logic would dictate that hearsay falling
outside of the traditional "foundations" of firmly rooted exceptions would
not enjoy the same treatment, even though a court or legislature might expand historical boundaries to encompass new hearsay within a category
which still bore a traditional label. But the Court has not applied its "general
approach" to fix hearsay exceptions within their historical boundaries. Instead, the Court has bent the constitutional limits as the hearsay exceptions
themselves have expanded. Indeed, Roberts might actually have encouraged
that expansion. By elevating firmly rooted exceptions to constitutional significance, Roberts created an incentive for litigants to "pigeonhole" more
hearsay into those exceptions, thereby avoiding a separate inquiry into the
reliability of particular hearsay statements.108 The hearsay "tail" now wags
the constitutional "dog."109
The Court has promoted this trend by giving constitutional finality to the
label that a trial court affixes to a hearsay statement, with little heed to the
process that affixes the label in the first place. Once a trial court places hearsay within the "pigeonhole" of a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Court
appears content to end its constitutional inquiry, even though the particular
Id. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
Prior to Wright, for example, a state trial court admitted hearsay accounts of a child's
complaints of abuse under a non-traditional hearsay exception. See Dana v. Department of Corrections, 958 F.2d 237, 238-39 (8th Cir. 1992). After the Supreme Court decided Wright, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief by finding that the statement would
have been admissible under Minnesota's expanded version of the traditional exception for statements for medical diagnosis and treatment. See also State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 126 (Minn.
1991) (en bane); Allison C. Goodman, Note, Two Critical Evidentiary Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases: Closed-Circuit Testimony by Child Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 855, 882 (1995) ("The Supreme Court's holding in White [v. Illinois] has had
the further effect of encouraging courts to interpret 'firmly rooted' hearsay exceptions much
more broadly than in previous years."). As an example, the Note cites cases extending the exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis to include a child's statements
regarding the identity of the abuser, id. at 882 n.202 (citing United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97,
99 (9th Cir. 1992); State v. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d 621, 629 (Mich. 1992); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d
1010, 1020-21 (Wyo. 1993)), and a case easing time limitations that traditionally limited the exception for spontaneous declarations. See id. (citing Dezarn v. State, 832 P.2d 589, 590 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1992)). In fact, the ruling of the trial court and the Appellate Court of Illinois in White
v. Illinois might represent an example of the same phenomenon: expanding traditional hearsay
exceptions-both the spontaneous declaration and the medical diagnosis exceptions-to bring
hearsay statements within a "firmly rooted" exception. See infra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
109 On occasion, an appellate court does manage to resist the temptation to allow the pigeonholing of hearsay within a firmly rooted exception to determine the outcome of a confrontation challenge. See, e.g., Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1207 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Plainly, the mere
fact that a state court, in admitting evidence, tucks it into a pigeonhole which bears the label of a
time-honored hearsay exception cannot be entirely dispositive.").
107

108

212

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 67:191

hearsay statement might have fallen outside of the historical limits of the
exception.
White v. Illinois provides the clearest example of the Court's tacit endorsement of this "pigeonholing" approach.11° White was convicted of sexual assault upon a four-year-old girl. 111 Although the child did not testify, the
trial court admitted testimony from her babysitter, her mother, a police officer, a nurse, and a physician, all of whom recounted the child's statements
regarding the nature of the assault and the identity of the assailant. 112 The
trial court admitted the statements under Illinois's version of the hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis. 113 On appeal, White contended that the statements fell
outside of the traditional boundaries of those exceptions because (1) the
"spontaneous" declarations occurred forty-five minutes after the event and
were made in response to questioning, not volunteered and (2) the statements to the doctor and the nurse related details of the offense that were not
directly relevant to any medical treatment. 114 The Appellate Court of Illinois
rejected those arguments, but went well beyond the traditional boundaries of
the spontaneous declarations and medical diagnosis exceptions in doing so.
The court relied on a recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, relaxing
the requirements of spontaneity and immediacy in cases of "spontaneous
declarations" by child victims of sexual abuse.11 5 The statements to medical
personnel, the Appellate Court found, were admissible under a 1988 revision
to the Illinois Code, which the court characterized as a "new hearsay exception" intended to broaden the definition of statements for purposes of medical diagnosis beyond traditional restraints. 116 In short, the Illinois courts
quite explicitly admitted nontraditional hearsay under expanded hearsay exceptions that still bore traditional labels.
~

502 U.S. 346 (1992). Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), offers a similar
example. Bourjaily challenged the admissibility of certain coconspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), and further argued that admission of the statements violated the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 176, 181. In ruling on the evidentiary issue, the Court
abandoned the traditional "bootstrapping" rule that had required trial courts to look only at
independent evidence of conspiracy, rather than the alleged coconspirator's statements themselves, in order to determine the existence of the conspiracy, a foundational fact necessary for
the admission of the coconspirator's statements. See id. at 178. The Court found that Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(a) effectively eliminated the traditional restriction. See id. at 176-81. After declaring the hearsay admissible, the Court quickly rejected the Confrontation Clause challenge, because the hearsay fell within the exception for coconspirators' statements, a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception. See id. at 181-84. In dissent, Justice Blackmun, the author of Roberts, argued:
[B]ecause the Court alters the traditional hearsay exemption ... I do not believe that the Court can rely on the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" rationale [of
Roberts] to avoid a determination whether any "indicia of reliability" support the
coconspirator's statement, as the Confrontation Clause surely demands.
Id. at 186 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111 See White, 502 U.S. at 349.
112 See id. at 349-50.
113 See id. at 350-51.
114 See People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1249, 1251 (Ill. App. 1990).
115 See id. at 1246-50 (citing People v. Nevitt, 553 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. 1990)).
116 Id. at 1251.
110
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In the Supreme Court, only those labels mattered. A unanimous Court
fourid the two hearsay exceptions "firmly rooted" and simply applied the
Roberts rule to dispense with further inquiry under the Confrontation Clause:
"We ... see no basis in Roberts ... for excluding ... evidence embraced
within such exceptions to the hearsay rule as those for spontaneous declarations and statements made for medical treatment." 117 The Court never
paused to consider just how the various statements happened to be "embraced within" the two "firmly rooted" exceptions or whether the boundaries
of the exceptions had expanded beyond their recognized "roots." Instead,
"[w]e take as a given," the Court wrote, "that the testimony properly falls
within the relevant hearsay exceptions." 118 The hearsay statements came to
the Court bearing the proper labels. The labels carried the day.
A trial judge's incentive to pigeonhole hearsay within a favorably labeled category becomes even more apparent when one contrasts the standard of review on appeal that applies to evidentiary rulings with the standard
applied to a finding of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" for
Confrontation Clause purposes. Appellate courts typically review a trial
court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard.119 For that
reason, a court's decision to admit hearsay at the fringes of a traditional exception is spared an exacting review on appeal. That is exactly what occurred
in the Appellate Court of Illinois on White's initial appeal.120 By contrast, if
the trial court adopts a narrower view of the traditional hearsay exceptions,
but nonetheless admits the hearsay under the residual or "catch-all" exception, the appellate treatment is entirely different. An appellate court may
review the evidentiary ruling only for abuse of discretion. 121 But because the
trial court has not fit the hearsay within a firmly rooted exception, the appellate court must undertake its own, independent review for "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," with no requirement to defer to the discretion of the trial court. 122 Reversal becomes a more likely possibility.
Idaho v. Wright is a prime example. There, an Idaho trial court admitted
the testimony of a physician, recounting hearsay statements of a three-yearold victim of sexual abuse.123 The State offered and the court admitted the
evidence under Idaho's residual hearsay exception, identical to then Federal
117 White, 502 U.S. at 357. Even before the Court's ruling in White, Professor Berger noted
the trend of expanding hearsay exceptions, particularly in child sexual abuse cases, and posed
the question, later answered in White, whether the Court nonetheless would view such hearsay
as "firmly rooted." Berger, supra note 15, at 606 n.198.
118 White, 502 U.S. at 351 n.4.
119 See, e.g., White, 555 N.E.2d at 1250.
120 See id.
121 See State v. Valencia, 924 P.2d 497, 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
122 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818-22 (1990). Tue "pigeonholing" incentive might
be even greater in state prosecutions. Fitting hearsay within a firmly rooted exception might
offer a convenient means to minimize successful collateral attacks. When federal courts review
state convictions on habeas corpus petitions, the courts will not overturn state evidentiary rulings-giving deference to findings of fact-but will review de novo the question of "reliability"
under the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir.
1996); Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 685 (10th Cir. 1990).
123 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 809-11.
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Rule of Evidence 803(24).124 That evidentiary ruling was subject to review
only for abuse of discretion. 125 But because the court did not deem the
residual hearsay exception to be "firmly rooted," Wright's Confrontation
Clause challenge required a heightened standard of review. Applying the
Roberts formula, first the Idaho Supreme Court and then the United States
Supreme Court undertook their own factually detailed, independent assessments of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Both courts found
the hearsay insufficiently trustworthy. 126
To explain the differing results in White and Wright, it is tempting, but
not very satisfying, to draw fine factual distinctions between the circumstances under which the two child declarants made their hearsay statements
and to conclude that the statements were more reliable in one case than in
the other. The major difference between the two cases, however, is that the
trial court in White managed to fit the statements into hearsay exceptions
with traditional labels, but the trial court in Wright did not. The lesson of
White and Wright is that hearsay labels matter.127 The appellate process rewards creative attempts to pigeonhole hearsay within firmly rooted exceptions, even if the effort requires an expansion of the exceptions at the
margin. 128

D.

Non-"Firmly Rooted" Hearsay: Searching for "Particularized
Guarantees of Trustworthiness" in No Particular Direction

Despite the tendency of courts to "pigeonhole" hearsay into firmly
rooted exceptions, some hearsay admissible under the law of evidence still
falls outside such categories. Residual or "catch all" hearsay exceptions are
not "firmly rooted." 129 A number of states have legislated new hearsay exceptions, often specifically designed for cases of sexual or other abuse of chilSee id. at 811-12.
See State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1225 (Idaho 1989); State v. Giles, 772 P.2d 191, 192,
194 (Idaho 1989) (explaining that Giles was Wright's codefendant, but filed a separate appeal).
126 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 818-27 (1990); State v. Wright, 775 P.2d at 1230.
127 Although it is possible to explain the outcome of the two cases by noting factual differences in the circumstances surrounding the statements, that effort seems unconvincing. There is
little reason to believe that the three-year-old in Wright felt any less inclined to tell the truth to
her doctor than did the four-year-old in White. Although the questioning by medical personnel
in White might have been more "open-ended" than the leading questions of Dr. Jambura in
Wright, compare People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (ill. App. Ct. 1990), with Wright, 497
U.S. at 809-12, 818, that factor was not controlling in Wright, see 497 U.S. at 818, and was not
even mentioned in the White opinion. There is certainly no reason to conclude that a jury, fully
apprised of the circumstances of each child's statement, would be any better equipped to evaluate the truthfulness of one rather than the other. Nevertheless, the Court drew a constitutional
line between the two. The hearsay "label" made the ultimate difference.
128 Perhaps the one departure from this "pigeonholing" effect has been the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest; confrontation concerns actually might be responsible
for narrowing the exception. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1994).
First, the Williamson Court took pains to confine the exception within narrow limits. See id. at
600-04. The Court then strongly suggested that the exception, as redefined, would be "firmly
rooted." See id. at 605.
129 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990).
124
125
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dren or elderly victims.130 At least for the moment, the exception for
statements against penal interest lacks clear endorsement as a firmly rooted
exception.131 In all these cases, the Roberts formula dictates that the hearsay
statement must satisfy a Sixth Amendment standard of reliability that is, in
theory at least, independent of any standard created by the law of evidence.
Under the second stage of the Roberts reliability test, absent "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," the Confrontation Clause excludes such hearsay.132 This second step theoretically maintains a constitutional throttle on
legislative or judicial decisions that seek to admit statements beyond the
fringes of traditionally admissible hearsay.
Since Roberts, the Court has decided only two Confrontation Clause
challenges to non-firmly rooted hearsay and has excluded the evidence on
both occasions. At first glance, then, the rulings in Lee v. Illinois133 (dealing
with purported statements against interest) and in Idaho v. Wright134 (dealing
with the residual hearsay exception) suggest that the Confrontation Clause
remains a significant constitutional check on new forms of hearsay. But that
appearance is deceptive. The Court's subsequent redefinition of statements
against penal interest probably makes that exception "firmly rooted," relegating Lee's constitutional ruling to the shadows of the law of evidence.135
130 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1996); CAL. Evm. CooE § 1228 (West
1995); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (1995); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-3-16 (1995); ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 1992); Mo. CooE ANN. of 1957, § 775
(1996). Cf. UNIF. R. Evm. 807.
131 See supra note 85; infra note 132.
132 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
133 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
134 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
135 In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), the Court held that Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3), the federal version of the exception for statements against interest, applies
only to those portions of a narrative that are "genuinely self-inculpatory" and not to other "collateral" portions of the same statement. See id. at 600-01, 605. Although the Williamson Court
avoided deciding the Confrontation Clause challenge, the opinion took pains to note that "the
very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory-which our reading of Rule 804(b)(3)
requires-is itself one of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement admissible under the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 605. That dictum clearly signals that
statements against interest admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements, are constitutionally "trustworthy" without further scrutiny. For practical purposes, Williamson turned statements against penal interest into a firmly rooted hearsay exception. If
challenged today, the law of evidence would exclude the hearsay at issue in Lee, with the Confrontation Clause merely as a redundant back-up. But see John J. Capowski, Statements Against
Interest, Reliability, and the Confrontation Clause, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 471, 479-80 (1997)
(contending that even after Williamson, courts will not treat statements against interest as
"firmly rooted").
Lee involved an accomplice's confession that inculpated the defendant. See Lee, 476 U.S. at
531. The state argued that the confession was admissible as a statement against penal interest, a
hearsay exception that the prosecution contended was "firmly rooted." See id. at 544 & n.5. The
Court never accepted the state's characterization of the evidence as a statement against interest
and, therefore, never squarely addressed the question whether that hearsay exception is firmly
rooted. See id. Instead, the majority noted that the category of statements against penal interest
"defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." Id. at 544 n.5. The
Court then moved directly to the Roberts analysis of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," and ultimately found none. See id. at 146. Viewed broadly, Lee holds that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of the hearsay statement of an accomplice which appears to
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Despite the Court's insistence in Wright that "[t]he Confrontation Clause ...
bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule," 136 the lower courts have found ample flexibility in Wright's standard of reliability to admit most hearsay that
the residual exception allows.131
In cases applying the residual hearsay exception, Wright has limited impact because it requires a constitutional assessment of reliability virtually
identical to that which the law of evidence already requires. To admit a statement under the residual hearsay exception, a trial court must satisfy itself
that the evidence possesses "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
that are "equivalent" to those that gave rise to the other hearsay exceptions
set out in the Rules. 138 Residual hearsay, therefore, must be just as reliable
as, say, a dying declaration or an excited utterance. Of course, under the
"firmly rooted" hearsay approach of Roberts, statements falling within almost all of the enumerated exceptions are conclusively presumed reliable
and are admitted without further constitutional scrutiny. Once a court has
found a statement with "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" that
are "equivalent" to those which make "firmly rooted" hearsay admissible
under the Confrontation Clause, simple logic would dictate that such a statement is itself constitutionally admissible. 139 Not surprisingly, based on that
logic, commentators prior to Wright concluded that any statement properly
admitted under the residual exception automatically would satisfy the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" requirement of Roberts. 140
In theory, Wright evaded that logic by ruling that the constitutional
search for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" may not take into
account corroborating evidence beyond the circumstances of the statement 141 Because the test for trustworthiness under the residual hearsay exception does not include such a limit, Wright made it logically possible that a
statement corroborated by independent evidence and properly admissible
under that exception might nonetheless fail the constitutional test for trustworthiness. In practice, despite the result and the rhetoric of Wright, the
shift blame to the defendant. In Lee, one might argue, the Court at last established a clear
constitutional rule of exclusion, independent of the law of evidence, for an important category of
hearsay statements. In light of the Court's ruling in Williamson, however, the law of evidence
seems once again to preempt the constitutional standard.
136 Wright, 497 U.S. at 814.
137 See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Accetturo,
966 F.2d 631, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ellis, 951F.2d580, 583 (4th Cir. 1991); see
also Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catchalls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding
Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 925, 933 (1992).
138 See Fed. R. Evid. 807; Wright, 497 U.S. at 817-18.
139 Of course, there remain possibilities for avoiding this logic where hearsay is admitted
under state "residual hearsay" exceptions where either the residual exception itself or the underlying "enumerated" exceptions differ materially from the standard of the federal rules.
140 See Jonakait, supra note 8, at 573 (" Roberts's language seems designed to guarantee that
if hearsay is properly admitted under a residual exception, it will not violate the confrontation
clause"); David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 867, 898 (1982) ("[S]atisfaction of the residual
exceptions amounts to satisfaction of the confrontation clause.").
141 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 819-24.
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Confrontation Clause today almost never dictates a result different from that
obtained under the residual hearsay exception itself. 142 The reason is that
Wright's constitutional "niche" is remarkably small. Except in cases where
corroborating evidence is the most important factor establishing trustworthiness, it is exceedingly unlikely for a court to find the same statement "trustworthy" for the purposes of the residual hearsay exception, but not
"trustworthy" for Confrontation Clause purposes. And, corroboration is seldom the only factor a court may identify to support "trustworthiness."
Aware that corroborating evidence is unhelpful in the constitutional analysis
after Wright, creative prosecutors and trial courts have little difficulty identifying other "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 143
In the end, Wright's potential impact as an exclusionary rule for nontraditional hearsay is limited because its test for "reliability" under the Confrontation Clause is simply too vague to effectively limit any court that
otherwise is inclined to admit a hearsay statement under the law of evidence.
Roberts required "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," without offering a hint as to what such guarantees might be. The Wright Court clearly
ruled that independent corroboration is not such a guarantee. 144 But the
Court expressly declined to formulate a standard to determine what is. 145 In142 Numerous appellate opinions that find evidence properly admitted under a residual exception also find such evidence sufficiently reliable to satisfy the constitutional demand for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 800-01
{8th Cir. 1997) {admitting the grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness under the residual
exception); United States v. lsmoila, 100 F.3d 380, 393 (5th Cir. 1996) {admitting credit card
holders' affidavits of lost or stolen cards under the residual exception); Shaw, 69 F.3d at 1254
{admitting the testimony of an unavailable witness from the trial of a coconspirator under the
residual exception); United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 84 {4th Cir. 1993) {admitting the suppression hearing testimony of an unavailable witness under the residual exception); Accetturo, 966
F.2d at 633-35 {admitting written statements given to police by extortion victim under the
residual exception.); State v. Grube 531 N.W.2d. 484, 489-90 (Minn. 1995) {admitting affidavits
detailing prior spouse abuse under the residual exception). Occasionally, appellate courts find
that a lower court improperly admitted testimony in violation of the "reliability" standards of
both the residual hearsay exception and the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., United States v.
Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1462-63 (7th Cir. 1993) {finding that grand jury testimony was inadmissible
under the residual exception.). Cases holding that a trial court properly admitted hearsay under
a residual exception, but that the court admitted the hearsay in violation of the Confrontation
Clause are practically nonexistent. Wright seems to stand alone in that regard.
143 See, e.g., Earles, 113 F.3d at 800-01 {finding particularized guarantees sufficient to admit
the grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness, because the statement was made under oath,
never was recanted, was based on personal knowledge, and was not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence); Accetturo, 966 F.2d at 633-36 {finding particularized guarantees when an unavailable
witness gave statement in his own handwriting, to police, voluntarily, knowing that the police
would investigate further, while the events were fresh in his mind, and when his fear of the
defendants and the desire for protection left him with no motive to lie); State v. Dunlap, 930
P.2d 518, 537 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding particularized guarantees sufficient to admit the
grand jury testimony of a deceased witness, because the \vitness made the statement under oath,
had personal knowledge, did not recant, and had no motive to lie). Cf. Myatt v. Hannigan, 910
F.2d 680, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) {finding, prior to Wright, the hearsay statement of a child to be
sufficiently reliable based on an expert witness's assessment that the child was capable of telling
the truth and had not been induced to lie); see also cases cited infra notes 152, 154, 156.
144 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.
145 The Court "decline[d] to endorse a mechanical test for determining 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'" Id.
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stead, Wright offered a nonexclusive list of appropriate factors for courts to
consider in determining reliability. The factors include "spontaneity and consistent repetition," "mental state of the declarant," and "use of terminology
unexpected of a child of similar age." 146 Although the Court required an
"affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement
was made" as a basis for finding reliability, the most flexible and expansive of
the reliability factors-a "lack of motive to fabricate,"-requires no affirmative showing at all. 147 Indeed, such a "factor" simply shifts the burden to the
defendant to show a "motive to fabricate" in order to establish a Confrontation Clause violation. 148 Leaving even more room for creativity in the lower
courts, the opinion adds "courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors." 149 As a practical matter, the Wright standard for
trustworthiness is no standard at all. Trial courts must consider the "totality
of circumstances" surrounding a hearsay statement, ignore potentially corroborating evidence, and then ask whether the declarant was "particularly
likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made." 150 It would have
been simpler, and no less precise, if the Court had said, "Let the evidence in
if it looks reliable."
Lower courts searching for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" have managed only to prove that reliability is in the eye of the beholder. While one court might rely on a particular factor to establish
trustworthiness, another court might treat that same factor as evidence of
likely fabrication. In cases involving the hearsay statements of child sexual
abuse victims, for example, some courts regard especially young children as
highly unreliable and inclined to fantasize. 151 Others find that the innocence
of the youngest victims leaves them with no motive to lie. 152 Some courts
look skeptically upon any statements a suspect makes to police, fearing the
declarant's motive to shift blame from himself. 153 Others find comfort in the
fact that the police are listening, taking notes, and as far as the declarant
knows, are likely to investigate further and to "check out" his information. 154
Plea or immunity agreements, in the view of some courts, provide motives to
See id. at 821-22.
See id. at 821.
148 At least one court has found a "lack of motive to lie" in the face of evidence showing
such a motive. See Accetturo, 966 F.2d at 635-36 (finding no motive to lie, despite testimony that
the declarant might have fabricated the kidnapping story to avoid usurious debt).
149 Wright, 597 U.S. at 822.
150 Id.
151 See Gregory v. North Carolina, 900 F.2d 705, 707 (4th Cir. 1990).
152 See Dana v. Department of Corrections, 958 F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1992). Cf. United
States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1445 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Indeed ... a declarant's young age is a
factor that ... mitigates in favor of the trustworthiness and admissibility of her declarations.").
153 See Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162, 1166-67 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Matthews, 20
F.3d 538, 545-46 (2d Cir. 1994). Indeed, such skepticism is at the heart of the Court's ruling in
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986), and also played a role in Williamson v. United States, 512
U.S. 594, 601 (1994). See generally Welsh S. White, Accomplices' Confessions and the Confrontation Clause, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753 (1996) (arguing that accomplices' confessions to
police are almost always unreliable).
154 See United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631, 635 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ellis,
951 F.2d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 1991).
146
147
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fabricate in order to "curry favor" with authorities. 155 Others note that such
agreements require honesty as an explicit condition to any benefit and
thereby reduce the incentive to lie.156 In short, Wright's test for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" offers something for everyone. As an
exclusionary rule that purports to establish a constitutional barrier against
unreliable hearsay, independent of the law of evidence, however, it is too
malleable to have much of an effect.

!IL

How the Exclusionary Rule Stifles the Confrontation Right

If the worst that can be said of the Confrontation Clause as an exclusionary rule is that it is redundant, then there may be little reason to re-examine
the rule. After all, one might say, two reasons to exclude unreliable evidence
are better than one. As Fourth Amendment scholarship reveals, however, an
exclusionary rule may have "ripple effects" that are not always obvious, and
not always benign. 157 In the Fourth Amendment context, scholars argue convincingly that the choice of exclusion as a remedy changes and limits the
substance of the right. 158 That same effect seems apparent in the Confrontation Clause context, and for similar reasons.
A.

The Exclusionary Rule Skews, and Shrinks, the Right of Confrontation

Although courts and critics often separate right from remedy for analytical purposes, the two are in fact interdependent. As a leading Fourth
Amendment scholar observed, "the remedy tends to shape the right." 159 The
history of Fourth Amendment protection since Mapp v. Ohio 160 has been, for
the most part, marked by limitations and exceptions. 161 The exclusionary
rule has influenced that process (1) because of the context in which it
presents the substantive issues and (2) because of the hard choice it imposes
on courts. First, because of the exclusionary rule, courts define Fourth
Amendment rights in response to motions to suppress evidence. Suppression
hearings arise only where the police actually discover evidence, typically
physical evidence that is both highly reliable and highly incriminating. Such a
setting is hardly the most likely to evoke judicial sympathy toward the "victim" of a search or seizure. Second, because of the exclusionary rule, Fourth
Amendment cases present courts with an all-or-nothing choice. If a judge
finds a Fourth Amendment violation, she must suppress all of the evidence
155 See United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 983 (11th Cir. 1989).
156 See United States v. Clark, 2 F.3d 81, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1993); Ellis, 951 F.2d at 583 (4th
Cir. 1991); State v. Dukes, 544 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 1996).
157 See William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 443, 443 (1997).
158 See id. For another critical perspective on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
see Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy Violations),
20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 457 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REv. 757 (1994).
159 Stuntz, supra note 157, at 443.
160 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
161 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 188 S. Ct. 2014, 2020-21
(1998); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 992 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984).
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discovered as a result of the violation, no matter how severe the crime, how
crucial the evidence, or how limited the police transgression. 162 There is no
middle ground, no graduated sanction. That hard choice can lead judges to
qualify or limit Fourth Amendment rights. As one judge wrote, "[W]hen
something less draconian than the exclusionary rule is restored as a remedy
for an unreasonable search and seizure, then the judiciary will be less inclined
to interpret the Fourth Amendment in the narrowest possible fashion .... " 163
Since Roberts, the history of the Confrontation Clause likewise has been
the story of a shrinking right. As in the Fourth Amendment context, the
exclusionary rule has contributed to that shrinkage, both because of the context in which the rule puts confrontation issues, and because of the all-ornothing choice the rule imposes. Because courts apply the Confrontation
Clause as an exclusionary rule, defendants raise confrontation challenges as
objections to the introduction of evidence. Confrontation claims almost always follow on the heels of unsuccessful hearsay objections. In that context,
a court properly reaches a Confrontation Clause issue only when it already
has determined that hearsay is admissible under the law of evidence. That
determination stems from at least an implicit finding that the evidence is reliable. In effect, the confrontation challenge begins with a strike against it. As
in the Fourth Amendment arena, the natural consequence is to restrict the
scope of the confrontation right.
Like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the Confrontation
Clause presents courts with an all-or-nothing choice. Although the tension
between protecting a defendant's rights on the one hand and presenting complete information to a jury on the other might be diminished somewhat when
the evidence consists of an out-of-court statement rather than a tangible object like a gun, that tension is still quite real.1 64 A court's reluctance to exclude might be overwhelming when the declarant is an eye witness or a victim
of the crime-like a sexually abused child-whose statements are critical to
any prosecution. Not surprisingly, those are the types of cases where courts
seem most willing to find exceptions to both the hearsay rules and the right
See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
Stephen J. Markman, Six Observations on the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 425, 428 (1997).
164 The price of exclusion can be just as high under the Confrontation Clause as under the
Fourth Amendment. Excluding the out-of-court statements of a dead or unavailable eye witness
can gut a prosecution just as effectively as excluding the murder weapon found under a defendant's bed. And in at least one respect, that price is harder to justify in the Confrontation context.
The "deterrence" rationale that supports Fourth Amendment exclusion is largely missing from
Confrontation Clause cases. Typically, the confrontation issue arises through no fault of the
prosecution or police. Indeed, the issue might arise even though the government would much
prefer to proceed through live testimony than through hearsay. Often there is, in short, nothing
to deter.
Exclusion under the Confrontation Clause makes more sense when the Clause is not merely
a "back stop" for the law of evidence, but where it serves a purpose sinrilar to the deterrent
function of other exclusionary rules. See Motes v. United States 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900) (finding the confrontation right to be violated by admitting hearsay when the declarant's absence was
the result of the government's culpable neglect). For a discussion of the appropriate application
of the Confrontation Clause for this purpose, see infra text accompanying notes 295-295.
162

163
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of confrontation. 165 At the same time, those are the cases where the defendant's need to challenge such statements is most critical. A remedy "less draconian" than exclusion might permit a court to admit probative evidence, and
yet still permit a defendant an effective means to challenge the prosecution's
hearsay evidence.
B.

The Exclusionary Remedy Leads Defendants to Ignore, or Even Avoid,
Possibilities for Effective Confrontation

Professor William Stuntz has argued that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule skews criminal litigation by diverting scarce resources, often at
the defendant's expense, from the central factual issues in a criminal case.166
In a system in which appointed counsel and public defenders with heavy
dockets represent the vast majority of defendants, defense counsel's time is in
short supply. By creating even a remote possibility of a high reward-exclusion of critical evidence-in exchange for a limited expenditure of timeusually a rather brief suppression hearing-the exclusionary rule diverts defense counsel's time and attention from the more central problems of contesting guilt or mitigating punishment.167 In a system of limited resources,
litigation over suppression of evidence might occupy time, effort, and attention out of proportion to any benefits to the few defendants who win the
exclusion "lottery," and at the expense of the many others who lose not only
the suppression motion, but also the opportunity to contest other matters
more central to the issues of guilt, innocence, or punishment.168
Experience suggests that the exclusionary rule skews Confrontation
Clause analysis in a similar way. A remarkably consistent characteristic of
confrontation-hearsay litigation is what is missing. The "confrontation" argument almost always begins and ends with the question of admissibility. The
reported cases seldom discuss how, or if, the defendant might challenge hearsay once it is admitted-how he might impeach or "confront" a hearsay declarant who is not in the courtroom when the evidence is received. 169 Indeed,
165 Compare White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation in admission of hearsay statements of victim), United States v. Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631 (11th
Cir. 1992) (same), and Dana v. Department of Corrections, 958 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1992) (same),
with Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (finding a Confrontation Clause violation where the
hearsay declarant was an accomplice), and United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326 (6th
Cir. 1991).
166 See Stuntz, supra note 157, at 451-55.
167 See id.
168 See id. Noting the overwhelming workload of most public defenders and the relatively
low "caps" on fees for court-appointed counsel, Professor Stuntz argues:
In a world in which most defense counsel must severely ration the claims they
make, ... suppression motions presumably displace something else. The most obvious "something else" is factual argument, argument about the merits of the criminal charge. That kind of argument is more likely to require non-trivial investigation
by defense counsel than exclusionary rule claims. It is also costlier to pursue.
Id. at 453.
169 The only exceptions to this pattern in the Supreme Court's opinions are brief passages
in two cases dealing with available hearsay declarants. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355
(1992) ("[T]he Compulsory Process Clause and evidentiary rnles permitting a defendant to treat
witnesses as hostile will aid defendants in obtaining a declarant's live testimony.") (footnote
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in more than a few reported cases, defendants complaining of the denial of
confrontation have foregone the opportunity to put an available declarant on
the witness stand for cross-examination, preferring instead to stake their
chances on the appeal of a ruling denying their constitutional objection to
admissibility. 170
The exclusionary rule itself is at least partly to blame for skewing confrontation-hearsay litigation into this pattern that ignores possibilities for
confronting hearsay. As in the Fourth Amendment arena, the remedy of exclusion diverts both the time and the focus of defense counsel to the question
of admissibility and away from matters more closely related to the testing of
truth in the courtroom. 171 When courts and litigants focus on exclusion as the
remedy for preserving confrontation rights, they ignore alternative means for
challenging or testing hearsay statements that are admitted in evidence. And
because the Confrontation Clause now excludes very little hearsay, few defendants are likely to win the exclusionary "jackpot," even though many
devote considerable time and energy to their constitutional challenges. That
time and energy could be spent on efforts to discredit the hearsay in the eyes
of the jury.
Still, in a system populated by more than a few creative and zealous
criminal defense attorneys, diversion of effort alone is an insufficient explanation for what is missing from most confrontation-hearsay battles. An element of tactical choice plays a role as well. Here, and the exclusionary rule
further skews Confrontation Clause litigation. By offering an incentive to
battle over exclusion, the rule can create a tactical disincentive for counsel to
pursue actual confrontation or any alternative means of attacking prosecution hearsay. In some cases, for example, defense counsel might anticipate
that the declarant, if available, likely would make a sympathetic impression
on a jury. Although defense counsel might readily raise a confrontation argument to exclude the hearsay, actual confrontation might be the last thing
the defendant really wants. In other cases, experienced defense counsel
might believe, probably correctly, that juries discount hearsay evidence to
begin with. 172 In those instances, counsel might see little value in efforts to
impeach the declarant. And if the real aim is exclusion, then confrontation,
omitted); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986) ("If respondent independently wanted
to secure [tlie declarant's] testimony, he had several options available, particularly under Federal
Rule of Evidence 806 .... "). Even in these cases, the Court looks not to tlie right of confrontation, but to the Compulsory Process Clause and to Rule 806 to establish a right to inlpeach tlie
declarant. The Court never has addressed the issue as an aspect of the confrontation right. See
infra text accompanying notes 265-274.
110 See, e.g., Inadi, 475 U.S. at 390; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 n.19 (1970). See infra
note 174 and accompanying text.
171 The diversion of attention away from confrontation and toward questions of admissibility may have anotlier cause as well: lawyers are taught to look at tlie Confrontation Clause as
part of the law of evidence. See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of
the Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 295, 341 (1981).
112 Empirical research confirms the view of many trial lawyers tliat jurors tend to discount
hearsay. See Peter Miene, Roger C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and the
Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 683, 691 (1992); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan
Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REv. 655, 656-58 (1992).
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or something closely approximating confrontation, does not help the argument. By demanding and winning any opportunity to confront the declarant-either in person or through alternative means-defense counsel
diminishes the likelihood that the trial court will exclude the evidence.173
Barring the all-out victory of exclusion, counsel might prefer a "pure" denialof-confrontation issue for de novo review on appeal, rather than a record
showing that counsel sought and obtained the functional equivalent of confrontation. As long as trial courts treat exclusion as the appropriate means of
protecting the confrontation right, instead of insisting on consideration of
other means, there wi~ be a value for some defendants in not pursuing those
alternatives. In effect, the exclusionary rule can put defense counsel in a position where the rational choice is to value the confrontation issue more "than
the confrontation itself.174
173 Because defendants seldom take advantage of opportunities to impeach absent hearsay
declarants, there are few cases that assess the impact of such impeachment on the question of
"reliability" under the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682 (E.D.N.Y.
1987), is one such case. In assessing the trustworthiness of a foreign deposition, Judge Weinstein
took into account the defendant's opportunity, under Rule 806, to offer testimony regarding the
deponent's demeanor at the deposition. See id. at 691-93.
174 Inadi offers an almost comic example of the backward incentives that result from the
Court's exclusionary thinking. The government charged and convicted Inadi for conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 388-89. At trial, the government offered
in evidence several audio tapes that contained statements of coconspirators, including one
Lazaro who was alive, reasonably close by, and at least reluctantly \villing to testify. See id. at
390. Over the defense's objection, the court admitted the tapes under Federal Rule of Evidence
80l(d)(2)(E). See id. Inadi then raised his Confrontation Clause objection, arguing under Roberts that the Clause prohibited the introduction of hearsay unless the government first demonstrated that the declarant was unavailable. See id. The trial court asked defense counsel if she
wanted the government to produce the witness, and counsel responded only that she would ask
her client. See id. The government subpoenaed Lazaro, who then failed to appear, claiming "car
trouble." See id. Neither the government nor Inadi made any further effort to bring Lazaro to
court. See id. The defense merely renewed its Confrontation Clause objection, which the court
overruled, finding that coconspirator statements satisfied the reliability requirements of Roberts
and therefore are admissible even without actual confrontation of the declarant. See id. at 39091.
Inadi demonstrates the backward approach to confrontation-hearsay litigation that results
from exclusionary thinking. The government apparently had no interest in Lazaro as a witness
and made only a perfunctory effort to secure his presence. The defendant, who could have
issued his own subpoena and insisted on further efforts to produce Lazaro, never even answered
the Court's simple question, "Do you want him to testify?" While vigorously debating the defendant's right to exclude evidence in the absence of confrontation, both parties struggled mightily to avoid the very confrontation that the defendant claimed to seek. In effect, exclusionary
thinking turned the confrontation-hearsay debate into a game of Sixth Amendment "chicken,"
with both parties engaging in brinksmanship over an admissibility ruling, rather than making
serious efforts to confront an available declarant.
Inadi is not an aberration. The Inadi Court noted, "[T]he actions of the parties in this case
demonstrate what is no doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy cases-neither side wants a
coconspirator as a witness." Id. at 397 n.7. Similarly, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the
Court noted, "Counsel for Evans informed us at oral argument that he could have subpoenaed
[the declarant] but had concluded that this course would not be in the best interests of his client." Id. at 88 n.19. See also Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1368-70 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the defendant does not waive his Confrontation Clause rights by refusing to call an adverse
declarant to the witness stand).
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In sum, treating the Confrontation Clause as an exclusionary rule raises
more than just a concern over keeping relevant information from juries. Just
as in the Fourth Amendment setting, the rule has "ripple effects." The natural aversion of courts to excluding pertinent information from trial leads to a
narrow construction of the confrontation right, particularly when the information to be excluded already has passed the test of the law of evidence. In
addition, either through the diversion of counsels' energies or through deliberate tactical choice, the exclusionary rule discourages defendants from pursuing other means available to challenge prosecution hearsay. The end result
is a Confrontation Clause that serves little purpose in modem criminal trials.
The Clause excludes very little hearsay and almost never is invoked as an
affirmative right to challenge admissible hearsay.

IV.

Beyond Exclusion: The Confrontation Clause as a Right to
Confront Hearsay

Because its confrontation-hearsay opinions focus exclusively on admissibility, the Court has not considered what right the Confrontation Clause provides for a defendant to impeach or "confront" a nontestifying declarant
once hearsay is admitted in evidence. This section explores that question by
looking to the text and the history of the Confrontation Clause and by considering the Clause in context with the other guarantees in the Sixth Amendment. That review demonstrates that the notion of an affirmative
constitutional right to confront a hearsay declarant fits well with the language, history, and basic purposes of the Sixth Amendment, perhaps more
easily than does the right to exclude unreliable hearsay.
A.

The Text
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. "175
"Truth is not always in a well." 176

Perhaps the best way to begin, then, is by observing the obvious. The
plain text of the Sixth Amendment creates a right "to be confronted with"
witnesses. The text says nothing of excluding a witness's testimony. Likewise, although the hearsay rule and many exceptions, along with the term
"hearsay" itself were known well to the Framers,177 the Sixth Amendment
does not mention "hearsay." As Justice Harlan wrote, "The language [of the
Confrontation Clause] is particularly ill-chosen if what was intended was a
prohibition on the use of any hearsay .... " 178
175 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
176 EDGAR ALLAN PoE, The Murders in the Rue Morgue, in THE COMPLETE TALES AND
POEMS OF EDGAR ALLAN PoE 141, 153 (1975). The quoted passage is an observation of Poe's
central character and investigator of the murder, C. Auguste Dupin.
177 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 12-27 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
178 Evans, 400 U.S. at 95 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In looking at the apparent gap between the text of the Confrontation
Clause and the modem application of the Clause as a rule excluding unreliable hearsay, several members of the Court and distinguished scholars have
argued that the Court made a wrong tum in assuming that the Clause applies
at all to most hearsay. The Court's error, they say, comes in its interpretation
of the phrase, "witnesses against" the accused. The most appropriate definition of the noun, "witness," they argue, is "one who testifies in a judicial
proceeding."179 Under a strict reading, the "witnesses against" an accused,
therefore, are only those persons who actually testify against him in court.
The right of confrontation, then, would consist of the right to see, hear, and
cross-examine witnesses who appear in the courtroom, whether they speak
from personal knowledge or based on hearsay. Generally, the Confrontation
Clause would not be concerned with hearsay at all, because the declarant is
not a "witness against" the accused. To avoid direct circumvention of the
basic rule, and in keeping with the Clause's history as a rule barring inquisitorial practices, proponents of this view would expand the definition of "witnesses" slightly, in order to cover persons who indirectly give "testimony" for
use at trial through affidavits or through some form of ex parte examination.180 Though this position has strong historical and scholarly support, the

179 Justice Scalia first outlined this view in dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 86465 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Craig was not a confrontation-hearsay case. It involved the
testimony of a live \vitness, a child abuse victim, through closed-circuit television. See id. at 840.
Justice Scalia argued that the confrontation-hearsay cases were inapposite in that context, but in
doing so, he first outlined his view of the meaning of the Sixth Amendment's text:
The Sixth Amendment does not literally contain a prohibition upon [hearsay],
since it guarantees the defendant only the right to confront "witnesses against
him." Ai; applied in the Sixth Amendment's context of a prosecution, the noun
"\vitness"-in 1791 as today-could mean either (a) one "who knows or sees any
thing; one personally present" or (b) "one who gives testimony" or who "testifies,"
i.e. "[i]n judicial proceedings, [one who] make[s] a solemn declaration under oath,
for the purpose of establishing or making proof of some fact to a court." The former meaning (one "who knows or sees") would cover hearsay evidence, but is excluded in the Sixth Amendment by the words following the noun: "witnesses
against him." The phrase obviously refers to those who give testimony against the
defendant at trial.
Id. at 864-65 (citations omitted).
180 In an amicus brief filed in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Justice Department
urged the Court to adopt the view that Confrontation Clause rights apply only to in-court testimony and to certain forms of "testimonial" hearsay created in anticipation of a criminal trialfor example, affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony. See Brief for the United slates as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18-20, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 906113). The government's position rested primarily on the historical evidence suggesting that the
Framers intended for the Clause to prevent "prosecuting a defendant through the presentation
of ex parte affidavits, without the affiants ever being produced at trial." White, 502 U.S. at 352;
see also id. at 363 (Thomas, J., concurring). In the government's view, a hearsay declarant who
does not make a statement knowing that the statement might be used in a criminal prosecution is
not a "'vitness against" the accused within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. See Brief for
the United States, supra, at 20. The government's position effectively would exclude most "garden-variety" hearsay from any application of the Confrontation Clause. With minimal analysis
of the historical merits of the government's position, the majority in White rejected it \vith the
simple statement that it "comes too late in the day to warrant reexamination" of the Court's
many earlier opinions that, at least implicitly, had taken the broader view that ''\vitnesses
against" an accused generally included hearsay declarants. See id. at 353. Justice Thomas wrote
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Court gave it a rather perfunctory burial in White v. Illinois. 181 The notion
that a hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused, therefore, seems
firmly entrenched as a starting point for analysis of the Sixth Amendment
text.
Even given that premise, however, it does not follow that the Confrontation Clause is designed to exclude hearsay from criminal trials. If the declarant is a "witness against" an accused, then the Clause grants a right to
"confront"-not a right to silence or exclude-that witness. Further, it does
not follow at all from the text that the confrontation right is somehow "satisfied" once reliable hearsay is admitted. The most direct reading of the
Clause would provide that if the declarant is a "witness"-reliable or notwe must treat her like a witness, or at least as much like a witness as possible,
and allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to "confront" her.
a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, urging a more thorough consideration of the government's position. See id. at 358, 364-65 (Thomas, J., concurring).
The leading scholarly proponent of the argument is Professor Akhil Reed Amar. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.J. 641, 647 (1996). Professor Amar writes:
Not all out-of-court declarants within the meaning of the so-called hearsay rule
are "witnesses" within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. In the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, "witness" means a person who physically
takes the stand to testify, or (to prevent government evasion of the spirit of the
clause) a person whose out-of-court affidavit or deposition (prepared by the government for in-court use) is introduced as in-court testimony. In the Sixth Amendment the word "witness" means the same thing, and for the same reason. Once we
see this, the Court's current Confrontation Clause conundrum vanishes. The clause
means what it says, and the strict rule it lays down makes sense as a rule.
Id. at 647. See also Akhil Reed Amar, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 89-144
(1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEo. L.J. 1045 (1998).
In a recent work, Professor Richard Friedman advocates a variant of this view. See Friedman, supra note 13. He argues that the Clause does not apply to all hearsay. See id. at 1013. He
contends, however, that it applies somewhat more broadly than to "formal" testimonial materials such as affidavits or depositions. See id. at 1038-39. Professor Friedman would extend the
meaning of "witness" under the Sixth Amendment to any declarant who gives a statement with
the intention that it be used in a criminal prosecution. See id. at 1038-43. He would apply the
rule strictly, dispensing with any assessment of reliability and forbidding the government from
using such hearsay without giving a defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
See id. at 1029.
While the views of Professors Amar and Friedman have both historical and textual appeal,
the White Court's quick rejection of similar arguments advanced by the Department of Justice
probably stems from more than the concern that they "come[] too late in the day." White, 502
U.S. at 353. The principal problem with reading hearsay declarants out of the definition of "witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause, as Professor Amar would do, is that it leaves government hearsay untested, or at least that it leaves defendants without the most obvious
constitutional basis for insisting that hearsay, like live testimony, must be subject to adversarial
challenge. The principal problem with the Court's view, on the other hand, is that it calls the
declarant a "witness," but then fails to treat her like other witnesses. In advocating a "right to
confront hearsay," this article seeks to avoid both problems by taking seriously the defendant's
right to test prosecution hearsay, a right to treat the declarant as the "witness" which the Court
insists that she is.
181 See White, 502 U.S. at 353 & n.5.
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There is a line of Confrontation Clause cases, almost three decades old,
in which the Court applied the Clause exactly in that fashion. Not surprisingly, the declarants in those cases were, in fact, prosecution witnesses. 182
They appeared in court and related their own prior out-of-court statements.183 What is the accused's confrontation right when the declarant testifies? It is the right to treat the declarant like any other witness: Confront
her; cross-examine her about the out-of-court statement, or anything else
permitted in the normal course of cross-examination.
Significantly, the Court's approach to the testifying declarant has nothing to do with the reliability of the hearsay statement. The statement is admissible as substantive evidence of the "truth" that it imparts, although the
declarant now disavows it. The reliability of hearsay statements is no concern of the Confrontation Clause in these cases: "We do not think such an
inquiry is called for," the Court tells us, "when a hearsay declarant is present
at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination."184 When the declarant testifies, the Court simply applies the constitutional command according
to its plain terms.
Now consider a slightly different case. The hearsay declarant is sitting at
home, or perhaps even at the courthouse, available to testify. The prosecution elects not to call her to the witness stand, but instead offers her out-ofcourt statement in evidence. The statement satisfies an exception to the
hearsay rule, but the defendant objects, claiming that admission of the hearsay will violate his right to confront the declarant. In light of the Court's
treatment of testifying declarants, the treatment of declarants available to testify would seem like a simple matter. Admit the hearsay, if the rules of evidence permit it. And if the defendant wants a confrontation, give him what
he asks for. Make the prosecution put the declarant on the stand and let the
defendant cross-examine her. This view, in essence, is the "rule of necessity"
announced in Roberts. 185 It fits nicely with the constitutional text. The
Clause creates a right "to be confronted with" the witness. It is phrased in
the passive voice, arguably by design. The phrase suggests a defendant's
right to have the confrontation come to him. It is, after all, the prosecution's
burden to call the witnesses who will prove its case.186
This literal reading of the text, however, suffers from a major weakness:
it can make a trial terribly inconvenient. Most hearsay exceptions apply
182 See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15
(1985); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
183 Perhaps the most frequent example of this category is the declarant who at first tells the
police or a grand jury that the defendant "did it," but who then gets cold feet at trial. See, e.g.,
Green, 399 U.S. at 150-51. She changes, or conveniently forgets, her original story. If she testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, the law of evidence permits the prosecution to
offer her original story as substantive evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(l).
184 Owens, 484 U.S. at 560.
185 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
186 The Sixth Amendment identifies two separate "witness-related" rights. The Confrontation Clause speaks in the passive voice: the right of the accused to "be confronted 'vith" witnesses "against him." U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Compulsory Process Clause speaks in the
active voice: the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Id.
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whether or not the declarant is available. 187 They are designed that way, in
part, for reasons of convenience. The business records exception is a good
example. If the prosecution had to produce every declarant who contributed
the original information in bank, payroll, telephone, and other business
records, then most simple larceny or fraud prosecutions would take weeks to
try. Applied across the board, a strict rule of necessity would render unconstitutional all the hearsay exceptions in Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and
803, as applied when the declarant is available. Obviously concerned with
that prospect after Roberts, the Court quickly compromised on its general
rule of necessity, ultimately limiting the rule to hearsay in the form of prior
testimony. 188
That compromise makes sense as a practical matter. The Court's approach still requires the government to produce an available declarant before
using her former testimony, which essentially prevents the government from
using a calculated strategy of building a case by creating hearsay testimony.189 This approach roughly adheres to the "core" historical purpose of
the Confrontation Clause: preventing the inquisitorial practice of trial by affidavit or by ex parte examination. 190 At the same time, this approach avoids
187 See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2), 803.
188 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992). See supra Part II.A. The Court's retreat
in Inadi and White from an unavailability requirement, or a "rule of necessity," mirrored the
shift by Justice Harlan twenty years earlier. Although convinced that the historical evidence was
"amorphous," Justice Harlan originally had argued that "the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce any available witness
whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial." Green, 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring). He did not accept the limitation that hearsay declarants generally are not "witnesses"
within the meaning of the Clause. See id. at 175. Only six months later he retreated from his
original position, largely because an across-the-board requirement for the government to produce any available hearsay declarant "would be unduly inconvenient and of small utility." See
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970). The prospect of requiring the government to produce hearsay declarants in order to introduce business records, public records, and learned treatises appeared "difficult, unavailing or pointless." See id. at 96.
189 In lintiting the unavailability rule to cases of former testimony, the Court said, "Roberts
stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation
Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a
prior judicial proceeding." White, 502 U.S. at 354. The Court has not had further occasion to
define "prior judicial proceeding." It would be entirely consistent with White's analysis for that
phrase to encompass grand jury testimony, affidavits, and ex parte depositions. Unlike coconspirator statements, spontaneous declarations, and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis-the statements at issue in White and Inadi-none of those statements possess evidentiary
significance that flows from the context in which it was made and which "cannot be recaptured"
in court. See id. at 356. And unlike the situation with business records, for example, the practical burden of imposing an unavailability requirement on hearsay stemming from quasi-judicial
settings would be slight.
190 See infra text accompanying notes 215-227. Perhaps more than coincidentally, the
Court's retreat from the unavailability requirement in White came close to giving the Department of Justice what it sought through its amicus brief. Instead of restricting altogether the
application of the Confrontation Clause to prior testimony, as the Department had sought, the
Court restricted only the application of the Roberts rule of necessity or "unavailability requirement." See White, 354 U.S. at 353-54. The Court still applies its "reliability" analysis to gardenvariety hearsay, which the Department sought to exempt altogether from Confrontation Clause
coverage. Because the Court-deems virtually all hearsay exceptions that apply to available declarants to be "firmly rooted," compare FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2), and 803, with supra Part II.B,

1999]

Beyond Admissibility

229

the considerable systemic burden of requiring the government to produce
every available hearsay declarant as a predicate to the use of any hearsay.
And by placing on the defendant the burden of initiating confrontation with
many available declarants, it avoids the backwards set of tactical incentives
that have created battles over admissibility, in the name of the confrontation
right, when confronting the declarant was the last thing that defendant really
wanted.191 Undoubtedly, it is less convenient for defendants than a rule that
required them to do nothing but object to the admission of hearsay. Properly
applied, however, a rule providing that defendants must request a subpoena
to invoke the confrontation right should not work serious hardship on defendants.192 In essence, the rule requires that a defendant mean what he says
when he asks for confrontation.
Equally important, the Court's compromise fits with a plausible reading
of the Sixth Amendment text. The defendant's right is "to be confronted
with" witnesses. 193 The use of the passive voice leaves the text ambiguous. It
does not specify who must bring about the confrontation, as would a rule
stating, for example, "In all criminal prosecutions, the prosecutor must confront the accused with the witnesses against him." In light of the practical
consequences of a strict rule of necessity, it makes sense to conclude that this
ambiguous text sets no rigid rule defining when, how, and by whom the witness must be produced. Moreover, in most instances, it is not the defendant
alone who brings about the confrontation with a declarant whom he subpoenas. After all, it is the court-not the defendant-that issues the subpoena
and, where necessary, enforces it.
There is one element in the Court's treatment of available declarants,
however, that bears little relation to the constitutional text. Under the "general approach" defined in Roberts, the Court still screens hearsay for "reliahowever, the Court's reliability test excludes very little hearsay in such cases. In short, although
the Court explicitly rejected the Justice Department's argument, it gave the Department practically all that it asked for.
191 See supra note 174.
192 Requesting and serving subpoenas are part and parcel of a defendant's normal pretrial
preparation. The government will bear the cost of subpoenaing a witness for indigent defendants. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b). There are significant dangers, however, in shifting to defendants the burden of initiating confrontation, and courts applying the Clause in cases of available
declarants must take care that the right to obtain the declarant's presence is not illusory. This
Article argues that the Confrontation Clause itself requires the government to take affirmative
steps to assist in the production of the declarant if a subpoena alone does not suffice. See infra
Part V.A.2. Further, without discovery relating to hearsay declarants, defendants might be seriously disadvantaged. See infra Part V.C. Of course, typical rules of discovery do not require the
government to disclose before trial the names of its expected witnesses. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM.
P. 16; 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994) (Jencks Act). But cf FED. R. Evm. 807 (requiring pretrial notification of an intention to use "residual hearsay"). Although the Confrontation Clause might not
require pretrial discovery of the government's intention to use hearsay, any realistic application
of the right to confront hearsay must take into account the information provided to a defendant
before trial. The prosecution would violate the right of confrontation, for example, if it failed to
disclose the identity or whereabouts of the declarant and then successfully argued at trial that
the defendant was too late in attempting to subpoena a witness about whom he knew nothing
before trial.
193 See U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
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bility" even where the declarant is available to testify. 194 That approach is
inconsistent with the Court's treatment of hearsay from a testifying declarant.
It is a vestige of the Court's "exclusionary thinking." If a defendant has
available the opportunity for in-court confrontation, there is no reason to
invoke a constitutional exclusionary rule that exists only as a poor substitute
for real confrontation.
When the declarant actually testifies or is available to testify at trial, the
Confrontation Clause can-quite literally-mean what it says: the right is to
"confront" the declarant, not to exclude hearsay. When the declarant is unavailable, however, a literal application of the text seems impossible. How
can the defendant "confront" someone who isn't there?
One way out, of course, would be to exclude all hearsay. The Court
quickly dismissed that alternative in Mattox as a matter of "necessit[y]."195
Another appealing solution might be to define "witnesses" under the Clause
in a way that avoids the problem: hearsay declarants are not "witnesses." In
White, however, the Court renounced that alternative as well. 196 Instead,
since Mattox, the Court has chosen a different method to deal with the perceived impossibility of confronting hearsay: it simply has created "exceptions" to the right. 197 Because the purpose of the Clause, as the Court
defines it, is to "augment accuracy in the factfinding process," 198 the Court
makes exceptions for reliable hearsay. The Court justifies screening hearsay
for reliability, then, as the best available substitute for confrontation.
As a matter of interpreting constitutional text, however, this approach is
not especially satisfying. The text says nothing of hearsay or reliability. The
Clause on its face has no exceptions. 199 Equally important, this approach
skips a step-it embraces reliability as a substitute for confrontation without
considering whether another alternative might serve just as well, without departing so sharply from the text of the Clause.
There is an alternative. It requires us to question the original assumption that it is impossible to "confront" an unavailable declarant. It makes
sense to question that assumption. After all, why should we concl).lde so
readily that the Framers left us with an explicit constitutional command to do
the impossible? If the Court insists on a broad construction of the term "witness" to include hearsay declarants, then shouldn't our reading of the re194 For example, in White, after setting aside the unavailability requirement, the Court held
that the hearsay at issue was reliable, because it fell within the firmly rooted exceptions for
spontaneous declarations and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis. See White, 502 U.S.
at 357.
195 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
196 See White, 502 U.S. at 353; supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
197 See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
198 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
199 See Amar, supra note 15, at 647:
At common law, the traditional hearsay "rule" was notoriously un-ruly, recognizing countless exceptions to its basic preference for live testimony; and more recent statutes have proliferated exceptions. But the words and grammar of the
Confrontation Clause are emphatically rule-ish: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"no ifs, ands, or buts.
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mammg text take into account the reality that declarant "witnesses"
sometimes die, disappear, or refuse to testify? Given that reality, it makes
sense to construe the term "confront" to include whatever form of "confrontation" is possible for such "witnesses."
If we approach the Clause from that perspective, another possibility becomes apparent. The verb "confront" means "to face," as one might physically face a testifying witness in a courtroom. But the verb connotes a
particular kind of "facing": facing as in "challenge."200 Although it might be
literally impossible to face an absent declarant, it is possible to challenge her
testimony in most, if not all, of the same ways that one might challenge the
testimony of a live witness. A declarant's absence does not preclude a defendant from presenting the jury with, for example, the declarant's prior inconsistent statement, her earlier conviction for perjury, the deposited check
that shows she was bribed, or the driver's licensing record showing her poor
vision.201 A declarant's absence does not preclude a thorough cross-examination of the live witness who recounts the hearsay, in a manner calculated to
expose the weaknesses and gaps in the secondhand information that the jury
has heard. If we read the verb "confront" to include a right to "challenge"
hearsay testimony, then we have a Clause that no longer commands us to do
the impossible. Instead, the Clause simply tells us to treat the declarant as
the "witness" which the Court insists that she is.
This view is no less consistent with the purposes of the Confrontation
Clause than is the Court's exclusionary rule. While one aim of confrontation
is to augment the accuracy of fact-finding at trial, the Clause seeks that goal
only indirectly. Its more immediate purpose is not to ensure the reliability of
evidence but rather to ensure the adversarial testing of evidence. Cross-examination is the principal means by which the Clause achieves that testing.202
Cross-examination does not guarantee reliable evidence. Indeed, both direct
and cross-examination might be peppered with lies, half-truths, and accidental inaccuracies. Instead, the aim of the testing process is to give the jury the
tools to decide for itself what is truth and what is not.
Viewed in this manner, then, the Confrontation Clause does not serve as
a rule of exclusion based on reliability. Instead, the Clause guarantees a right
200 See THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1995 ed.) ("Confront vb 1: to face esp. In
challenge: OPPOSE."). A reading of the term "confront" that encompasses means other than
face-to-face confrontation for challenging prosecution evidence is consistent with the central
purpose of the Clause. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 71 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting) ("The right of a defendant to confront an accuser is intended fundamentally to provide an
opportunity to subject accusations to critical scrutiny."); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (explaining that
the "underlying purpose" of the Clause is "to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by
ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence.").
201 See infra Part V.B.1.
202 See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the clause
hold that a primacy interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical confrontation."); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). As Wigmore put it, "The main and
essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness,
or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination ...." 5 WIGMORE,
supra note 177, § 1395, at 150.
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to confront hearsay. When a prosecution witness testifies at trial, the Clause
guarantees an "adequate" opportunity to cross-examine. The Clause provides the same right when the witness is an absent hearsay declarant. An
"adequate" opportunity is one that serves the purposes of adversarial testing,
one which, in the words of the Court, "afford[s] the trier of fact a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the [out-of-court] statement."203
At a minimum, compared to the Court's starting place-the assumption
that confronting an absent declarant is simply impossible-this interpretation
is a much more productive place to begin. If a defendant has a right to challenge hearsay, then confrontation-hearsay analysis does not begin and end
with the question of admissibility. Rather, admissible or not, hearsay is subject to challenge. This approach does not leave the Confrontation Clause at
the mercy of the law of evidence, because no hearsay exception creates an
"exception" to the confrontation right. And this view provides for a consistent reading of the Sixth Amendment text, whether the "witness" is on the
stand or is an absent declarant. This approach gives us one Confrontation
Clause; not two.
There are other sound reasons, founded in the constitutional text, to
read the Confrontation Clause as a right to challenge, but not to exclude,
hearsay. Most notably, the Clause is found in the Sixth Amendment. The
drafters chose to place the confrontation right in the same sentence, in the
same amendment, with the rights to counsel, to compulsory process, and to
trial by jury.204 Read together, those rights have little to do with the reliability of evidence or even with the accuracy of the ultimate verdict. Defense
counsel has no obligation to present only "reliable" evidence. In fact, she has
an obligation to seek to impeach even "reliable" witnesses when that opportunity presents itself.205 The defendant is entitled to compulsory process to
secure witnesses, without regard to their reliability. The Compulsory Process
Clause creates a right for the defendant to "present [his] version of the facts,"
whether reliable or not. 206 The Sixth Amendment does not require a "reliable" jury, a well-educated jury, or the jury most likely to reach an "accurate"
verdict. Indeed, we select jurors with calculated randomness. An important
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
205 Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967) (White, J., concurring and
dissenting):
Law enforcement officers ... must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a
procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of
the crime .... But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or
present the truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be and is
interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea
of guilty, we also insist that he defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty.
206 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). In Washington, the defendant sought
to call an accomplice as a witness, but a Texas rule of evidence which made a co-indicted accomplice incompetent to testify on behalf of the defendant prohibited the defendant from doing so.
See id. at 16-17. The Court held that the rule violated the defendant's right, under the Compulsory Process Clause, to call witnesses in his favor. See id. at 23. In essence, the Court found that
the compulsory process right overrode the state rule of evidence, even though the state rule
aimed to exclude unreliable evidence. See id. at 22-23; see also Westen, supra note 2, at 591-92
(discussing the Court's rationale in Washington).
203

204
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qualification is their ignorance of the facts to be litigated before them.207 The
Constitution commands an "impartial" jury.208 Viewed as a whole, the Sixth
Amendment does not appear-in a direct way-to be concerned that any
particular form of evidence, or even any verdict, is accurate. If the Confrontation Clause is a rule that excludes unreliable evidence, the drafters certainly put it in a peculiar place.209
.
Finally, if we expand our view beyond the Sixth Amendment to the full
text of the Bill of Rights, we find one final reason to reject an exclusionary
approach to the Confrontation Clause in favor of a right to confront hearsay.
The Due Process Clause is itself a constitutional limit on unreliable evidence.
In criminal cases, due process is essentially an overriding principle of fairness.
The Due Process Clause works together with trial by jury to ensure fairness.
Most "element[s] of untrustworthiness" in criminal trial evidence are the
"customary grist for the jury mill."210 But due process does protect against
evidence that a jury cannot evaluate rationally.211 Prior to the Warren
Court's embrace of the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporation" theory, the
Due Process Clause provided the only constitutional standard for determining admissibility of prosecution hearsay outside of the federal courts.212
Given the ubiquitous nature of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions and the
Court's essentially standardless test for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," it is hard to see that an exclusionary rule based solely on Due
Process standards of reliability would offer any lesser protection for defendants than does the Court's current approach.213 For present purposes, it is
207 See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 {1991).
208 See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
209 Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 {1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that
were thought to assure reliable evidence....").
210 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 {1977) ("We are content to rely upon the good
sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is
customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of ... testimony that has some questionable feature.").
211 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-05 {1976); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 99
{1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Professor Westen argues that the Constitution provides a single
standard of admissibility; that evidence is constitutionally admissible if it "possesses 'sufficient
aspects of reliability' to be intelligently evaluated by the jury for its proper weight." See Westen,
supra note 2, at 598 (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 106). He concludes that the Due Process
Clause is the proper source of that standard, id. at 598-600, and that it makes no sense to apply a
separate standard to hearsay under the Confrontation Clause:
[T]here is no reason to believe that hearsay is generally so much Jess reliable
[than some kinds of direct testimony] that it requires a separate constitutional standard of admissibility.
But even if hearsay evidence is Jess reliable, there is no reason to apply a different standard of admissibility. The due process test already accounts for the fact
that evidence may contain "element[s] of untrustworthiness," and the hearsay character of evidence is simply one of the circumstances to be considered in assessing its
probative value.
Id. at 598-99 (quoting United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1977)).
212 See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904).
213 Compare discussion infra Part II.B, C & D, with United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427,
1433 {10th Cir. 1998) (applying the Due Process standard to evidence of similar crimes admitted
under Federal Rule Evidence 413 in a sexual abuse prosecution and noting that the court would
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enough to recognize what the presence of the Due Process Clause might tell
us about the confrontation right: even as a constitutional rule excluding unreliable hearsay, the Confrontation Clause is redundant.

B.

History

Most discussions of the history of the Confrontation Clause begin with
disclaimers.214 Perhaps the greatest danger in interpreting that history, then,
is to draw firm conclusions at all. In light of the limited historical evidence, it
is safest to contemplate only what is plausible. Accordingly, this section aims
to make only two limited points. First, it is not at all clear from history that
the Framers intended for the Confrontation Clause to exclude any hearsay
from criminal trials. Second, it is even less certain that the Framers aimed to
adopt the hearsay rule and its exceptions as a matter of constitutional law,
although that is essentially the way that today's Court applies the Confrontation Clause. If the Framers were concerned with hearsay at all when they
adopted the Clause, it is at least equally plausible to conclude that they left
admissibility to the law of evidence and created in the Confrontation Clause
a right to challenge all prosecution evidence, including hearsay evidence.
The Framers said little about confrontation when they adopted the Bill
of Rights,215 but they were not writing on a blank slate. They were aware of a
history of struggle to resist inquisitorial procedures in English courts, and
they were anxious to preserve for themselves the adversarial system of trial
that their English ancestors had won from the Crown.216 The struggle began
two centuries before the time of the American Constitution.
The practice of live testimony, viva voce, by witnesses at an open trial in
the presence of the accused was widespread in early English common-law
courts and was a distinguishing, and treasured, feature of the English system.217 In a number of politically charged sixteenth- and seventeenth-cenhold Rule 413 unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause if the lower court had not applied
the safeguards embodied in Rule 403 to protect the defendant from unfairly prejudicial
evidence).
214 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very
little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause."); Friedman, supra note 13, at 1022 ("The origins of the Clause are famously obscure.").
In keeping with tradition, this Article includes a disclainier of its own. This Article is not,
and does not purport to be, an exhaustive effort in original research into the history of the
Clause. Far more able scholars, upon whose work this Article gratefully draws, have performed
that effort in painstaking detail. Several relatively recent works with excellent accounts of the
available historical evidence have proved especially helpful. See id. at 1022-24; Berger, supra
note 15, at 567-86; Lilly, supra note 13, at 208-15.
215 There was no substantive debate over the Clause when the First Congress passed its
resolution proposing the Bill of Rights. See 1 Annals of Congress 756 (1789) (reprinted in 5
PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CoNSTITUTION 262-63 (1987)); Green,
399 U.S. at 175-76 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
216 See Berger, supra note 15, at 580-86. Professor Berger's article is a rich source for accounts of the American colonists' views on confrontation and on the adversary system in general. She attributes particular significance to the influence of Blackstone's Commentaries, a text
in high demand in the Colonies during the decade of American independence. See id. at 581-84.
211 See Friedman, supra note 13, at 1023-24 & n.69 (citing inter alia the Case of the Union of
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tury trials for the crime of treason, the English monarchy sought to impose
inquisitorial procedures, similar to those of the civil-law courts of Continental Europe. In these "State Trials," some of which were conducted before the
infamous Star Chamber, the prosecution typically relied on depositions, affidavits, or written statements procured by examining magistrates or officers of
the Crown.218 The trials consisted of the reading of such statements followed
by a colloquy, an argument, between the prisoner and either the Crown's
counsel or the court.219 Not surprisingly, such prosecutions "occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his 'accusers,' i.e. the witnesses
against him, brought before him face to face." 220 By the middle of the seventeenth century, the reaction to these abuses served to reaffirm a common-law
right of confrontation in criminal trials. The practice of "trial by affidavit"
diminished after the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641 and largely had
disappeared by 1700.221
The Court has traced the beginnings of the American confrontation right
to this period of English history.222 Although some scholars question
whether events occurring as much as two hundred years earlier would have
weighed on the minds of late-eighteenth-century Americans,223 there is good
reason to believe that the connection is real. The lawyers and statesmen who
proposed and debated the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights undoubtedly were familiar with this history.224 During the pre-Revolutionary
period, they perceived themselves as victims of Star Chamber-like practices.225 Their own writings demonstrate that they bristled against attempts
the Realms, 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 913 (K.B. 1604) ("For the Testimonies, being viva voce before
Judges in open face of the world, ... was much to be preferred before written depositions by
private examiners or Commissioners.")).
218 See Green, 399 U.S. at 156-57 (recounting the English practice of trying defendants by
ex parte affidavit); Berger, supra note 15, at 569-70.
219 See Green, 399 U.S. at 176-77 & n.9; 9 Sm WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 225-27 (3d ed. 1994); 1 JAMES FITZ.JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 325-26 (London, Macmillan 1883) ("[T]he whole trial, in fact, was a long
argument between the prisoner and the counsel for the Crown, in which they questioned each
other and grappled with each other's arguments with the utmost eagerness and closeness of
reasoning."); Berger, supra note 15, at 569-70.
220 James F. Stephen, Criminal Procedure from the Thirteenth to the Eighteenth Century, in
2 SELECT EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HISTORY 443, 491 (1908), quoted in Berger, supra note
15, at 570. The most prominent example was the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason.
See infra notes 230-234 and accompanying text.
221 See Berger, supra note 15, at 570; Friedman, supra note 13, at 1024; 5 WIGMORE, supra
note 177, § 1364, at 23 & n.47.
222 See Green, 399 U.S. at 156-57.
223 See Kenneth W. Graham Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir
Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. Buu.. 99, 100 n.4 (1972) (suggesting that the
notion that "the evils of the Raleigh trial led in some way to the Sixth Amendment" might not
be "anything other than a convenient but highly romantic myth"); see also Green, 399 U.S. at
177-78 (Harlan, J., concurring) (questioning the connection of the Raleigh trial's abuses to the
Confrontation Clause).
224 See supra note 216.
225 The colonists' ire was directed at the vice-admiralty courts established by the British to
punish violations of acts restricting the colonists' rights in international trade. See Lilly, supra
note 13, at 211. Professor Lilly describes the nature of the colonists' objections:
Initially, the colonial common law courts had jurisdiction over these offenders.
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by George III to revive elements of the inquisitorial system in penalty proceedings in the vice-admiralty courts in the 1760s.226 In short, there is a
strong reason to believe that the Framers placed a high value on the right of
confrontation that had originated in the common-law courts and that had
survived the battles in the Star Chamber. Despite the absence of direct commentary on the issue during the adoption and ratification of the Bill of
Rights, logic suggests that the Confrontation Clause was the means chosen to
perpetuate that common-law practice.
History, then, permits one reasonably safe conclusion: the Clause was
intended-at least in part-to prohibit trials by ex parte affidavit or by deposition when a court denied an accused any opportunity to challenge his accusers face-to-face. Thus, more than a hundred years after the Bill of Rights, the
Court probably was correct when it wrote, "The primary object of [the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as
were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness ...." 227
But this is only a starting point; there is more to the historical puzzle. If
we conclude that the Framers' only aim was to stop inquisitorial "trials by
affidavit," we plausibly might decide that the Clause applies only to "witnesses" who testify in court or from whom the government, in something
akin to the inquisitorial fashion, has obtained "testimony" in a form
equivalent to affidavits or to ex parte depositions. But as we have seen, the
Court rejected that view with little apparent concern for historical analysis.228
Even if the Framers meant to include declarants as "witnesses," however, we
still are left with two historically plausible possibilities that either (1) do not
The earlier prosecutions were conducted in the traditional adversarial mode, which
included examination of witnesses in open court and trial by jury. The significance
of the latter, coupled with British apprehension that colonial juries were unwilling
to convict fellow colonists, led Parliament to enlarge the jurisdiction of the viceadmiralty courts. These courts sat without a jury and their procedure was based
upon civil law. The colonists strenuously objected to this mode of trial which in
England was carefully restricted.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
226 George Mason, author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, from which drafters of the
Bill of Rights directly derived the Confrontation Clause, complained that the King had created a
"civil law court," depriving the colonists of the rights that Englishmen enjoyed in the commonlaw courts. See 1 KATE MASON RowLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MAsoN 1725-1792, 383 (1892),
quoted in Lilly, supra note 13, at 211. John Adams, who defended John Hancock in a penalty
proceeding in the vice-admiralty courts in 1768, condemned the practice of the "[e]xamination of
witnesses upon Interrogatories" in that court. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JoHN ADAMS 207 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). Popular publications from both the pre-Revolutionary period and from the time of the Constitutional debates attack the inquisitorial practices
of civil-law courts and extol the virtues of the co=on-law practice. See Berger, supra note 14,
at 583 n.108.
221 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); see also Green, 399 U.S. at 156:
[T]he particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the
practice of trying defendants on "evidence" which consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magistrates, thus denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-to-face encounter in front
of the trier of fact.
228 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992).
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require exclusion of hearsay at all, or (2) provide for exclusion, not because
of unreliability, but only as a means to induce the government to produce
available witnesses.
One possibility is that the Clause guarantees only the right to "confront"
an available witness, but does not require exclusion of his hearsay testimony.
If the Star Chamber was on the minds of the Framers, then this view is entirely plausible. The Star Chamber battles focused on confrontation, not on
exclusion of hearsay. For example, in the 1603 prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason, probably the most famous of the State Trials, the Crown
accused Raleigh of conspiring with Lord Cobham to overthrow King
James.229 The Crown's principal evidence was Cobham's "confession"-an
ex parte examination before the Privy Council-and a letter that Cobham
later wrote.230 Raleigh did not call for exclusion of the confession. Instead,
he protested, "let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before
my face, and I have done."231 His demand was for confrontation, not for the
exclusion of evidence. Indeed, Raleigh seemed. to concede that the out-ofcourt confession would remain before the court.232 The same pattern holds
true in at least some of the other celebrated State Trials.233 Exclusion was
not the issue.234 The accused demanded "confrontation."
A second plausible interpretation of history equates with the Roberts
Court's original "rule of necessity"-the Clause requires exclusion of hearsay
only when the declarant is available but is not called by the government as a
witness. Conversely, under this view, when the declarant is unavailable, the
Confrontation Clause would not restrict the admissibility of hearsay. Here,
exclusion is not based on the unreliability of the hearsay statements.235 Instead, the threat of exclusion serves as a spur to require the government to
See 1 STEPHEN, supra note 219, at 333.
See id.
231 2 COBBETI'S CoMPLETE CoLLEcnON OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE TIME
1783, at 1, 16 (London, R. Bagshaw, 1809) [hereinafter "STATE TRIALS"].
232 "[L]et [Cobham] be produced, and if he will yet accuse me or avow this Confession of
his, it shall convict me and ease you of further proof." Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1 CRIMINAL
TRIALS 400, 427 (London, Charles Knight 1832).
233 See 1 STATE TRIALS, supra note 233, at 875-76 (discussing the trial of Sir Nicholas
Throckmorton); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 219, at 216 (same); 3 STATE TRIALS, supra note 231,
at 1315-22 (trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton); 1 STATE TRIALS, supra note 233, 483, 492
(trial of Sir Thomas Seymour); 1 STATE TRIALS, supra note 233, 515, 520 (1551). But see 5
WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 1364, at 23 ("[M]arkedly by the middle of the 1600s •.. the notion
tends to prevail, and gradually becomes definitely fixed, that even an extrajudicial statement
under oath should not be used if the deponent can be personally had in court.").
234 Justice White, writing for the Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), noted
this distinction and attributed significance to it:
But objections occasioned by this practice [of trial by ex parte affidavit] appear
primarily to have been aimed at the failure to call the witness to confront personally the defendant at his trial. So far as appears, in claiming confrontation rights no
objection was made against receiving a witness' out-of-court depositions or statements, so long as the witness was present at trial •...
Id. at 157.
235 See Lilly, supra note 13, at 213 ("[T]he common law right of confrontation diverged
from the hearsay rule in this particular: the declarant's presence was always preferred even
229
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produce the testimony in the preferred form: through a live witness in court.
The Clause "functions as a rule of preference requiring the presence of the
declarant, if available." 23 6
There is historical support for this view both from the American Colonial period and from the earlier State Trials. John Adams wrote that the ex
parte examinations of witnesses in a criminal case "ought not to be read [in
court] if they can be produced, viva voce." 237 Presumably, Adams's qualified
language suggests that he was more willing to accept the use of hearsay when
the declarant could not be produced. Wigmore cites a handful of State Trial
reports through the mid-seventeenth century that admitted the depositions of
unavailable witnesses against criminal defendants.238 Although the practice
of trial by affidavit diminished after the abolition of the Star Chamber in
1641, English courts in criminal cases during, and beyond, the time of the
drafting of the Bill of Rights continued to admit in evidence the statements of
deceased witnesses made during ex parte examinations by coroners or justices of the peace, notwithstanding the absence of cross-examination.239 In
sum, even as the confrontation right developed over the two centuries before
the American Constitution, the English courts proved reluctant to grant an
exclusionary remedy in cases in which the declarant's unavailability would
depri'.'e the court of the witness's evidence altogether.
When the Court formulated its "general approach" in Roberts, however,
the Court merely ignored the ambiguities in this history. The Roberts opinion began with the bald assertion that "[t]he historical evidence leaves little
doubt ... that the Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay." 240 To the
extent that the Court has relied on history at all to justify its exclusionary
rule, it has reached two conclusions that deserve critical attention. First, the
Court has equated the Confrontation Clause to the common-law right of confrontation. It first took that step in Mattox and repeated it in later confrontation-hearsay cases.241 Second, the Court has equated that common-law right
though his statement may be sufficiently trustworthy to fall within a hearsay exception and thus
be admissible in his absence.").
236 See id. at 215.
237 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JoHN ADAMS, supra note 226, at 341 (emphasis added) ("The Examination of the Prisoner himself (if not on oath) may be read as Evidence against him; but the
Examination of others (though not on oath) ought not to be read if they can be produced, viva
voce.").
238 5 WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 1364, at 23 n.47.
239 See id. at 25 & n.51 (citing, inter alia, King v. Buckworth, 84 Eng. Rep. 252 (K.B. 1669)
(admitting, in a perjury prosecution, the testimony of a deceased witness from the trial in which
the perjury occurred); 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 306 (ca. 1680) (finding that information
upon oath before a justice of the peace is admissible in felony trials)).
240 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57
& nn.9-10). Curiously, this passage from Green not only fails to support the Court's categorical
assertion, but it actually contradicts the assertion in part. The cited passage ends by concluding,
"Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not
violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying
as a \vitness and subject to full and effective cross-examination." Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
241 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Salinger v. United States, 272
U.S. 542, 548 (1926) ("The right of confrontation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth
Amendment, but was a common-law right having recognized exceptions. The purpose of that
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of confrontation to the hearsay rule. Again, the Court first made this connection in Mattox, where the Court analogized a hearsay exception-dying declarations-to exceptions to the confrontation right.242 Attempting to leave
some shred of independent life in the Confrontation Clause, the Roberts
Court slightly modified that approach to provide that only "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions, or those exceptions with equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness, would pass muster under the Clause.243
There is historical support for the Court's first step-the notion that the
Framers aimed to adopt the common-law right of confrontation for their new
Constitution. Justice Story maintained that the Confrontation Clause "follow[ed] out the established course of the common law in all trials for
crimes."244 It requires a much greater leap, however, to equate that common-law right of confrontation to the wholesale "incorporation" of the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
It seems at least equally plausible that the Framers viewed the accused's
right of "confrontation" as something separate and distinct from the evidentiary rule against "hearsay." The few legal treatises that were available to
eighteenth-century lawyers treat the basic rules of hearsay separately from
the problem of relying upon ex parte affidavits in criminal cases.245 The hearsay rule and its exceptions are, and were in 1791, principles of evidence that
applied generally to all parties in all cases, not just to the government in
criminal cases.246 Because generous hearsay exceptions are just as likely to
favor the defendant as the government, there is little reason to believe that
the Framers feared the development of hearsay exceptions as a likely source
of state tyranny. Although eighteenth-century Americans wrote about the
abuses of the Star Chamber, there is no historical evidence that they railed
against the Crown's excessive use of, for example, dying declarations or
coconspirator statements.
provision . . . is to continue and preserve that right, and not to broaden it or disturb the
exceptions.").
242 See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44.
243 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
244 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 664
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
245 Blackstone praised the co=on-law system of the "open examination of witnesses"
when "the occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of interrogatories previously penned and settled." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *345. Beyond its
discussion of confrontation, Blackstone's Commentaries do not address the law of evidence at
all. See Berger, supra note 15, at 584 & n.110.
_,
In its chapter "Of Evidence," Hawkins's 1724 treatise addresses the matter of ex parte examinations as a question apart from the admissibility of "hearsay." See 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A
TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429-31 (1724). Hawkins first addresses the question,
"[w]here the Confession of the Defendant or the Depositions of others out of Court may be
allowed as Evidence" and recounts a series of opinions holding, for the most part, that ex parte
examinations before a justice of the peace or a coroner are admissible only if the witness either is
dead or is clearly unavailable. See id. at 429-30. In the next section, he addresses the apparently
separate question, "How far Hearsay is Evidence." See id.
246 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 97 n.4 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing 1 JoHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 4, at 16-17).
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Finally, the "incorporation of hearsay rules" approach suggests that the
Framers chose to "freeze" the law of hearsay as it existed in 1790, and to
subject any further development of hearsay doctrine to the laborious process
of constitutional amendment. That would be an extremely peculiar choice
for a group of lawyers and statesmen who were familiar with the evolutionary
process by which common-law courts developed and modified the rules of
evidence generally and the hearsay rules in particular.247 By making such a
choice, in effect, they would have arrested the common-law process that they
so admired, and that had produced the right of confrontation in the first
place.
In short, there are more than a few plausible historical reasons to conclude that the Framers left the admissibility of hearsay to the law of evidence.248 That does not mean, however, that they intended to leave the
accused defenseless in the face of hearsay evidence. Rather, the Framers
drafted a Sixth Amendment that includes a host of rights intended to ensure
an adversarial challenge to prosecution evidence. If they considered hearsay
at all in relation to those rights, there is no reason to conclude that the Framers would have considered such rights to be inadequate for challenging prosecution hearsay. Certainly in the case of available declarants, they had an
historical point of reference in Raleigh's case that highlighted actual confrontation, rather than exclusion. 249 Even in the case of deceased or absent declarants, the common law offered some examples of adversarial challenges to
admissible hearsay. Although that historical evidence is slim, the practice of
impeaching hearsay declarants is probably as old as the notion of exceptions
to the hearsay rule. Some of the earliest hearsay exceptions provoked adversarial responses, and the common-law courts allowed an opponent to present
both prior inconsistent statements and adverse character evidence to impeach dying declarations and other hearsay testimony. 250 In sum, even without a Sixth Amendment limit on admissibility, the Framers would not have
considered defendants powerless to challenge hearsay.
247 See James W. Jennings, Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach
to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 746 (1965) ("[T]he established
hearsay exceptions had gone through a gradual and at times confusing development by the
1790's, and others were still in the process of being refined."); see also 5 WrGMORE, supra note
177, § 1364, at 12-28.
248 This was Wigmore's conclusion:
The net result, then, under the constitutional rule, is that, so far as testimony is
required under the hearsay rule to be taken infrajudicially, it shall be taken in a
certain way, namely, subject to cross-examination-not secretly or ex parte away
from the accused. The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial
statements (dying declarations or the like) shall be given infrajudicially-this depends on the law of evidence for the time being-but only what mode of procedure
shall be followed-i.e., a cross-examining procedure-in the case of such testimony
as is required by the ordinary law of evidence to be given infrajudicially.
5 WrGMORE, supra note 177, § 1364, at 159. Justice Harlan is the only member of the Court to
have embraced that view explicitly. See Evans, 400 U.S. at 93-94 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I
have ... become convinced that Wigmore states the correct view ....").
249 See supra text accompanying notes 230-234.
250 See 3A WrGMORE, supra note 177, § 1033, at 1037-39 & n.2 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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Defining and Applying the Right to Confront Hearsay

Once we move beyond the question of admissibility, the right of confrontation is fundamentally the same whether it applies to a testifying prosecution witness or to a hearsay declarant. The defendant's right is to
"confront," to challenge the credibility and accuracy of, a witness either
through live in-court cross-examination when the declarant is available or
through any available alternative means to challenge hearsay when she is not.
To understand the scope of that right as it relates to hearsay declarants as
"witnesses," we should look first at how the Court has applied the right when
a witness testifies for the prosecution at trial.
When a prosecution witness testifies, the confrontation right is not selfexecuting. The defendant must affirmatively exercise it. Thus, a defendant
waives the right if he elects not to cross-examine the witness.251 Likewise, he
waives the right if the defendant himself takes steps to avoid confrontation.252 The Clause guarantees only an opportunity to cross-examine. It is up
to the defendant to seize the opportunity.
That opportunity is subject to reasonable limits. Courts may limit crossexamination if it is irrelevant,253 cumulative,254 or merely for the harassment
of a witness255 Nevertheless, the legitimate aims of cross-examination, which
are quite broad, define the scope of the confrontation right. Cross-examination aims to elicit details-details omitted from direct examination-for the
purpose of demonstrating inconsistencies or qualifications in the witness's
testimony.256 Cross-examination also aims more broadly at the impeachment
of the witness; that is, it aims to elicit facts showing that the witness either is
mistaken or lying, or both.257 Thus, a court violates a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights if it impedes a defendant's opportunity to inquire into the
details of the case, or to impeach the witness by eliciting facts relating to her
perception, memory, bias, or integrity.258
251 See United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1457 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Howard, 751 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1984).
252 See United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding no confrontation
violation when defendant ordered someone to murder the witness); United States v. Ronco, 765
F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding the confrontation right to be waived when the defendant
killed the witness).
253 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (finding no confrontation violation when the lower court had restricted cross-examination on matters of marginal significance).
254 See United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1996) (restricting cumulative cross-examination).
255 See Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 402 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that the lower court
properly restricted cross-examination that lacked any factual basis).
256 See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 1368, at2336-37 ("[A] witness, on his direct examination, discloses but a part of the necessary facts. That which remains suppressed or undeveloped
may be of two sorts, (a) the remaining and qualifying circumstances of the subject of testimony,
as known to the witness, and (b) the facts which diminish the personal trustworthiness of the
witness.").
257 See id.; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
258 See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (finding that the trial court violated the
Confrontation Clause by prohibiting the defendant in a rape case from cross-examining the victim regarding her cohabitation with her boyfriend); Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17 (finding that the
lower court violated the defendant's confrontation right by preventing him from cross-examining
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The Clause, of course, does not guarantee the success of cross-examination at trial.259 Thus, a defendant's confrontation right is not violated when
cross-examination results only in confirming that a witness is a pillar of truth.
Likewise, the Court has found no violation when a witness's inability to answer most questions with anything beyond, "I don't know," or "I can't remember," largely frustrates cross-examination.260 In sum, when a witness
testifies at trial, the Confrontation Clause guarantees "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." 261
The Court tells us that a hearsay declarant is a "witness" for purposes of
the confrontation right.262 This final section explores the scope and practical
application of the right to "confront" that declarant "witness." The section
deals separately with available and unavailable declarants not because the
right is fundamentally different in each case, but because of the obvious practical differences in the nature of the "confrontation." In either case, however, the roadmap for defining the right should be the same. A defendant's
right to confront hearsay should, as closely as possible, mirror his opportunity
to challenge a testifying prosecution witness.
A.

Confronting Available Declarants-The Right to Real Confrontation

When a hearsay declarant is available to testify, a defendant has an opportunity for real confrontation-face-to-face cross-examination in the courtroom. Under Roberts' general rule of necessity, the government must
provide that opportunity in order to use hearsay from an available declarant.263 As we have seen, the Court quickly compromised that general rule.
After Inadi and White, the government must produce an available declarant
only where it seeks to use her former testimony.264 The Court does not impose that burden on the government, however, as a condition to admissibility
of any other form of hearsay.
Inadi and White offer both good news and bad news for defendants seeking support in the Sixth Amendment for a right to confront an available hearsay declarant. The good news is that the Court recognizes some right for the
a witness about possible bias or prejudice); United States v. Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir.
1983) (finding that the lower court violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by restricting cross-examination regarding the source of drugs, when the questions related to facts
supporting the defendant's theory of the case).
259 See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) ("[S]uccessful cross-examination is
not the constitutional guarantee.").
260 See id. at 559-60 (finding that the defendant's confrontation right was not violated by
the admission of an assault victim's hearsay identification of the defendant when, on cross-examination, the victim suffered memory loss and was unable to remember seeing the assailant or to
recall the circumstances of the out-of-court identification); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15
(1985) (finding no violation of the Confrontation Clause when, on cross-examination, an expert
was unable to recall the theory upon which his opinion was based).
261 Id. at 20, quoted in Owens, 484 U.S. at 559, and Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739
(1987).
262 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992).
263 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
264 See White, 502 U.S. at 353-54.
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defendant to pursue that confrontation. Inadi tells us that "if [the defendant]
independently wanted to secure [the declarant's] testimony, ... [t]he Compulsory Process Clause would have aided [him] in obtaining the testimony."
and Federal Rule of Evidence 806 would permit the defendan.t to question
that declarant "as if under cross-examination."265 The bad news, of course, is
that the Court finds that right in the Compulsory Process Clause and in the
Rules of Evidence, not in the Confrontation Clause. Ironically, it seems, the
Confrontation Clause plays no role in bringing about real confrontation of
the declarant.266
It is too early, however, to draw that broad conclusion from Inadi and
White. After all, both cases are products of the Court's exclusionary thinking. Both address the issue of unavailability only as "a condition to admission" of hearsay.267 Neither case presented the Court with the question of a
265 United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also White, 502
U.S. at 355.
266 In a thoughtful critique of Inadi, Professor Jonakait argues that a defendant's opportunity to subpoena a hearsay declarant is no substitute for a requirement that the prosecution
produce available witnesses. See Jonakait, supra note 8, at 613-22. He argues that such a view
improperly ignores the distinction between the compulsory process right to obtain witnesses
"favorable" to the defense and the defendant's right to confront "witnesses against" him. See id.
at 613-14. As a result, he argues, the Inadi view would require a defendant to make a showing
that a declarant is both "favorable" and material before she could be subpoenaed, id. at 614 &
n.150, a view that would mean that "the accused does not generally have a constitutional right to
compel the presence of a person who has uttered incriminating hearsay." Id. at 614. Professor
Jonakait expresses further concerns about the practical burdens that such a rule would place on
defendants, who may not have a right to discover the identity of hearsay declarants before trial,
and who may not have the practical ability to locate and to serve a subpoena on the declarant.
See id. at 615-22.
If the Court applied Inadi and White in the fashion that Professor Jonakait fears, then the
decisions indeed would leave precious little of a confrontation right in cases of available declarants. This Article suggests that such a reading of Inadi and White is unnecessary. Those cases
merely shift to the defendant the burden of initiating confrontation in cases in which the prosecution uses hearsay, other than former testimony, from an available declarant. The cases do not
address, however, the standard that a defendant must meet in order to call a hearsay declarant as
a witness. And neither Inadi nor White explores issues such as discovery relating to hearsay
declarants, nor any rights that a defendant might have to government assistance in producing
available declarants when a subpoena alone is insufficient. Indeed, if courts shift to the defendant the burden of initiating confrontation, then-to address the concerns appropriately raised by
Professor Jonakait-they must take seriously a defendant's right to learn the declarant's identity,
to obtain her presence, and to cross-examine her in a manner, and at a point during the trial, that
most closely would duplicate cross·examination of a live witness. See infra Part V.
267 See White, 502 U.S. at 34849:
In this case, we consider whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment requires that, before a trial court admits testimony under the "spontaneous declaration" and "medical examination" exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
prosecution must either produce the declarant at trial or the trial court must find
that the declarant is unavailable.
Id.; see Inadi, 475 U.S. at 391 ("We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether the Confrontation Clause requires a showing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the out-ofcourt statements of a nontestifying coconspirator ....") (citation omitted).
In both cases the defendants raised constitutional objections to the introduction of hearsay
evidence. The defendants, however, neither demanded that the hearsay declarant testify nor
made any attempt to produce or to call the declarant as a witness. As a result, the only issue
before the Court in both cases was the admissibility of hearsay. The Court never needed to

244

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 67:191

defendant's right to pursue confrontation with an available declarant because, like so many defendants, neither Inadi nor White vigorously sought an
in-court showdown with the declarant. Although the Court's dictum regarding Compulsory Process and Rule 806 might be true as far as it goes, it is by
no means a clear pronouncement from the Court that the confrontation right
plays no role in securing and defining a defendant's opportunity to challenge
an available declarant.
Such a rule would be inconsistent both with the Sixth Amendment and
with the Court's own decisions in two important respects. First, it would be
inconsistent with the Court's treatment of testifying declarants. When a
hearsay declarant actually testifies at trial, the Court quite clearly tells us to
treat her like any other witness.268 The confrontation right does not disappear just because hearsay is admitted. A defendant has the right to crossexamine a declarant-witness about the details of her hearsay statement, and
about any other matter that might serve to impeach her credibility. A court
that unduly restricts that cross-examination violates the Confrontation
Clause.269 If that same declarant were not called as a prosecution witness,
but instead appeared in court at a defendant's request only after the prosecution had introduced the same hearsay statements in evidence, then surely a
defendant is entitled to the same opportunities for impeachment. And if a
court sought to limit that impeachment, then the Confrontation Clause, not
the Compulsory Process Clause, would be the standard by which to judge
that limitation.270 It would make no sense to give the defense any less of an
opportunity to challenge the declarant because the prosecution had managed
to prove its case through hearsay, without calling the declarant to the stand in
the first place.
answer some fundamental questions about a defendant's right to confront an available declarant
once the hearsay is admitted: What if a subpoena fails to produce the declarant? Must the
government assist a defendant to loc;ate and produce her? When does she testify? What form of
questions may counsel ask? What discovery rights does a defendant have with respect to a hearsay declarant? An objective observer, un-schooled in the Court's confrontation-hearsay jurisprudence, might find these issues much more central to the matter of "confrontation" than, for
example, the historical roots of the coconspirator hearsay rule. Because Inadi and White address
only admissibility, however, the opinions have little to say about confrontation.
268 See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558-61 (1988); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 19-22 (1985); supra text accompanying notes 182-184.
269 See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316-17 (1974).
210 Compare Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17, with United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 867 (1982). The Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to an opportunity for effective
cross-examination and is violated when the trial court prohibits defense cross-examination from
exposing any "facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness." See Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. Although there is relatively little law
considering a defendant's right, under the Compulsory Process Clause, to present favorable evidence, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), it seems clear that such a right is more
limited than a defendant's right to cross-examine a prosecution witness on any matter reasonably
related to credibility. Indeed, the Court has suggested that the Compulsory Process standard is
violated only if a "defendant [is] deprived of 'testimony [that] would have been relevant and
material, and ... vital to the defense."' Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867 (quoting Washington,
388 U.S. at 16 (1967)).
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Second, a rule that would deprive the Confrontation Clause of any role
in defining a defendant's right to challenge an available declarant would run
afoul of White. The Sixth Amendment speaks of two rights regarding witnesses. The Confrontation Clause provides a right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against" an accused.271 The Compulsory Process Clause, by
contrast, provides a right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 272 White tells us, for good or for ill, that a hearsay declarant is a "witness against" the accused.273 It would be anomalous,
therefore, to look only to the Compulsory Process Clause to define a defendant's rights with respect to such a "witness."274
These observations return the discussion to a fundamental point: the
right of confrontation does not end when a hearsay declarant testifies. It is
critical to recognize that the confrontation right survives the initial question
of admissibility because, in some cases at least, its protections are broader
than those afforded by the Compulsory Process Clause and by the law of
evidence. At a minimum, that confrontation right includes (1) the right to
call a hearsay declarant as a witness simply because she is the declarant of
"testimony" already introduced by the government, whether or not she meets
the Compulsory Process standard for witnesses "favorable" to the defense;
(2) the right to good-faith efforts by the government to locate and to produce
a hearsay declarant if a subpoena alone does not suffice; and (3) the right to a
cross-examining form in questioning the declarant.2 75
1.

The Right to Call a Hearsay Declarant as a Witness

"The Sixth Amendment," the Court has written, "does not by its terms
grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses." 276 The Compulsory Process Clause applies
only to "witnesses in [the defendant's] favor." 277 To show a violation of his
right to compulsory process, the Court has held, a defendant must "make
some plausible showing" that the witness he seeks to produce is likely to give
testimony that is (1) material and (2) favorable to the defense.278 If an indigent defendant seeks subpoenas at the government's expense, the Federal
Rules mirror that limitation.279
See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
See id.
273 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992).
274 See Jonakait, supra note 8, at 614 n.151 (criticizing Inadi's logic because it "recognizes
only one right when the Constitution created two").
275 To meaningfully exercise the right to confront an available declarant, a defendant also
must be accorded the same discovery rights with respect to a hearsay declarant as for any other
prosecution "witness." See infra Part V.C.
276 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
277 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
278 See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867.
279 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b) (stating that a court shall issue a subpoena for an indigent
defendant "upon a satisfactory showing that ... the presence of the witness is necessary to an
adequate defense"). In fact, the language of this rule seems even more restrictive than the
Court's words in Valenzuela-Bernal.
271

212
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Where the "witness" is a hearsay declarant whose "testimony" the government has already succeeded in putting before the jury, however, the showing required by the Compulsory Process Clause is too restrictive. In the first
place, the issue of materiality has already been determined in large measure
by the government's choice to offer the hearsay and the court's finding that it
is admissible. Given that predicate, for purposes of the confrontation right,
anything is "material" that a defendant might choose to pursue on cross-examination if the declarant appeared as a prosecution witness. The notion of
"materiality" thus includes a declarant's ability to perceive and to remember
the facts conveyed through the hearsay statements and to add detail. It includes anything reasonably calculated to impeach credibility. It even includes a witness's demeanor before the jury if she does nothing other than
relate the same facts contained in the hearsay statement.280 In short, almost
by definition, that declarant's testimony will meet the test of "materiality."
Second, requiring a defendant to show in advance that his examination of a
hearsay declarant would prove "favorable" to the defense is inconsistent with
the right of confrontation at trial. At trial, defense counsel may cross-examine without proving in advance that his examination will result in successful impeachment. As a practical matter, it often may be difficult for counsel
to predict in advance what facts she might elicit on cross-examination. The
Confrontation Clause guarantees the opportunity to inquire nonetheless.281
It would be anomalous to place additional restrictions on that opportunity
simply because a court allowed the government to proceed by way of hearsay
evidence.
If the declarant is a "witness against" the accused, then a defendant's
right to bring her before the jury for cross-examination arises simply because
she is the declarant, not because of an independent showing that cross-examination is likely to succeed. In effect, this approach does nothing more than
put a defendant in the same position that he would have occupied if the prosecution had offered live testimony rather than hearsay. As a practical matter,
this approach seems unlikely to impose on courts and on prosecutors the
kinds of burdens that the Court sought to limit in Inadi and White when it
retreated from a general rule requiring the government to produce any available hearsay declarant. First, the confrontation right is not self-executing, a
defendant must invoke the right. Experience suggests that, purely by tactical
choice, defendants will prefer to avoid real confrontation more often than to
invite it.282 Moreover, after Inadi and White, defendants must invoke the
right by obtaining and by serving a subpoena.283 Few defendants will go to
that trouble without some reason for believing that it will matter. Finally, to
280 But cf United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388-89 (3rd Cir. 1986) (finding that the
lower court faced with a large volume of evidence at a pretrial detention hearing, properly refused to compel the attendance of defense witness when the defendant sought the witness's
presence only because visual observation might lead the jury to find the witness unreliable).
281 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (stating that a cross-examiner may "delve
into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory"); Henry v. Speckard, 22 F.3d
1209, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the lower court violated the Confrontation Clause by
refusing to allow defense counsel to explore possible bias of a child witness).
282 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
283 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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the extent that a defendant seeks to abuse the opportunity to obtain the tiresence of hearsay declarants for cross-examination, the court retains the same
power it would have to restrict any cross-examination designed purely for
delay, harassment, or other improper purpose.284
2.

Government Assistance in Producing the Declarant

Because Inadi and White address the issue of availability only as a predicate to the admissibility of hearsay, they shift to the defendant only the burden of initiating confrontation.285 If a defendant wants confrontation, he
must ask for it. Just as he may waive confrontation of a courtroom witness by
choosing not to cross-examine her, a defendant may waive confrontation of
an available declarant by failing to demand her presence.286 Under Inadi and
White, a defendant must make that demand by requesting a subpoena and by
taking reasonable steps to locate and bring the witness to court.
The Court retreated from its general "rule of necessity," requiring the
government to produce all available hearsay declarants, because the rule imposed substantial, and largely unnecessary, burdens on the courts and on the
government.287 There is an equivalent danger, however, in leaving defendants entirely to their own devices in bringing a declarant to the courtroom.288
Requesting a subpoena normally should impose little burden on a defendant.
But a subpoena may not always suffice to bring about confrontation. Declarants may be hard to locate or impossible to produce without information or
resources available only to the government. It would be a mistake to read
Inadi and White in a manner that absolves the government of all constitutional responsibility for bringing available declarants to the courtroom.
When a defendant seeks real confrontation, the Sixth Amendment requires
the government to be more than a passive observer to his exercise in futility.
A comparison with the compulsory process right proves the point.
When a defendant seeks to call a witness in his behalf, the Compulsory Pro284 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (dictum) (finding that a court
does not violate the confrontation right by restricting cross-examination on matters of marginal
significance).
285 Professor Westen summarized the distinction between the Compulsory Process right to
"have compulsory process" to obtain witnesses "in favor" of the accused, and the Confrontation
Clause right to "be confronted with" the "witnesses against" the accused.
[T]he significance of the dichotomy is simply that it allocates between the prosecution and the defense the burden of taking the initiative in identifying the witnesses to be produced-placing on the prosecution the burden of confronting the
defendant with witnesses "against" him, and placing on the defendant the burden
of identifying and requesting the production of witnesses "in his favor."
Westen, supra note 2, at 602. After White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), of course, the allocation of burdens that Professor Westen described has changed. Except in cases of former testimony, the Court now places on the defendant the burden of initiating confrontation with an
absent declarant. See id. at 353-57.
286 See United States v. Burton, 937 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1991).
287 See White, 502 U.S. at 356-57; United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397-99 (1986).
288 Professor Jonakait notes with concern the practical difficulties facing defendants in attempting to produce hearsay declarants. See Jonakait, supra note 8, at 614-16. These concerns
highlight the need to give the right to confront hearsay a realistic construction that includes both
discovery rights and the right to government assistance when necessary to produce a declarant.
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cess Clause gives him more than the right to obtain a subpoena and to hope
that it works. The right extends to witnesses beyond a state's subpoena powers.289 It includes the right to require the government to use available coercive and persuasive means to bring a witness to court.290 Although the right
does not require the government to accomplish the impossible, it compels the
government to make good faith efforts to obtain the presence of available
witnesses for the defense. 291
Although the constitutional source of the right to obtain the presence of
an available hearsay declarant, a "witness against" the accused, rests more
comfortably in the Confrontation Clause, the government's obligation to assist in that effort should be at least equivalent to its obligations under the
Compulsory Process Clause. Surely the government can have no less of an
obligation to assist in producing a hearsay declarant, whose statements the
government itself has used in evidence, than in producing a defense witness
whom the government had no role in choosing. For most purposes, of
course, it might not matter which Clause one prefers to identify as the source
of the right; the result is the same. Whether based on the Confrontation
Clause or its "fraternal twin," 292 the Compulsory Process Clause, a defendant
has a right to the reasonable assistance of the government in producing hearsay declarants when a subpoena alone does not suffice. A defendant is not
"on his own" to produce available hearsay declarants any more than he is left
to his own powers to produce defense witnesses.
In the end, a defendant's right to bring an available declarant to court
offers an indirect path to a Sixth Amendment rule excluding some hearsay.
Except in cases of former testimony, the government need not produce an
available declarant as a precondition for the admission of her hearsay statements.293 Where the defendant's subpoena fails, however, the government
may be required to assist in efforts to produce the declarant.294 If the government fails to exercise good faith in making such efforts, the only effective
sanction might be exclusion of the hearsay. 295 In this respect, Inadi and
289 See United States v. Theresius Filippi, 918 F.2d 244, 247 (1st Cir. 1990); Westen, supra
note 2, at 588.
290 See Filippi, 918 F.2d at 247 (finding that the government violated the defendant's com·
pulsory process right by failing to request a special interest parole from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to enable the attendance of a defense witness); Westen, supra note 2, at
588 & n.54 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 475 F.2d 61, 64 (9th Cir. 1973)
(finding that the government satisfied the Compulsory Process Clause by allowing the defense to
send an investigator to Mexico to persuade a witness to attend the trial)).
291 See Filippi, 918 F.2d at 247; Westen, supra note 2, at 588. Cf United States v. Gutierrez,
931F.2d1482, 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding no compulsory process violation when the government made a reasonable, but unsuccessful, effort to locate a witness).
292 Amar, supra note 15, at 695.
293 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992).
294 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
295 Invoking the exclusionary sanction for this purpose has added benefits. If the government expects to use hearsay to prove an important fact at trial, but fails to provide a defendant
with both notice and discovery regarding the location and the identity of the declarant, if known
to the government, then the government takes a significant risk in introducing the hearsay in
evidence. At a minimum, it risks some delay at trial while the defendant attempts to subpoena
the witness. Even if the court admits the evidence, the government's subsequent failure to make
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White leave open the prospect that the Sixth Amendment may operate as an
exclusionary rule of a different sort: not as a rule of evidence excluding unreliable hearsay, not even as a rule of necessity, or "preference," making a
showing of unavailability an automatic precondition to the admission of prosecution hearsay, but as an exclusionary rule under the court's supervisory
power when the government drags its feet in bringing about a confrontation
that a defendant desires but cannot obtain through subpoena.296
3.

The Right to "Hostile" Questioning

The right to cross-examination is the core of the Confrontation
Clause.297 And the cross-examination guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
means more than simply facing a witness and asking her what happened.
Cross-examination, quite literally, involves "confrontation." The cross-examiner confronts a witness with facts-typically through leading questions and
sometimes with documentary or physical evidence-and demands an immediate response. The power of cross-examination, the Court often has recognized, comes in large measure from this process of hostile questioning, a
process of "testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness." 298
Even when a witness appears at trial, testifies before the jury, and is
questioned by defense counsel, a court may violate the defendant's confrontation right by denying the defense an opportunity to this hostile form of
questioning an adverse witness. Chambers v. Mississippi29 9 offers the clearest
good faith efforts, if necessary, to locate and to produce the witness might lead to a successful
defense motion to strike the hearsay or, if the evidence is sufficiently important, to a mistrial.
Prosecutors who expect to use hearsay to_prove significant facts, therefore, would be well advised to inform defendants of that expectation well before trial, thereby allowing the defense to
request and to serve a timely subpoena. Of course, when the defense chooses to subpoena a
hearsay declarant, the likely result in many cases will be a change of strategy by the prosecutor,
who would not want the jury to perceive him as the party seeking to "hide" the \vitness from the
jury. In such cases, the defense's subpoena may induce the prosecutor to put the declarant on
the stand.
296 In enforcing its "rule of necessity" even before Roberts, the Court made it clear that the
government's neglect to use available means to produce a hearsay declarant would render hearsay constitutionally inadmissible. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723, 725 (1968) (e.xcluding
hearsay under the Confrontation Clause because the government made no effort to obtain a
hearsay declarant from federal prison); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (excluding hearsay under the Confrontation Clause when a witness's absence was due to government
negligence in releasing the witness from jail and in failing to monitor him). Under the approach
suggested in this Article, government neglect essentially would have the same effect. After Inadi
and White, the main difference would be a requirement that a defendant take the first step,
except in cases of former testimony, to demand the presence of a witness and to back-up the
demand with a subpoena.
297 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested."); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the clause hold that a primary
interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination."); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242-43 (1895); see also 5 WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 1367, at 158 ("[I]f the accused has had the
benefit of cross-examination, he has had the very privilege secured to him by the Constitution.").
298 See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242.
299 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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example of such a violation. There, a defendant charged with murder sought
to prove that another man, Gable McDonald, was the true culprit.300 McDonald, in fact, had confessed under oath to the murder. 301 When the state
failed to call McDonald as a witness, the defense put him on the stand and
succeeded in offering the sworn confession in evidence.302 Under prosecution questioning, McDonald promptly repudiated the confession.303 When
the defense then sought permission to examine McDonald "as an adverse
witness," the trial court denied the request under Mississippi's then-existing
"voucher" rule that prohibited a party from impeaching its own witness.304
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, in part because the trial court
had denied the defendant the hostile form of questioning typically associated
with cross-examination. "The right of cross-examination," the Court wrote,
"is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation"305 Under Chambers, then, the right to a hostile
form of questioning does not evaporate simply because the defendant calls
the witness.306
Inadi is certainly correct when it says that a defendant has the "option,"
provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 806, to call a hearsay declarant to the
stand and question her as if she were on cross-examination.307 But that right
to a cross-examining form in questioning that declarant is more than an option under the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is a criminal defendant's constitutional right.308
See id. at 289.
See id. at 287.
302 See id. at 291.
303 See id.
304 See id. at 291-94.
305 Id. at 295. Although the opinion ultimately rests upon a finding that Chambers's trial
violated the Due Process guarantee of a fair trial, the Court's views on due process stem directly
from the confrontation right in the Sixth Amendment. "The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential
to due process." Id. at 294.
306 Professor Amar reaches the same conclusion, but with different reasoning. He challenges the Court's view that a hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused and argues
accordingly that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to most hearsay. See Amar, supra
note 15, at 691-97. Nevertheless, he finds a right to "hostile questioning," in appropriate circumstances, inherent in the Compulsory Process Clause: "[T]he very notion of compulsory process
suggests the possibility of an obvious conflict of interest between the witness and the accused."
Id. at 696 n.214.
307 See FED. R. Evm. 806 ("If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.").
308 It could be argued that the confrontation right should encompass other aspects of trial
procedure typically available when a defendant cross-examines a prosecution witness. One important aspect, for example, might be the defendant's typical right to cross-examine a witness
immediately after direct examination. Tue opportunity to impeach while the witness's direct
testimony is fresh in the jury's mind might have important advantages over a process that requires a defendant to wait until the end of the government's case before calling the declarant for
what would be, in effect, a cross-examination. See Jonakait, supra note 8, at 619-20. Professor
Westen contends, "the right of a defendant to interrupt the state's presentation of evidence by
cross-examining prosecution witnesses is at the core of the sixth amendment right of confrontation." Peter Westen, Order of Proof An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence of
300

301
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In summary, there is life in the Confrontation Clause for dealing with
available declarants, even after Inadi and White. That life stems from viewing the Clause not as a rule of admissibility, but as an affirmative right to
confront hearsay. Inadi and White require a defendant to be serious in his
demand for confrontation, and to back up that demand with a subpoena, but
they do not erase the basic right to confront hearsay. A defendant has the
right to confront a hearsay declarant not because he can show in advance that
cross-examination would prove "favorable" to the defense, but simply because the hearsay declarant is a "witness against" him. When a subpoena
alone is insufficient to produce a declarant, the government still has an obligation to make good faith efforts to assist in producing her. When the declarant appears, the Confrontation Clause preserves the right to a crossexamining form of questioning. In short, a defendant is entitled to the opportunity to treat a hearsay declarant like any other prosecution witness.

B.

The Right to "Confront" Unavailable Declarants

It seems sensible enough to speak of a "right to confront hearsay" when
a defendant can bring a hearsay declarant to the courtroom and cross-examine her like any other witness. But how can a defendant cross-examine
someone who never testifies? As we have seen, the apparent impossibility of
confronting the unavailable declarant was what led the Court to an exclusionary rule in the first place.
The right to confront a hearsay declarant means little unless there is
some realistic means to pursue the right. In addressing the problem of unavailable declarants, this section begins with practical considerations. It first
attempts to demonstrate that the notion of "confronting" an unavailable declarant is neither impossible nor unprecedented. Though it is a much neglected art, able defense attorneys can successfully impeach absent declarants
in much the same way that they can cross-examine in-court witnesses. Indeed, often the impeachment process actually benefits from the absence of
the declarant. This section begins with a practical look at that process of
"virtual cross-examination." Then the section returns to the Confrontation
Clause and examines the scope of the constitutional right to use that process
to "confront" an unavailable declarant.

1.

The Art and Efficacy of Virtual Cross-Examination

Prosecution hearsay offers what a bombardier might call a "target rich
environment." Hearsay, after all, is vulnerable to begin with. It comes
before the jury with its most obvious weakness already exposed; jurors know
they are getting secondhand information.309 Nevertheless, few defense attorEvidence in His Defense, 66 CAL. L. REv. 935, 983 (1978). It is difficult to argue, however, that
the Sixth Amendment commands this strict order of proof in every criminal case. See United
States v. Cutler, 676 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the trial court did not violate
the Confrontation Clause by delaying cross-examination of a witness about related crimes until
after the defendant testified).
309 See Westen, supra note 2, at 599 ("[T]he hearsay character of evidence is simply one of
the circumstances to be considered in assessing its probative value. Indeed, hearsay evidence
may be introduced more safely than direct testimony because the former carries its deficiencies
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neys take the opportunity to attack hearsay once it is in evidence.310 Either
through deliberate tactical choices, or simply as a result of precedent and
inertia, our traditional approach to hearsay and confrontation is mired in exclusionary thinking. Whether one consults reported case law, or basic texts
on trial advocacy, little is said of the impeachment of hearsay declarants.311
That omission, however, is not born of impossibility. Indeed, the few
experienced jurists and trial attorneys who have examined the issue see the
impeachment of hearsay declarants as a land of missed opportunity:
As a trial judge, ... I sometimes wonder at what seems to me
the passing up of golden opportunities by the able advocate. Foremost among these lost opportunities is the virtual total neglect to do
anything about the other side's hearsay once it has been admitted
by the trial judge into evidence.
True enough, the able advocate fought valiantly against the
hearsay admission; but, having lost that position, he does not fall
back to the next logical position-impeaching the hearsay
declarant. 312
Though seldom used, tools for attacking hearsay already exist. The most
prominent weapon is Federal Rule of Evidence 806, which permits an opponent of hearsay to attack the credibility of the declarant "by any evidence
which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a
witness." 313 Numerous states have virtually identical rules.314 The practice
codified in Rule 806 was well known to the common law.315 It is more than
an historical curiosity. In the words of one very able criminal defense lawyer,
Rule 806 is "an invaluable tool for trial lawyers."316
Rule 806 and similar provisions allow for a process that this Article calls
"virtual cross-examination." In essence, it is the process of placing in evidence prior statements of the declarant, documents, physical evidence, character evidence, and other testimony that aims to impeach the hearsay
on its face and is subject to the judge's instructions with respect to its weight."). For studies
suggesting that juries properly discount the value of hearsay testimony, see Rakos & Landsman,
supra note 172, and Miene, Park & Borgida, supra note 172.
310 See Brannon, supra note 9, at 158.
311 See STEVEN LuBET, MODERN TRIAL AovoCACY (2d ed. 1997) (making no mention of
impeachment of hearsay declarants); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 264 (4th ed.1996)
(devoting one-half page to the impeachment of hearsay declarants); RoBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL
TACTICS AND METHODS (2d ed. 1973) (making no mention of impeachment of hearsay
declarants).
312 Brannon, supra note 9, at 158.
313 FED. R. Evm. 806.
314 For a comprehensive listing of comparable state statutes, see JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 806-14 through 806-17 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997). Cf UNIF. R. EVID. 806 (1974) (identical to FED. R. Evm.
806 except in the numbering of the cross-references to Rule 801).
315 See Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697-98 (1897) (citing numerous decisions in
state courts); Rex v. Ashton, 2 Lewin, Crown Cas. 147 (1837). See generally 3A W1GMORE, supra
note 177, §§ 884-88, at 651-53 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
316 See Bennett, supra note 9, at 1168. Professor Bennett has enjoyed a distinguished career as a trial lawyer, including a successful tenure as the Federal Public Defender for the District of Maryland.
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declarant. In many cases, defense counsel can present the impeaching evidence to the jury through and during the testimony of the government witness who relates the hearsay.317 Handled in that manner, virtual crossexamination appears much like the cross-examination of the declarant might
look and sound if the declarant testified in court.
To appreciate the efficacy of, and the limitations of, virtual cross-examination, it helps to consider the aims, the method, and the tactics of traditional
cross-examination. Wigmore describes two basic aims of cross-examination.
The first is to elicit "the remaining and qualifying circumstances of the subject of testimony," 318 in other words, contradictory facts or details left out or
underemphasized in direct examination that will contradict or qualify a witness's direct testimony. The second is to elicit impeaching facts, "facts which
diminish the personal trustworthiness or credit of the witness."319
Cross-examination puts both contradictory and impeaching facts before
the jury directly in three ways and inferentially in a fourth. First, the crossexaminer presents the fact in the form of a question. In reality, good crossexaminers seldom really ask questions at all. Their questions actually are
assertions of fact that, if properly framed, the witness has no choice but to
acknowledge. 320 Because the jury first hears the contradictory or impeaching
fact from the mouth of counsel, the question itself, including its volume, timing, and phrasing, often carries as much persuasive power as the witness's
answer, which often involves little more than a nod of acknowledgment. For
this reason, the drama of cross-examination is closely akin to that of closing
argument. Second, the jury learns the impeaching or contradictory fact when
the witness answers. Of course, on live cross-examination, the witness can
deny, qualify, or evade. If the question and answer alone, then, do not prove
the target fact, then the cross-examiner can resort to a third method. Either
during the cross-examination, or after calling another witness, counsel can
demonstrate the impeaching or contradictory fact through independent "extrinsic" evidence, such as the transcript of a prior inconsistent statement or
317 For a series of hypothetical cross-examinations demonstrating this approach, see Bennett, supra note 9, at 1142-63.
318 5 W1GMORE, supra note 177, § 1368, at 37 (emphasis omitted); see Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (noting that a cross-examiner is permitted to "delve into the witness'
story"); MAuET, supra note 311, at 218 (explaining that the two purposes of cross-examination
are "[e]liciting favorable testimony" and "discredit[ing] the witness").
319 5 W1GMORE, supra note 177, § 1368, at 37 (emphasis omitted); see Dav!S, 415 U.S. at315
(stating that a cross-examiner is "allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness"); MAUET, supra
note 311, at 218.
320 See MAUET, supra note 311, at 225:
During cross-examination you [the cross-examiner] are the person who should
make the principal assertions and statements of facts. The witness should simply be
asked to agree with each of your statements. By phrasing your questions narrowly,
asking only one specific fact in each question, you should be able to get "yes,"
"no," or short answers to each question. Keep in mind that whenever the \vitness is
given the chance to give a long, self-serving answer, he will.
Another prominent trial advocacy text describes the technique as follows: "The best questions
on cross-examination are not questions at all. Rather, they are propositions of fact that you put
to the witness in interrogative form. You already know the answer-you simply need to produce
it from the witness' mouth." LUBET, supra note 311, at 105.
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the record of a criminal conviction.321 Finally, the jury might infer the contradictory or impeaching fact from the demeanor of the witness who, in theory
at least, is reacting spontaneously to a question delivered without waming. 322
The tactics of cross-examination are well known to trial lawyers. The
first principle of cross-examination is caution. Because the witness is typically adverse, cross-examination generally presents more pitfalls than opportunities. Effective cross-examination rarely involves an open-ended question
designed to elicit new and unanticipated information from a witness. "Fishing
expeditions" more likely end with a "hook" in the cross-examiner than in the
witness. Instead, trial lawyers learn that they should "never, never ask a
question to which [they] do not already know the answer."323 The key to
cross-examination is control of the witness. Good trial lawyers maintain that
control with narrowly framed, leading questions that are based on known
facts. 324 To guard against the evasive or downright deceitful witness, those
questions generally stem from facts that, if denied by the witness, the crossexaminer can prove independently. Thus, effective preparation for cross-examination requires counsel to assemble her "ammunition" or "material": the
documents, physical evidence, prior witness statements, and any other factual
material that counsel might need to correct, control, and direct an evasive
witness.325
With this basic outline of the aims, methods, and tactics of cross-examination, we can begin to appreciate the opportunities that exist for effective
"virtual cross-examination" when the "witness" is an absent declarant whose
"testimony" comes before the jury as hearsay. Whether defense counsel's
aim is to present "contradictory" details left out of the hearsay statement or
to present "impeaching" facts about the declarant, such facts generally stem
from counsel's factual investigation into sources beyond the hearsay stateSee MAUET, supra note 311, at 260-64; LuBET, supra note 311, at 152-53.
In describing the goals of cross-examination, the Court in Mattox noted the significance
of witness demeanor. Cross-examination, the Court wrote, compels the witness "to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). In a sinlilar vein, Blackstone recognized the utility in
requiring spontaneous answers in open court: "[T]he occasional questions of the judge, the jury,
and the counsel, propounded to the witness on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than
a formal set of interrogatories previously penned and settled .... " 3 Blackstone, supra note 245,
at *345, quoted in Berger, supra note 15, at 583.
323 IRVING YOUNGER, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 23 (American Bar Ass'n, Section
of Litigation Monograph, Series No. 1, 1976). Professor Mauet describes the tactic this way:
Play it safe. Many witnesses will seize every opportunity to hurt you. Crossexamination is not a discovery deposition. This is not a time to fish for interesting
information or to satisfy your curiosity. Its sole purpose is to elicit favorable facts
or minimize the impact of the direct testimony. Accordingly, your cross-examination should tread on safe ground. Ask questions that you know the witness should
answer in a certain way, or, because he might not give exactly the expected answer,
questions that you know you can handle his response to.
MAUET, supra note 311, at 220.
324 See LuBET, supra note 311, at 109-27.
325 See id. at 90-92. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 67 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("A crucial avenue of cross-examination ... may be foreclosed by the denial of access to material that would serve as the basis for this examination.").
321

322
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ment itself. Such facts typically come from other, more detailed prior statements by the same declarant or from documents authored or acknowledged
by the declarant.326 Often, counsel may obtain independent evidence of inducements or relationships of the declarant that might show bias, or physical
or mental characteristics of the declarant that would affect perception, memory, or communication. Just as with a live witness, counsel preparing to confront a hearsay declarant must assemble the same type of "material" as a
basis for framing questions and, where necessary, proving contradictory and
impeaching facts.
In a well-controlled cross-examination, counsel often reduces the witness
to a "foil," simply confirming the facts posited in narrowly framed leading
questions.327 In virtual cross-examination, of course, the declarant is never
on the witness stand at all. But the prosecution must call some \vitness
through whom to relate the hearsay. Normally, that will be the witness most
familiar with the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement. In many
instances, that witness provides the necessary "foil" for most questions.
Counsel thus will have much the same initial opportunity for putting impeaching facts before the jury-that is, by stating them in the form of questions-that counsel has in "real" cross-examination. The principal
difference, of course, is that the virtual cross-examiner's questions are
phrased in the third person, rather than the second person: "Ten minutes
after the shooting, she said the gunman had blond hair. Isn't that right?"
rather than "You said the gunman had blond hair. Correct?" The substance
of the impeaching fact, however, is the same.
The second method of putting impeaching facts before the jury, through
a witness's answer, can be effective in virtual cross-examination despite, or
even because of, the absence of the declarant. A hearsay declarant, of
course, cannot answer questions if she is not present. But the testifying witness often will be in a position to provide responses equally favorable, if not
more favorable, to the cross-examiner. An investigating police officer relating an accomplice's hearsay statement, for example, often may be a witness
to additional, contradictory, or more detailed statements by the same declarant. When the "material" for cross-examination is the officer's report, he can
do no more than acknowledge that the declarant made inconsistent statements.328 He cannot explain or qualify the inconsistency as the declarant
326
327

See LuBET, supra note 311, at 108-09.
"Foil ... 4: a person ... that makes another seem better by contrast." THE RANDOM
HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (rev. ed. 1980).
328 For an illustration of impeachment of an absent declarant by an inconsistent statement,
see Bennett, supra note 9, at 1160-62.
Of course, successful impeachment by prior inconsistent statement requires that the defense
have access, typically through discovery from the government, to the other statements by the
hearsay declarant. See infra Part V.C. Although the application of discovery rules to hearsay
declarants is largely an uncharted area, it is at least clear under the Jencks Act that when an
investigating agent recounts hearsay statements made by an out-of-court declarant, the officer's
own report in which he records those statements is "Jencks material" under the theory that the
report is a written statement of the agent. See United States v. Welch, 810 F.2d 485, 489-91 (5th
Cir. 1987). Once the agent testifies on direct exaniination, his written statements are discoverable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) {1994).
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might if she appeared as a witness. In this respect, the "answering" component of virtual cross-examination can be more controllable, and hence more
likely to be favorable to the cross-examiner, than its counterpart in real crossexamination.329 Effective virtual cross-examination, of course, is not limited
to impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. The technique can be just
as effective when the subject matter relates to the hearsay declarant's ability
to perceive or remember, or to her bias, prejudice, prior convictions, or "bad
acts." 330 When the testifying witness has knowledge of such facts, he will
have no choice but to admit them. Unlike the declarant, he will have little
ability to explain them away. In effect, the testifying witness who has related
only hearsay becomes a "sitting duck" for the cross-examiner, where the declarant herself might have proved a "moving target." 331
When the cross-examiner uses the third means of proving impeaching
facts, through independent, "extrinsic" sources, virtual cross-examination is
little different from traditional impeachment by extrinsic evidence. Once a
court has admitted the hearsay evidence, opposing counsel may call an adverse character witness or introduce a record of prior convictions, prior inconsistent statements, or other materials that contradict or impeach the
hearsay. 332 Again, a defendant has the advantage of impeaching an absent
declarant who cannot explain away the impeaching evidence.
329 See Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455, 464 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Indeed, [the defendant] may
well have benefitted from the fact that [the hearsay declarant] was not present to explain what
only appeared to be inconsistencies.").
In some early opinions, an absent declarant's inability to explain inconsistencies was considered to be a valid reason for denying this method of impeachment. See, e.g., Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244-50 (1895); see also supra note 45. Applying the traditional rule of
evidence that a party may not impeach a witness by prior inconsistent statement without first
laying a foundation by asking the witness whether he made the statement, see id. at 345, the
Mattox Court upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony of two defense witnesses
who were prepared to claim that the hearsay declarant had recanted in their presence. See id. at
244-50. The Court quickly cabined its position only two years later in Carver v. United States,
164 U.S. 694 (1897), limiting it to cases where the "witness had ... been examined and crossexamined upon a former trial," largely because adherence to the traditional rule would preclude
a defendant's only opportunity to challenge an absent declarant. See id. at 698.
Federal Rule of Evidence 806 explicitly dispenses with the traditional requirement: "Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's
hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded
an opportunity to deny or explain." FED. R. EVID. 806.
330 See Bennett, supra note 9, at 1142-63; Brannon, supra note 9, at 160-76.
331 Cf. Richard H. Underwood, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 21 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc.
113, 121 (1997) ("[I]n the real world, witnesses are not clay pigeons. They can move, and some
can shoot back.").
332 See United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the trial court
should have permitted the defendant, under Rule 806, to call an adverse character witness to
impeach an absent declarant); United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1127-28 (4th Cir. 1982)
(Widener, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the trial court should have
admitted a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 806 to impeach an absent declarant); United
States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that a testifying witness's observations regarding an absent declarant's demeanor were admissible under Rule 806 to impeach the
declarant); State v. Valencia, 924 P.2d 497, 505 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the prior inconsistent statement of a declarant to be admissible under Arizona's version of Rule 806).
In some instances, a defendant's opportunity to present extrinsic evidence should be greater
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Although it might often be as effective as, and less risky than, live crossexamination, virtual cross-examination has some obvious limitations. First,
when the declarant is absent, and is likely to possess information not available from any other source, the cross-examiner may have no means to discover theretofore unknown, and potentially exculpatory information. The
missing declarant cannot "fill in the blanks" left out of her hearsay statement.
Even in these situations, however, virtual cross-examination can be a useful
tool. The mere fact that a testifying witness must answer, "I don't know,"
when confronted with a barrage of questions seeking additional detail will
confirm to the jury the limited value of the hearsay.333 Moreover, the missed
opportunity to "fish" for unknown details might be of limited value in any
event. The "discovery" potential of cross-examination is probably overrated.
No doubt an occasional defense benefits when a witness blurts out an unexpected detail. Far more often, however, the cross-examiner whose aim is discovery merely manages to bury his own case with answers that he wishes the
jury had never heard.334
Virtual cross-examination falls short of live confrontation in one other
obvious respect. The jury cannot observe the declarant's demeanor in response to questioning. Live cross-examination of an important prosecution
witness can provide the most dramatic moments of a criminal trial. The jury
expects a battle, a "confrontation" between witness and advocate. They want
to see how the witness reacts, how she "holds up" when counsel probes at the
details of her story. To some degree, the jury might pick the winner and the
when impeaching an absent declarant than when impeaching a live witness. Impeachment with
evidence of "bad acts" is an example. See Bennett, supra note 9, at 1155.
333 Imagine a hypothetical example of "virtual cross-examination" of a police officer under
such circumstances:
Defense Counsel: Now Officer Smith, you say Ms. Declarant said she saw Mr.
Defendant running from the scene of the crime?
Witness: Yes.
Defense Counsel: I see from your report, Officer Smith, that she did not tell
you where she was standing when she observed the crime scene. Correct?
1
Witness: Correct. She didn't say.
Defense Counsel: And she didn't tell you where the lights were either, did
she?
Witness: No.
Defense Counsel: She didn't say how far away she was?
Witness: No.
Defense Counsel: Or whether she was wearing her glasses?
Witness: No.
Defense Counsel: Or how long she observed this person who was running?
Witness: No.
This example could continue for pages. The odds are strong that such ·a cross-examination
will prove more effective in the declarant's absence, because she would be in a position to provide the harmful details if she appeared in person.
334 Professor Lubet describes the odds of successful "fishing":
Fishing questions are the ones that you ask in the hope that you might catch
something. It has been said before and it is worth repeating here: Do not ask
questions to which you do not know the answers. For every reason that you have
to think that the answer will be favorable, there are a dozen reasons you haven't
thought of, all of which suggest disaster.
LUBET, supra note 311, at 121-22. See also MA.UET, supra note 311, at 220.
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loser in that battle based on how things are said as much as on what things
are said. Virtual cross-examination cannot supply that drama of spontaneous
reaction to hostile questioning.
Even that most obvious shortcoming, however, may prove to be less of a
disadvantage than it first appears. As a practical matter, witness demeanor is
seldom essential, and is sometimes downright misleading, as a means of identifying truth. 335 It has limited value for at least two reasons. The first is the
infinite variety of human personality. The reactions of witnesses to the pressures of cross-examination as reflected in their outward demeanor are simply
too variable to provide a reliable indicator of credibility. As McCormick observes, "It is, in truth, quite doubtful whether it is not the honest but weak or
timid witness, rather than the rogue, who most often goes down under the
fire of a cross-examination."336 Others share that observation.337 The second
335 Although one should not ignore the value of this "demeanor factor", the Court has
treated this factor as desirable, but not essential, as a constitutional matter. For example, though
the Mattox Court initially noted that a jury's observation of witness demeanor is an important
component of confrontation, in its next breath the Court dispensed with any constitutional requirement that the jury actually see the hearsay declarant. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895). If observation of a witness's demeanor were the sine qua non of all admissible hearsay, then juries never would hear a word of hearsay from unavailable declarants. The
Court has dismissed that notion as "unintended and too extreme." See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 63 (1980).
336 McCORMICK, supra note 16, at 41.
337 One classic text on cross-examination observes:
Although the demeanor of the witness often helps illuminate the truth or falsity of testimony, it may do just the opposite. An unscrupulous lying witness, well
trained, may not betray himself by his manner. He may look the jury square in the
eye; he may have an excellent poker face ....
A disturbed neurotic may appear to be a serene and accurate witness, at worst
only an eccentric....
An aged and dignified witness may suffer lapses of memory which he cleverly
conceals, even from himself, filling in the gaps with falsities, but he may impress a
jury.
J. W. EHRLICH, THE LoST ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 46-47 (1970).
Because of the interest in polygraphs, research into "lie-catching" is extensive. See William
J. Yankee, The Current Status of Research in Forensic Psychophysiology and Its Application in
the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception, 40 J. FORENSIC Ser., No. 1, at 63 (1995).
Although the accuracy of trained polygraphers using sophisticated equipment is subject to serious question, the accuracy of untrained jurors in detecting deception based on demeanor is probably little better than a roll of the dice. See PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LrES 162 (1985) ("Most liars
can fool most people most of the time. Our research, and the research of most others, has found
that few people do better than chance in judging whether someone is lying or truthful.").
Even more troubling, it is perhaps as likely, if not more likely, that inappropriate "demeanor factors" based on racial or cultural stereotypes play a larger role in assessing credibility
than do "legitimate" clues drawn from a witness's demeanor on the stand. For a fictional, but
telling account of such false impressions, consider how American jurors might have mistaken
self-control for defiance in the demeanor of a young Japanese defendant in the years following
World War II:
The accused man sat so rigorously in his chair, so unmovable and stolid. He
did not appear remorseful. He did not tum his head or move his eyes, nor did he
change his expression. He seemed to Ishmael proud and defiant and detached
from the possibility of his own death by hanging. It reminded him ... of a training
lecture he'd listened to at Parris Island. The Japanese soldier, a colonel had explained, would die fighting before he would surrender.
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reason is that, in modem trial practice, a witness's courtroom demeanor often
is rehearsed. There may be little real spontaneity in the courtroom confrontation. Few important witnesses appear in court without having undergone
hours, if not days, of preparation by counsel.338 Often, witnesses are grilled
in the conference room far more extensively than they are in the courtroom.
Before witnesses testify at trial, they become critics of their own demeanor
on videotape. At trial, a jury thus sees and hears only the "polished" version.339 In short, there is no reason to conclude as a general matter that live
testimony, even on cross-examination, is any more "spontaneous" than most
hearsay, or that a witness's demeanor on the stand is a predictable barometer
of truth.
That reality, of course, is no reason to abandon the right of cross-examination when a witness is available.340 It does suggest, however, that-as a
tool in a search for truth when declarants are unavailable-virtual cross-examination may not stand too far behind the "real thing." Moreover, the demeanor factor need not disappear entirely even when a hearsay declarant is
absent from the courtroom. Virtual cross-examination may offer an opportunity to explore even the declarant's demeanor. In some instances, the witness who relates the hearsay also can relate the declarant's nervousness,
delay, or evasiveness in making the hearsay statements.341
Finally, when it comes to witness demeanor, virtual cross-examination
offers one clear advantage over the real thing. A major risk in live crossexamination is simply that the jury will like the witness more than the lawyer.
The sobering reality for trial lawyers is that the sympathies of the jury are
usually on the side of the witness, not the cross-examiner.342 An attempt to
impeach a live human being in front of an audience is fraught with the risk

Kabuo Miyamoto rose in the witness box so that the citizens in the gallery saw
him fully-a Japanese man standing proudly before them ... The citizens in the
gallery were reminded of photographs they had seen of Japanese soldiers. The man
before them was noble in appearance, and the shadows played across the planes of
his face in a way that made their angles harden; his aspect connoted dignity. And
there was nothing akin to softness in him anywhere, no part of him that was vulnerable. He was, they decided, not like them at all, and the detached and aloof manner in which he watched the snowfall made this palpable and self-evident.
DAVID GUTERSON, SNOW FALLING ON CEDARS 344, 412 (1995).
338 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, Counseling the Client: Refreshing Recollection or Prompting Perjury, in THE LmGATION MANuAL: A PRIMER FOR TRIAL LAWYERS 491 (John G. Koeltl
ed., 1989); MAuET, supra note 310, at 89.
339 Mr. Ehrlich observes: "People come before a jury with their cases prepared and give
evidence which they have determined they will give. Like untidy housekeepers, many people
come before the judge and jury with clean floors; all the dirt is hidden under the rug." EHRLICH,
supra note 337, at 53. Indeed, it was in part the greater spontaneity of some hearsay in comparison to some in-court testimony that led the Court in Inadi and White to retreat from a strict
"unavailability" requirement. See supra Part II.A.
340 See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1092 (1991) (arguing
that live confrontation remains important to the perception of fairness, even if demeanor is a
poor indicator of credibility).
341 See United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 691-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that the
court reporter testified that a declarant was "on the verge of tears" during her deposition).
342 See Richard H. Underwood, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 21 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc.
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that counsel, perceived as the attacker, will lose more in credibility and sympathy than the witness. 343 Virtual cross-examination virtually eliminates that
risk and replaces it with an advantage. Most humans, by nature, are more
easily convinced to disbelieve and even to dislike someone that they do not
encounter in person than someone that they meet face-to-face. Virtual crossexamination gives counsel the great advantage of blaming falsehood or mistake on an easy target: an absent declarant whom the jury never sees.

2.

Virtual Cross-examination and the Confrontation Clause

If the prosecution is allowed to prove some part of its case through hearsay, and the declarant's absence prevents the defendant from cross-examining her in the traditional way, then fairness dictates that the court provide the
defendant with whatever reasonable opportunity is available to compensate
for that loss. In essence, the defendant should have a chance to replicate
cross-examination as closely as circumstances allow.
This notion of fairness is not new; it forms the basis for the common-law
rule that permits an opponent to offer evidence to impeach a hearsay declarant.344 Over a century ago, three dissenting Justices in Mattox recognized this
principle and connected it directly to the right of confrontation:
If, then, the right of the accused to confront the witnesses
against him, although formally secured to him by the express terms
of the Constitution ... , may be dispensed with because of the death
of a witness, it would seem justly to follow that neither should that
death deprive the accused of his right to put in evidence ... to show
that the witness was unworthy of belief ....345
Although a majority of the Court has never explicitly placed this principle of
fairness on a constitutional footing, that conclusion stems naturally from the
Court's insistence that a hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused.
Given that starting point, it follows from the language of the Clause itself
that a defendant's right is to "confront" such a witness. Further, because the
Court has identified cross-examination as a "primary interest" secured by the
confrontation right,346 and because a defendant literally cannot cross-examine an unavailable declarant face-to-face, it would only compound constitutional concerns to deny a defendant at least an opportunity for the closest
available substitute. Although the Supreme Court never has faced this issue
113, 122 (1997) (quoting FRANCIS WELLMAN, THE ART OF CRoss-EXAMINATION 30 (1903));
MAUET, supra note 311, at 217 ("In the cross-examination game, ties go to the witness.").
343 See Janeen Kerper, Killing Him Softly with His Words: The Art and Ethics of Impeachment with Prior Statements, 21 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 81, 83 (1997) ("[l]f the impeachment fails,
or the point turns out to be a trivial one, the attorney, rather than the witness, loses
credibility.").
344 See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 177, § 884, at 651-52 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
345 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 260 (1895) (Shiras, J., dissenting). A few years
later, the Court recognized the same principle, not as a constitutional matter, but in a ruling
construing the law of evidence: "As these [hearsay] declarations are necessarily ex parte, we
think the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any advantage he may have lost by the want of
an opportunity for cross-examination." Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 698 (1897).
346 See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1968).
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directly, at least three United States Courts of Appeals have. All have
agreed that the right to impeach an absent hearsay declarant is founded in
the Confrontation Clause.347 The only counterweight to this authority might
be the Court's dictum in White, that the confrontation right is "satisfied"
when hearsay is reliable.348 As we have seen, however, taken literally that
dictum would put the Court at odds both with its treatment of testifying declarants under the Confrontation Clause and with its conclusion that all declarants are "witnesses against" an accused.349
In the federal courts at least, the basic right to impeach a hearsay declarant already exists without resort to the Constitution. Rule 806 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence states:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule
80l(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the
declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that
the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or
explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under crossexamination.350
In essence, Rule 806 provides for the process of virtual cross-examination as
described in the previous section.
The process outlined in Rule 806 is more than a rule of evidence; the
process is an essential component of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to confront hearsay.351 Recognizing the constitutional status of the right has
important consequences: Congress could not limit the protections of Rule
806 for criminal defendants without violating the Sixth Amendment. Because the Court long ago "incorporated" Confrontation Clause protections as
an element of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,352 the
347 See United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1299 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that the trial
court violated the Confrontation Clause by preventing the defendant from using a child-declarant's statements from a competency hearing to impeach hearsay testimony); United States v.
Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that the trial court violated the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights by preventing the defendant from calling a character \vitness to
impeach an absent declarant); Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding
that the trial court violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by refusing to admit the
prior inconsistent statement of the hearsay declarant. Cf. United States v. Burton, 937 F.2d 324,
329 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the trial court did not violate the defendant's Confrontation
Clause right by denying the use of crinlinal history to impeach a hearsay declarant, because the
defendant waived his confrontation right by failing to demand confrontation of the available
hearsay declarant).
348 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992).
349 See supra text accompanying notes 267-274.
350 FED. R. EVID. 806.
351 See supra Part IV.
352 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) ("We hold today that the Sixth Amend-
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constitutional rights embodied in Rule 806 apply with equal force in state
prosecutions. Accordingly, defendants may raise violations of those rights on
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions or on certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.353
As a rule of evidence, Rule 806 provides only for the admission of impeaching evidence that satisfies the other rules of evidence. As a protection
guaranteed by the Constitution, however, the right to confront hearsay
prevails over evidentiary rules which unduly restrict its reach. 354 In other
words, when a prosecution witness testifies at trial, the Confrontation Clause
"trumps" any rules of evidence that deprive a defendant of an adequate opportunity to explore the witness's perception, memory, bias, motives, or integrity. Courts must give the Clause equal breadth when the witness is a
hearsay declarant.
Moreover, when rules of evidence developed in contemplation of actual
cross-examination include restrictions that a defendant cannot meet in the
case of an absent declarant, such restrictions themselves might violate the
confrontation right. A classic example is the traditional rule prohibiting impeachment by inconsistent statement until the witness has an opportunity to
deny or explain the inconsistency.355 If the witness is a declarant who never
appears at trial, then a defendant has no means to let the declarant deny or
explain the inconsistency. A court that prohibited impeachment under the
traditional rule, however, would deprive the defendant of a critical impeachment opportunity that would exist if the witness were present. Under these
circumstances, the Sixth Amendment should prohibit the prosecution from
having its cake and eating it too. The state cannot rely on the necessity of a
declarant's absence to relax the fundamental requirement for cross-examination, but then prohibit a defendant from compensating for the loss brought
on by that same necessity.356
Another example is the rule prohibiting "extrinsic evidence" of a witness's "bad acts" as a means of attacking credibility. The Federal Rules, and
most (if not all) states, prohibit such extrinsic evidence, but generally permit
a cross-examiner to ask a witness about specific instances of conduct relevant
to truthfulness.357 If the declarant never testifies, however, the defense has
ment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is ... a fundamental right and is
made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
353 See generally Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1988) (habeas corpus petition
challenging a state court's refusal to admit evidence impeaching a hearsay declarant).
354 Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1974) (finding that the confrontation right
required the state court to allow cross-examination based on a juvenile criminal record despite a
state statute making such records confidential).
355 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244-50 (1895); see also supra note 45.
356 See Smith, 862 F.2d at 638; Carver v United States, 164 U.S. 694, 698 (1897); Bennett,
supra note 9, at 1156-60. Federal Rule Evidence 806 avoids this problem by explicitly eliminating the foundational requirement that a cross-examiner give a declarant an opportunity to explain or to deny the prior statement.
357 See FED. R. Evm. 608(b) ("Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion
of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness ....").
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no means to effect this form of impeachment without resort to extrinsic evidence. A fiat rule forbidding such impeachment in the case of an absent
declarant violates the Confrontation Clause when the rule precludes a valid
line of impeachment that would be available if the hearsay declarant had
testified. 358
Evidence of demeanor offers a third example. Courts normally would
not permit a defendant to call one witness to report his observations of the
demeanor of another witness. 359 Rather, the jury is left to its own observations. When the jury cannot observe the declarant, however, a court might
need to permit "demeanor evidence" in order to give full effect to the defendant's right to confront hearsay.36o
The constitutional right to impeach a hearsay declarant encompasses
procedural issues beyond the scope of evidentiary rules like Rule 806. For
example, although Rule 806 addresses a party's right to "attack" a hearsay
declarant's credibility with "evidence which would be admissible" if the declarant had testified, the Rule says nothing about the timing of that attack.361
One advantage of live cross-examination is its immediacy. The effort to impeach a witness begins as soon as direct examination ends, when the witness's
statements are still fresh in the jury's mind. At least one commentator has
argued that "the right of a defendant to interrupt the state's presentation of
evidence by cross-examining prosecution witnesses is at the core of the sixth
amendment right of confrontation."362 A virtual cross-examiner sometimes
will have that same advantage where he can address impeaching questions
and elicit knowledgeable answers during cross-examination of the same prosecution witness who relates the hearsay statements. But defense counsel
might not always be so lucky. He might need to call other witnesses to relate
or to authenticate impeaching evidence that, had the hearsay declarant testified, counsel could have presented through the hearsay declarant herself.
While the Confrontation Clause supports a defendant's effort to confront hearsay in the manner most closely resembling real cross-examination,363 the clause probably does not support a hard and fast rule on the
timing of that impeachment. Such a rule would be broader than the right to
confront a testifying witness. Although immediate cross-examination is the
358 Cf Davis, 415 U.S. 308 (finding that the trial court violated the defendant's confrontation right by denying an opportunity to pursue impeachment based on the witness's possible
bias). Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence without addressing the constitutional issue,
the Second Circuit achieved the same result. See United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569-70
(2d Cir. 1988) (stating that Rule 806 permits the impeachment of an absent hearsay declarant
through extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct, despite the limitation to the contrary
in Rule 608(b)).
359 See United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1973) (prohibiting expert
testimony that a government witness was a liar, based in part on the expert's observation of the
witness's live testimony); cf United States v. Scheffer, 118 U.S. 1261, 1266-67 (1998) (upholding
a per se rule against polygraph evidence based, in part, on the government's interest in preserving the "jury's core function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials")
360 Cf United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 691-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing evidence
of a hearsay declarant's demeanor under Rule 806).
361 See FED. R. Evro. 806.
362 See Westen, supra note 308, at 981-83.
363 See supra Part IV.
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universally accepted practice, trial courts maintain some degree of discretion
to delay some elements of cross-examination even for live witnesses. 364
Moreover, if the declarant never testifies, it might be impossible to know
which evidence would have been admissible during real cross-examination
and which would have required a later witness to lay a foundation. 365 Borrowing a page from the Court, then, perhaps the most one can say is that the
Clause establishes a "preference" for immediate impeachment. Courts
should allow a defendant to pursue virtual cross-examination as soon as practicable after the admission of hearsay, absent a good reason to delay the
process.366

Discovery and Other Pretrial Rights Regarding Hearsay Declarants

C.

1.

Discovery Rights

Effective cross-examination begins before trial, with the collection and
organization of raw material. A witness's prior statements, criminal convictions, psychological history, financial records, or personal relationship with
the accused, among many other pieces of information, provide the "ammunition" that the cross-examiner will use at trial. As a practical matter, the lion's
share of a defense counsel's pre-trial investigation often involves the collection and the analysis of such material for cross-examination.
A great deal of that material typically rests in government hands. For
that reason, a defendant's right to discovery from government files is critical
to the effective exercis~ of the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.367
With respect to testifying prosecution witnesses, the Due Process Clause and
a variety of statutes and court rules grant defendants access to such material
either before or during the trial. 368 Though it remains an open question, the
364 See United States v. Cutler, 676 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the trial
court did not violate the Confrontation Clause by delaying the cross-examination of a witness).
365 For example, a document or written statement contradicting the witness would be admissible during cross-examination only if the witness under cross-examination were able to authenticate the document. See FED. R. Evrn. 901. Although counsel might inquire on crossexamination about the document or the written statement, he could not present the evidence
until he successfully laid a foundation through a witness who could provide the necessary authentication. Impeachment by an adverse character witness is another example. Such witnesses
typically testify some time after the witness whom they attack. In these situations, then, not all
of the elements of impeachment of even a live witness always will occur immediately after direct
examination.
366 In some instances at least, the rules of evidence themselves will permit immediate presentation of evidence that impeaches a hearsay declarant. For example, if the government introduces the hearsay in the form of a written or a recorded statement, a defendant is entitled to
introduce in evidence "at that time ... any other part [of the statement] or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." FED.
R. Evrn. 106 (emphasis added).
367 "[T]he right of cross-examination also may be significantly infringed by events occurring
outside the trial itself, such as the wholesale denial of access to material that would serve as the
basis for a significant line of inquiry at trial." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
368 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994) (Jencks Act); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 84-87 (1963).
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Confrontation Clause also might guarantee such discovery rights. 369 The effective exercise of the right to confront hearsay requires that courts accord
defendants the same discovery rights in relation to nontestifying hearsay
declarants.
The Due Process Clause requires the government to disclose to the defendant information that is "favorable" to the defense and "material" to the
issues of guilt or punishment.370 Such "Brady material" includes information
that defense counsel could use to impeach a prosecution witness.371 Because,
as the Court insists, a hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused, the
government's obligations under Brady v. Maryland372 and Giglio v. United
States313 should extend equally to material that would serve to impeach a
hearsay declarant. The Supreme Court never has addressed this issue, perhaps because so few defendants make Brady requests regarding hearsay declarants. The few lower courts that have considered the issue, however,
readily have extended Brady and Giglio to encompass hearsay declarants.374
Indeed, scrupulous adherence to Brady might be even more important in the
case of a hearsay declarant. Because the declarant never appears in court,
the danger of undiscovered contradictions is even greater.
A defendant's right to discover impeaching Brady material is critical to
the effective exercise of the right to confront hearsay. But Brady and Giglio
have rather narrow limits. They are Due Process Clause, not Confrontation
Clause, opinions. Under the due process analysis, evidence is "material" to
the defense "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been'
different."375 Accordingly, courts have not construed Brady and Giglio to
require the automatic disclosure of a witness's prior statements.376 This limitation turns out to be an important one. Although some prior statements by
government witnesses obviously contradict their direct testimony on an important issue, such clear contrast is rare. The possibilities of impeachment
through omission or change in emphasis are often subtle.377 Thus, prior
369 See People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 992 (Cal. 1997) (noting, in light of the division of
views by the Court in Ritchie, that "it is not at all clear 'whether or to what extent the confrontation or compulsory process clauses ... grant pretrial discovery rights to the accused'" (quoting
People v. Webb, 862 P.2d 779, 794 {Cal. 1993))); see also infra text accompanying notes 387-392.
370 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
371 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 {1972).
372 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
373 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
374 See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hawryluk, 658 F. Supp. 112, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 623, 625-27 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996).
375 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 {1987) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 {1985)).
376 See id. at 57-58.
377 In the Court's seminal opinion on the discovery of witness statements, Justice Brennan
wrote for the majority:
Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value for impeaching
purposes of statements of the witness recording the events before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and the version
of the events given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission
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statements not subject to disclosure under Brady may still have value to a
cross-examiner.
In federal courts at least, this limitation is offset by the Jencks Act, which
entitles a defendant, following the direct testimony of a government witness,
to require disclosure of "any statement" of any "witness called by the United
States."378 Unlike Brady, the Jencks Act is not limited to identifiably "exculpatory" statements and thus encompasses a broader range of potentially useful material for cross-examination. A defendant's right to the discovery of
such "Jencks material" for testifying witnesses raises two important, and
heretofore unanswered, questions for counsel contemplating the impeachment of an absent hearsay declarant. Does the Jencks Act extend to statements of hearsay declarants? 379 Does the Confrontation Clause itself create
a right to discover the declarant's prior statements?
To accord federal defendants the same opportunity to confront hearsay
declarants as to confront live witnesses, the answer to the first question must
be "yes." The Jencks Act provides for the discovery of a witness's statements
"[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination."380 For Confrontation Clause purposes at least, the Court tells us that a
hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused. 381 The hearsay declarant's "testimony," in the form of hearsay, is offered in evidence in the government's case-in-chief. As an exercise in interpreting statutory language,
then, it takes no large leap to conclude that a declarant is a "witness called by
the United States" under the Jencks Act and that she has in effect "testified
on direct examination" once the government has introduced her hearsay
statements.382 Further, it is entirely consistent with the history and the aims
of the Jencks Act to extend its coverage to hearsay declarants. Congress
from the reports of facts related at-the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the
same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony.
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957).
378 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994); see also FEo. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (implementing Jencks and
providing for reciprocal discovery). Many state codes include roughly comparable provisions.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.060 (Michie 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3213 (1995); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 240.45 (McKinney 1993); TENN. CooE ANN.§ 40-17-120 (1997).
379 To date, only one United States Court of Appeals has addressed a defendant's right to
discover a hearsay declarant's statements under the Jencks Act. See United States v. WtlliamsDavis, 90 F.3d 490, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the stateme.qts were not discoverable as Jencks material, though
hearsay declarant statements might be discoverable under Brady if they are material and
favorable to the defense. See id.
380 18 u.s.c. § 3500(b) (1994).
381 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992).
382 But see Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 512-13. The analysis in Williams-Davis is open to
question. There, the court relied almost entirely on a line of cases that denied discovery of
nontestifying coconspirator statements under Rule 16(a)(l)(A). See id. The issue in those cases
is entirely different. The defense claim to discovery in those cases rests upon the probably erroneous view that coconspirator statements are discoverable as a defendant's own statements
under the theory that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) treats them as such for purposes
of the law of evidence. See id. The rationale for the discovery of the statements of a hearsay
declarant under the Jencks Act, Federal Rule of Evidence 806, and the Confrontation Clause
rests on the entirely different premise that the statements are statements of the declarant, who
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passed the Jencks Act largely to establish both time limits and subject-matter
limits on the discovery rights announced by the Court in Jencks v. United
States.383 In effect, the Jencks Act balances a defendant's need for impeachment material against the "concern for witness intimidation, subornation of
perjury, and other threats to the integrity of the trial process" that might
accompany earlier disclosure.384 Extending Jencks to hearsay declarants
would not upset that balance.385 In fact, witness intimidation and subornation of perjury are lesser concerns when a "witness" never testifies in person.
The substance of the hearsay is already fixed before it is repeated at trial.
The declarant's already-told story cannot be changed through intimidation or
persuasion.386 At the same time, the need for disclosure might be even
greater when a witness is a nontestifying declarant. The full record of the
witness's prior statements might be the only source for impeaching and contradictory detail.
Whether the Constitution creates Jencks-like discovery rights regarding
statements of hearsay declarants, or of any government witness, is a different
matter. Indeed, the Court never has authoritatively decided whether the
Confrontation Clause creates discovery rights at all. The Court came close in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, in which a four-Justice plurality ruled that the Confrontation Clause is not "a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovhas been rendered a "witness" by the government's choice to offer the hearsay declarant's outof-court statements in evidence.
383 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In Jencks, the Court ordered the government to provide the defense an opportunity to inspect all the statements of the two principal government witnesses.
See id. at 668-69. The opinion neither provided a timetable for discovery nor clearly defined the
category of witness "statements" that were discoverable. Congress quickly filled in these gaps
with the Jencks Act, defining "statement" to include only "written" or "recorded" statements,
including grand jury testimony, see 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e), and providing that courts were not to
order discovery until a witness had testified on direct examination. See id.; Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 349, 351-53 (1959).
Although the Court based its decision in Jencks on its supervisory powers, see Pennsylvania
v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 68 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Confrontation Clause clearly influenced the exercise of those powers. As Justice Brennan pointed out, "'it would be idle to say
that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision.'" Id. at 68
(quoting Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result)). For that reason, it makes sense to construe the phrase "witness called by the United
States" under the statute in a manner consistent with the Court's construction of the term "witness against" an accused under the Sixth Amendment.
384 See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 513 (quoting United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384,
1414 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
385 In practice, Department of Justice attorneys typically produce "Jencks material" before
trial, largely to avoid the inevitable delays that would occur upon producing a large volume of
witness statements and grand jury testimony at the conclusion of each witness's direct examination. In addition, when an investigating agent relates hearsay from a declarant whose statements
the agent has recorded in his own written report, the Jencks Act makes that report discoverable
as a "statement" of the testifying agent. See United States v. Welch, 810 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir.
1987).
386 There remains the problem of retaliation toward a hearsay declarant, which might occur
even though it would have no effect on the substance of already-made out-of-court statements.
That problem, however, should not preclude discovery at trial. The Jencks Act would compel
that discovery only after a court admitted the hearsay in evidence, a point at which the potential
for retaliation already has arisen. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994).
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ery."387 In large measure, the plurality reached that conclusion based on an
observation that "the right to confrontation is a trial right."388 Three Justices
disagreed. Concurring in the result, Justice Blackmun noted that "there
might well be a confrontation violation if ... a defendant is denied pretrial
access to information that would make possible effective cross-examination
of a crucial prosecution witness."389
Although a full exploration of the Confrontation Clause as a discovery
rule is beyond the scope of this Article, the problem of confronting a hearsay
declarant offers an additional perspective on that issue. Regardless of the
merits of Ritchie as it relates to live witnesses, the view that confrontation is
only a "trial right" carries less force when applied to hearsay declarants.
Some declarants never testify at trial, though the Court insists that they are
"witnesses" for Sixth Amendment purposes.
In effect, such declarant witnesses "testify" before the trial begins, and
the content of their "testimony" becomes fixed when they make their hearsay
statements. Given that reality, it is artificially restrictive to insist that a defendant's right to "confront" that declarant arises only at trial and does not
extend to pre-trial mechanisms, including discovery, that might be necessary
to preserve the confrontation right. It is not hard to imagine a case in which
the only effective opportunity for "confronting" a terminally ill declarant, for
example, might arise before trial and outside of the courtroom. As a general
proposition, it is unfair to permit the prosecution to introduce that hearsay at
trial, and yet to resist pre-trial discovery of the identity of that witness and
thereby avoid pre-trial efforts to preserve her testimony under cross-examination.390 If the plurality in Ritchie is correct in its view that confrontation is
387 See 480 U.S. at 52. In Ritchie, a defendant charged with sexual offenses against his
daughter sought pretrial discovery of the contents of a Pennsylvania Children and Youth Services file that contained records of an investigation into the alleged abuse, including statements by
the daughter, who later became the state's principal witness at trial. See id. at 43-44. The trial
court denied discovery on the basis of a Pennsylvania statute that rendered such files privileged.
See id. (citing PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 2215 (West 1986)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that the denial of discovery violated Ritchie's rights under both the Confrontation Clause
and the Compulsory Process Clause. See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (Pa.
1985).
388 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52. Rejecting both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause claims, Justice Powell wrote for the plurality that the Due Process Clause
provides sufficient protection through required disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused
and material to guilt or punishment. See id. at 57 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963)).
389 Id. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
wrote a dissenting opinion. See id. at 66-72 (Brennan J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote a
separate dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia, questioning the Court's jurisdiction over a nonfinal judgment. See id. at 72-78.
390 Applying confrontation as a pretrial right in this context both to discover the identity of
a hearsay declarant and to preserve her testimony under cross-examination would only put a
defendant on an equal footing with the government. The government generally will have an
opportunity to preserve testimony through pretrial depositions when it anticipates a witness's
absence. See FEo. R. CRIM. P. 15(a).
Professor Amar makes the related argument that the Compulsory Process Clause should
provide defendants with the same opportunity to preserve the testimony of defense witnesses
that the government enjoys for prosecution witnesses. See Amar, supra note 15, at 695.
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only a trial right, however, then the prosecution would win on all counts, and
a court would admit the hearsay in evidence as long as it met the Court's test
for "reliability." It seems more consistent with the aims of the Sixth Amendment391 to extend the right to discovery, and other pre-trial mechanisms,
where necessary392 to preserve a meaningful right of confrontation at trial.

2.

The Right of Access and Preservation

One such pre-trial mechanism that might solve many confrontation hearsay problems is the videotaped deposition. When a prosecutor can anticipate
the absence of a critical witness for the government, he typically has access to
some means to obtain and to preserve that government testimony.393 When a
defendant can anticipate the unavailability of a witness "in favor" of the defense, the right to compulsory process likewise encompasses the right to preserve for trial the testimony of that witness.394 In cases where the
government expects to prove a critical part of its case through hearsay, the
confrontation right should provide no less of an opportunity for pre-trial or
out-of-court access to a hearsay declarant and for preservation of her
testimony.
"Real" out-of-court confrontation often will be the closest available substitute for in-court cross-examination. In essence, that confrontation can tum
"unavailable" declarants into "available" witnesses. Some "unavailable" declarants are unavailable only in the sense that the court finds them unable to
testify at trial. They may be in a foreign country, beyond subpoena power.
They may be hospitalized and unable to travel to court. Like the declarants
in Idaho v. Wright395 and White v. Illinois,396 they may be young children who
prove incapable of communicating effectively in court, though they apparently have conveyed intelligible information to family members, doctors, and
391 Justice Powell's view that confrontation is purely a "trial right" and does not affect discovery is too restrictive for another reason. This view is inconsistent with the Court's approach
to other Sixth Amendment rights. The adversarial process envisioned by the Sixth Amendment
begins well before trial. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel clearly attaches before trial. See
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 {1972) {finding that the right to counsel attaches upon the
initiation of adversarial proceedings). Compulsory Process rights generally are exercised with
the issuance of subpoenas well before trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. Often, it is only through
the pretrial exercise of these rights that the adversarial process at trial is protected. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 {1967) {finding that defense counsel's presence at a pretrial
line-up is required to preserve a meaningful right to cross-examine identification witness at
trial).
392 A fiat constitutional rule requiring pretrial disclosure of all statements of a hearsay declarant is both unlikely and inadvisable. There is no such rule for testifying witnesses, and the
Jencks Act requires only disclosure at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 {1994). Indeed, there is no
strict requirement setting the timing of discovery under Brady. For the same reasons that gave
rise to the Jencks Act, competing concerns over witness safety require flexible rules and trial
court discretion in governing the timing of disclosure. The key point, however, is to recognize
that the confrontation right should apply before and outside of trial when necessary to preserve
a meaningful exercise of the right at trial.
393 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
394 See Amar, supra note 15, at 695. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 already provides defendants \vith the right to obtain pretrial depositions in appropriate cases.
395 497 U.S. 805, 824-25 (1990).
396 502 U.S. 346, 349, 356 (1992).
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police before the trial. In many cases, although they cannot testify in person
at trial, such declarants are able to answer questions in a different setting or
at a different time. Whether through a deposition under oath or, in the case
of a child witness, in a more informal setting, such declarants might be "available" out-of-court for an exchange of questions and answers duplicating, or
roughly approximating, cross-examination.397
If the confrontation right is not limited to the question of admissibility,
but rather includes an adversarial right to challenge prosecution hearsay
through alternative means, then the confrontation right should encompass
the right to bring about such alternative "confrontations" and to preserve
them for presentation to the jury. The technology of video and audio tape
can bring such out-of-court confrontations before a trial jury in full detail and
in living color. In truth, the problem of the absent or the unavailable hearsay
declarant is, and should be, a diminishing one in a world of air travel, teleconferencing and videotape.398 Exclusionary thinking, however, hinders, rather
than promotes, creative use of these alternatives.

D.

Putting the Exclusionary Rule in its Place

A defendant's right to confront hearsay is no more and no less than the
right to treat a hearsay declarant like the "witness," which the Court now
insists that she is. But in large measure, that is a right that the law of evidence, now reflected in Rule 806, has always provided. In the end, does this
"new" approach really offer anything that will change the way that courts and
litigants conduct criminal cases?
The answer to this question comes in two related parts. First, although
the law of evidence long has recognized tools for challenging hearsay, those
tools largely have been ignored. If nothing else, treating the Confrontation
Clause as an affirmative right to challenge hearsay, and not as an exclusionary rule, provides defendants with the necessary incentive to use those available tools. If courts allow the creative use of Rule 806, if courts order
discovery relating to hearsay declarants, if courts require the government to
support defendants' efforts to bring available declarants to the witness stand,
and finally, if courts consider the availability of these tools before excluding
hearsay evidence, then defendants will use those tools, rather than "playing
chicken" with the exclusionary rule. 399 Development of the hearsay rules
might go its own way, as it has in any event under the Court's current approach. But as more hearsay evidence is admitted, courts should encourage
defendants to pursue available opportunities to challenge it.
Second, treating the Confrontation Clause as a right to challenge hearsay should do more than simply encourage the use of tactical options available under the law of evidence. It should change the way that courts look at
397 UNIF. R. Evro. 807, although it allows for the admission of certain hearsay statements
by child declarants who are unable to testify at trial, includes a provision requiring that "the
court shall, at the request of the defendant, provide for further questioning of the minor in such
manner as the court may direct." UNIF. R. Evro. 807(b).
398 See Fredric I. Lederer, Technology Comes to the Courtroom, And ... , 43 EMORY L.J.
1095 (1994).
399 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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hearsay from the beginning. Once hearsay satisfies the standard for admissibility under the law of evidence, a defendant's Confrontation Clause objection should not lead to a rehashing of the reliability question. Instead, the
Court's first questions to the defense should be, "Is the declarant available;
and if so, do you want her here?" If the answer to both questions is "yes,"
then the defendant's subpoena request should be forthcoming (if not already
made), under penalty of waiving the right, but with the court's assurance that
the government will pay a high price if it fails to assist when necessary to
produce the hearsay declarant. If the declarant is unavailable, then the court
should invite defense counsel to use the tools available to challenge hearsay
in the same way that the court might invite cross-examination of a live witness. Of course, the court must give that "virtual cross-examination" the
same latitude, and support it with the same discovery rights, that it would
accord the defense in real cross-examination.
The question' of exclusion should become a constitutional issue only after the court has made that opportunity available to the defense. Taking into
account alternative methods available to impeach a hearsay declarant, the
court should consider-under the Due Process Clause, not the Confrontation
Clause-whether the hearsay at issue can be "intelligently evaluated by the
jury for its proper weight." 400 Applied in this manner, the exclusionary rule
would be a remedy of last resort, the ultimate constitutional backstop when a
court is convinced that the process of adversarial testing, and the common
sense of juries, will not suffice. Treating the Confrontation Clause as a right
to confront hearsay will put the exclusionary remedy in its proper place.

Conclusion
For a century, American courts have approached constitutional challenges to prosecution hearsay as if the Confrontation Clause offered only a
single tool: the tool of exclusion. That tool, of course, is the same one
wielded by the law of evidence, and the Court has wielded it for essentially
the same reason: to exclude unreliable hearsay from evidence. In retrospect,
at least, we now can see that the choice of that tool has left us with a Clause
that largely has disappeared as an independent protection for the accused.
The reason for that disappearance may be harder to see. It is not because the Confrontation Clause has imposed narrow constitutional limits on
the admissibility of hearsay. More hearsay is admissible in criminal trials today than ever before, and the process of expanding exceptions to the hearsay
rule is likely to continue without much impact from the constitutional "hammer" of the Confrontation Clause. The reason is that the Court's constitutional standard for admitting hearsay has proved as flexible as the expanding
hearsay exceptions themselves. In some instances, the constitutional exclusionary rule might even have encouraged the expansion.
This article, of course, is not about limiting the use of hearsay in criminal
cases. Admission of probative evidence, as a general proposition, is desirable, and a great deal of hearsay might be more reliable than well rehearsed
400
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testimony from the witness stand. Instead, this article is about using a different tool for contending with whatever hearsay the law of evidence may admit, today or in the future. Simply put, that tool should be the one that the
Sixth Amendment explicitly prescribes: confrontation.
If the Confrontation Clause is ever to become more than a redundancy,
then we must move beyond exclusionary thinking and expand our notion of
confrontation to encompass a broad, affirmative right to challenge hearsay.
When a hearsay declarant is available, there is little reason to pause over the
issue of reliability. Instead, courts should be serious about providing the defendant with an opportunity for real confrontation, if he really wants that
confrontation. When the declarant is unavailable, confrontation-hearsay
analysis should not begin with the assumption that confrontation is impossible. Effective challenge to hearsay often is possible despite, or sometimes
especially because of, the physical absence of the declarant from the courtroom. The art of "virtual cross-examination" has potential that remains
largely untapped because exclusionary thinking has left that tool on the shelf.
Courts should consider the efficacy of that tool, instead of moving automatically to the question of reliability. Finally, to ensure the meaningful exercise
of the right to confront a hearsay declarant, defendants will need the same
raw material that constitutional and statutory rules of discovery provide with
respect to all prosecution witnesses.
In the end, the right to confront hearsay offers more than just a tactical
opportunity for defense counsel. It is not simply a "fall-back" position when
the court rules for the government on the issue of admissibility. Rather, it
should affect the way courts approach confrontation issues from the beginning. It can preempt exclusionary thinking by changing the starting point for
analysis. Instead of asking, "Is the hearsay reliable?"-the same question
that the law of evidence asks-a court should begin by considering a defendant's opportunity to challenge the hearsay.
If creative and vigorous exercise of the right to confront hearsay can
equip the jury with adequate information for it to make a fair assessment of
the out-of-court statement, then the "hammer" of exclusion is unnecessary.
The tool of confrontation, the one written into the Sixth Amendment, will do
the job.

